It's Foreign Affairs, Stupid

The economy trumps national security as the country’s top political issue this election cycle. With the unemployment rate at 8.2 percent, this is not surprising. From a long-term strategic perspective, however, the two issues are closely connected. The current economic crisis threatens Americans’ standard of living and our capacity to address social problems. It also undercuts the U.S. ability to sustain international stability, a prerequisite for domestic prosperity. The campaign debate we must have is how the United States can deal with global problems while restoring its economic health.

In the near term, lackluster growth and ballooning deficits mean fewer resources for national security, including defense, diplomacy, foreign assistance and development. Economic challenges and dissatisfaction with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are prompting Americans to turn inward. Pressure to reduce the international burden is growing even as U.S. influence is declining. What is worse, these domestic constraints arise at a time when problematic trends abroad are limiting our options or creating greater demands for U.S. action.

Consider some key challenges: first, traditional U.S. allies seem less and less willing to step up to mutual-defense needs. The United States has complained for decades about Europe’s underinvestment in its defense and its lagging contribution to joint efforts. As the Europeans renegotiate their political and economic priorities amid the current fiscal and monetary crisis, NATO countries are likely to spend even less on defense or new NATO missions. European defense spending fell by close to 2 percent in 2011, with countries hit hardest by the sovereign debt crisis seeing more drastic cuts: Greece, 26 percent since 2008; Spain, 18 percent; Italy, 16 percent; and Ireland, 18 percent. By 2015, Britain and Germany, two of the top three European defense spenders along with France, plan cuts of 7.5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. France, if its withdrawal from Afghanistan is any indication, also will retrench in the coming years under its new socialist leadership.

In Asia, meanwhile, our strongest ally, Japan, is suffering from political gridlock and a crisis of confidence following the tsunami, nuclear accident and rapid rise of its regional rivals, particularly China.

Second, the United States cannot rely instead on emerging powers as they do not share, for the most part, U.S. views across a range of international-security issues. Rising powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey and Indonesia leverage their economic growth to modernize their militaries, press regional claims and demand greater representation in international bodies. But they don’t see themselves as stakeholders in the American-led international order. Rather, they show little inclination to share in the burdens of providing the collective goods needed to maintain security, enable global commerce and make international institutions work. The United States should seek cooperation with emerging powers on issues of mutual interest, but the absence of strategic like-mindedness will inhibit the emergence of fully integrated alliances. The divergence of interest among great and rising powers thwarts agreement on matters of substance at bodies such as the G-20.

Third, key regions are experiencing destabilizing transitions, particularly in the greater Middle East. The transnational terrorist threat from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region endures. Iran’s nuclear program threatens a cascade of proliferation. Prospects are real for a sectarian war between Sunni and Shia forces in Iraq, Syria and the Gulf, fueled by regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The most significant great powers outside the region—America, Europe, Russia, China and India—can’t agree on how to address these challenges.

The United States cannot afford to be indifferent to these problems, yet it lacks the resources to address them. The country’s fiscal health must be its top priority. Continuing with low growth and large deficits while economically dynamic rising powers expand their military capabilities will undercut U.S. leadership over time. These trends would culminate in a multipolar world like that of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. A multipolar world would increase the likelihood of war among major powers. The lesson of the twentieth century is that nothing is more expensive than such conflicts. So addressing the economic underpinnings of U.S. power is vital.

Two recent reports offer starting points for reform. The report of the Simpson-Bowles commission, appointed by President Obama in 2010, recommends a combination of cuts in domestic discretionary spending, revenue-increasing tax reforms, and controls on health-care costs and entitlements that could save $4 trillion over ten years. And in its study of “Fortune 500” companies, a report by the Partnership for a New American Economy found that the United States could exploit the already substantial contribution of immigrants by offering more green cards and visas for graduates with advanced degrees, entrepreneurs and highly skilled workers.

In addressing its international challenges, America must embrace five critical adjustments:

1. Preventive diplomacy: the United States should address security challenges early to prevent later needs for military action. The classic case is Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in the 1990s. A focused diplomatic effort supported by investments in state building and reconstruction could have precluded the power vacuum and civil conflict that led to 9/11.

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Sin Nombre (July 16, 2012 - 5:33pm)

Zalmay Khalilzad wrote:

The current economic crisis threatens Americans’ standard of living and our capacity to address social problems. It also undercuts the U.S. ability to sustain international stability, a prerequisite for domestic prosperity.

Let's overlook for the moment the blatant, totally hollow circularity of this statement. And let's instead celebrate its last sentence as the Rosetta Stone of understanding America's modern foreign policy elites who have done such a sterling job keeping America safe and out of debilitating wars and prosperous at home. Indeed, the *revolutionary* Rosetta Stone: After all, it says, "no no no!" to one of the most fundamental founding principles and ideas of this country that we were *not* established to go abroad in search of international monsters. (Much less "stability"!) Indeed it was doing precisely that sort of thing that was—and still is—the obvious road to ruin for any country. But "no no no!" say our modern foreign affairs elites—oh so much smarter than the Founders and our early, relatively war-free history. You see, through some *utterly* unexplained mechanism the United States (and the United States itself for some reason!) must establish and sustain "international stability" (and not even just prevent huge world wars!) because this is an absolute "prerequisite" to our own prosperity! Dissatisfied Bengalis somewhere causing "instability"? Send in the Khalilzads! Save our prosperity! And "unstable" Mideast due to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict? Well my God we'd better *carpet* bomb the region for decades first with our diplos like Khalilzad and then with our treasure and then with our actual blood to get that stability back! (That never existed before, even when our domestic prosperity was booming like it never had before.) Besides being self-serving, and deeply stupid, this is just sad. We used to have the wisdom to sit back as far as possible and let the stupid-affected regions of the world tear themselves apart with their ideologies and their wars. And it was *precisely* while they did so that *we* became rich. And then came ... folks like St. Woodrow, and even the example of Churchill destroying England as a world power just so he could pretend to guarantee Poland something he could not possibly prevent, and none of this made the Khalilzads stop and think. Nor could George Kennan's sage and proven advice to handle our foreign affairs in as passive and non-confrontational manner as possible. No, our Kalilzads are smarter than all of that. And, translated somewhat, but nevertheless still specifically faithful to their words, here is their creed:

Getting and staying involved in wars and conflicts even if they have *nothing* directly to do with any important American interests are *good.* Getting and staying involved in same is in fact *necessary* for the United States prosperity. We won't say how, we won't say why, but trust us. Look at how well we did in the first decade of the new century bringing both stability to the Mideast and prosperity to the United States.

 Contemplating how ubiquitous such people are today in positions of official responsibility goes a long way towards explaining why we enjoy *neither* stability in our international relations, nor prosperity at home. Why we tolerate them goes to the bigger issue of our seeming inability today to tell the stupidest ideas from the soundest, which is inexplicable, except perhaps to it being due to the sheer number of the former that have to be contended with. 

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May 25, 2013