Recent talks on Iran’s nuclear program between Tehran and the parties known as P5+1, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, have failed to reach an agreement. But there may yet be some middle ground on which the parties can agree.
A nonproliferation expert present at a July meeting at Iran's mission to the United Nations said that Iran may be open to negotiating on 20 percent uranium enrichment. Iranian statements and the historical record suggest this is a real possibility. By coming to an agreement with Iran over its uranium-enrichment program, centered on fuel assurances from a nuclear fuel bank under control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the P5+1 could ensure that Iran's nuclear capability is used only for peaceful purposes.
Iran’s uranium-enrichment program is ostensibly about having an indigenous source of enriched uranium for energy and medical research. It’s also a symbol of national prestige and modernity. Any concessions the P5+1 offers Iran must address both of these Iranian interests.
Allowing Iran to continue its own uranium enrichment at the 3.5 percent needed for nuclear energy, while under IAEA inspection, would satisfy part of the energy requirement and all of the need to save face. Iran could maintain its right to peaceful use of nuclear technology under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (assuming Iran agrees to its oversight obligations under the NPT) while keeping a safe distance between low-enriched-uranium efforts for energy and the highly enriched uranium needed to develop a nuclear bomb.
As part of any agreement with the P5+1, Iran also would need to halt uranium enrichment of levels over 3.5 percent and ship its 20 percent stockpile out of the country. Guaranteeing an outside supply of 20 percent-enriched uranium for medical isotope research may prove to be a more difficult venture, both diplomatically and logistically. But there are mechanisms that are in place, or soon will be, to help facilitate the process and provide a long-term solution to the issue.
There is one possibility that has been gaining momentum over the past few years, but it has taken a backseat to sanctions and covert actions. The IAEA Board of Governors approved the creation of a nuclear fuel bank in 2010 with the financial support of Warren Buffett and his organization, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, as well as funding from the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. President Barack Obama expressed his support for a fuel bank shortly after taking office in his 2009 Prague speech and again in March of this year. Kazakhstan has offered to host a nuclear fuel bank under IAEA auspices as a way to curb nuclear proliferation and plans to open it late next year. The plans call for having Russia enrich the uranium before it is stored.
The logistics behind a nuclear fuel bank are straightforward. First, the bank would provide a source of low-enriched uranium to states that are in compliance with IAEA safeguard obligations. This would allow states to use nuclear energy while obviating the need to spend the time and money, not to mention the expertise, on enriching uranium. The fuel bank would also ideally be free from any political considerations, so states would not worry about losing their supply of fuel in the event of any international disputes. Second, the fuel bank would help reduce the ambiguity surrounding dual-use technology, an issue that underlies current unease over Iran’s nuclear program. Since states would receive the uranium already enriched in the form of fuel rods, without the possibility of further enriching it to weapons-grade levels, the fuel would have only peaceful uses.
Comments
Sorry but anyone who has followed this issue carefully knows that Iran is not the problem here.
Iran has already repeatedly offered to place additional restrictions on its nuclear enrichment program well beyond what its current Safeguards Agreement requires, or what the Additional Protocol would require.
These Iranian offers have included capping enrichment, converting all LEU into fuel rods so they can't be used for bombs, and even opening the program to joint participation with the Western nations.
However, every single Iranian offer has been totally ignored, and at times the US has gone to great length to even undermine any chance of a peaceful resolution of the nuclear standoff (example: the US killed the Brazil/Turkey brokered uranium swap deal -- after Iran had said yes.)
The US keeps moving the goalposts and making excessive demands (that Iran totally give up enrichment, contrary to her sovereign rights) specifically because the last thing the US wants is to resolve this conflict while the regime is left in power.
The US is using the nuclear issue as a pretext, just as "WMDs in Iraq" was just a pretext, and it has no intention of compromising with Iran no matter how well-inspected or restricted Iran's nuclear program becomes.
And, former IAEA Director Elbaradei thought so too: “They weren’t interested in a compromise with the government in Tehran, but regime change – by any means necessary.”
Oh and FYI developing nations as a whole -not just Iran- object to US efforts to restrict enrichment, and see it as an attempt to monopolize the technology and process needed to make reactor fuel, so sole major source of energy in the near future. There is no such thing as "guaranteed" access to fuel. Iran was supposed to have such "guaranteed" access to nuclear technology and reactor fuel under the NPT and yet we see today how meaningless that guarantee turned out to be. A country would be a fool if it gave up its nuclear program and relied solely on such empty words. Would the US agree to give up all oil production of its own and instead relly totally on OPEC to provide it with the fuel? I think not. Why should Iran or any other developing country?