Fifty years ago this month, the United States and Soviet Union faced off in what is commonly considered the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War and, given the catastrophic consequences of a thermonuclear exchange, perhaps the most frightening military confrontation in human history.
In October 1962, the United States discovered that the Soviet Union was deploying in Cuba medium-range missiles armed with nuclear weapons that could hit much of the continental United States, after President John F. Kennedy had vowed never to allow such an act and the Soviets denied they would ever do such a thing. Kennedy and his advisers undertook almost two weeks of intense analysis, debate and back-channel diplomacy, employing a naval quarantine and crafting a complex deal that led the Soviets to remove the missiles (and other military forces) in exchange for an American guarantee not to invade Cuba and a secret promise to remove its nuclear-tipped missiles from Turkey.
There have already been and will continue to be numerous workshops, analyses and articles conveying “lessons” from this signal historical event. What should a nonexpert make of these accounts? Aficionados of the crisis still debate scores of smaller details that likely appear confusing and obscure to most outsiders. And despite countless books, articles and reams of declassified documents, the origins, resolution and consequences of the crisis remain both contentious and murky. Yet while there is little consensus on the answers and much scholarly work still to be done, it is possible to at least identify three key questions that should frame any discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
A Bold Move
First, why did the Soviet Union decide to put missiles in Cuba in 1962? Why did the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev undertake such a bold and risky gambit, and what did he hope to accomplish? There are at least three competing explanations:
Protect Cuba and its revolution: Some scholars who have looked at the Soviet documents have noted the almost romantic attachment Russian leaders had to the revolution in Cuba. Cuba was the first communist country in the Western Hemisphere, constantly threatened by its superpower neighbor ninety miles to the north. The Soviets not only wanted to protect the charismatic Fidel Castro and his regime but also needed to burnish their waning revolutionary credentials in the face of challenges from Mao’s People’s Republic of China.
Improve the Strategic Nuclear Balance: In the late 1950s, particularly after the launch of Sputnik, many American analysts feared that the Soviet Union was gaining a significant and threatening lead over the United States in nuclear capabilities. Improved U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly the aerial photographs produced by the Corona satellites, revealed there was a large gap—but one that favored the United States. In October 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric gave a speech laying out America’s great advantages in its ability to target the Soviet homeland with strategic nuclear weapons, a ploy that may have embarrassed Premier Khrushchev and increased his desire to catch up to and cancel out America’s nuclear lead as quickly as possible.
A Maneuver to Resolve Larger Issues: Several important geopolitical issues in Central Europe resulting from the Second World War had not been resolved when the crisis began in October 1962. The Soviets were especially perturbed by the unsettled status of West Berlin, located in East German territory, affiliated with a politically open and economically booming West Germany, defended by NATO and occupied by British, French and U.S. troops. In late 1958 and again in 1961, Khrushchev issued ultimatums demanding a resolution of West Berlin’s status that would have forced a removal of these troops. The historian Marc Trachtenberg has persuasively argued that the Soviet’s real worry, however, was West German interest and increased access to nuclear weapons, which the Soviets understandably saw as a grave threat to their interests.
Why did the Soviets remove the missiles from Cuba? There are several arguments for what factors were decisive in resolving the crisis without a war:
The Balance of Conventional Forces: Many of the key American decision makers involved in the crisis—Secretary of Defense of Robert McNamara and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, for example—believed the nuclear balance was irrelevant and that the crisis ended on terms favorable to the United States because of its overwhelming conventional superiority over the Soviets in the Caribbean. The evidence, however, is mixed. Why didn’t a similar if not larger Soviet conventional balance around Berlin allow it to prevail against the United States during the previous four years? Furthermore, many of the arguments made about the conventional balance and the Cuban Missile Crisis were made during contentious debates over controversial U.S. nuclear policies during the Reagan presidency.