Sorry Folks: Obama Isn't Going to Tehran
No Nixon-in-China moment is pending.
What a difference a phone call makes. Disappointment over the handshake-that-never-was swiftly gave way to hope for the future when Barack Obama called his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, for a fifteen-minute conversation as he wrapped up his outreach blitz in New York City, the first direct communication between the two countries’ presidents since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979. With expectations of a diplomatic breakthrough on Iran’s nuclear program once again running high, some commentators have seen fit to
Considering the relevancy of the opening to China, the most obvious precedent of America making friendly with an ideological and strategic adversary of the first order, for current Iranian-American diplomacy is instructive. Assuming a way can be found to trade a curtailment of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities for an easing of crippling economic sanctions, could such a bargain yield a wider rapprochement between Washington and Tehran? The near impossibility of such a development in the foreseeable future says much about Obama’s limited room for maneuver in foreign affairs in this age of interlocking security challenges and domestic political paralysis.
China back then presented many of the same challenges as Iran does to American policymakers today : a regime that preached hatred of the U.S. to its people, worked to subvert its neighbors and undermine America’s regional influence, furnished vital support to insurgents in a war that had drained U.S. blood and treasure, and stirred bipartisan hostility.
Playing the China card, however, offered strategic and political benefits that would not materialize from any gambit toward Iran. Richard Nixon’s interest in restoring relations with Beijing stemmed primarily from fear of an even greater geopolitical rival. By the time he assumed the presidency in January 1969, the Soviet Union had achieved nuclear parity with the United States and vigorously competed for global influence. The challenge facing Nixon was how to offset the Soviet threat when the war in Vietnam had overstretched American resources and sapped voters’ support of militarized containment and far-flung security commitments. Adhering to the time-honored diplomatic maxim that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” he appreciated that engaging Moscow’s rival for leadership of the communist world would unnerve the Kremlin and constrain any risk-taking behavior.
For a president looking to lower America’s profile in the Middle East after a decade of fruitless war and to rebalance resources toward the Asia-Pacific, Obama would find obvious advantages to a modus vivendi with Iran. Yet the strategic context of 2013 bears no comparison to that of forty years ago. A mutual interest in containing the USSR provided the hardheaded rationale for the Sino-American opening of 1971-72; there is no common adversary pushing Washington and Tehran closer together. The U.S. currently faces no peer competitor that Iran could help balance, as threats to its influence are regional in nature.
In the Middle East, Iran represents to U.S. policymakers what the Soviet Union did on a global scale in the early 1970s. It stands at the nexus of all of America’s regional troubles by way of its support for terrorism, its patronage of Hezbollah and Hamas, its firm military and diplomatic backing of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria’s civil war, its capacity to play spoiler in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and its nuclear program possibly triggering a destabilizing arms race. These pressure tools are employed by Tehran as a means both of self-preservation against what is seen as an existential American threat to clerical rule and of fostering the regional hegemony it has historically enjoyed, meaning their wholesale abandonment, which any grand bargain with Washington would likely require, is unlikely.
The demands of alliance management will act as a further brake on U.S. dealings with Iran. His hopes for a lighter footprint in the Middle East derailed by persistent volatility in the region, Obama has found it necessary to demonstrate America’s staying power there, which was the central focus of his recent speech to the UN General Assembly. Whereas Nixon exploited Soviet anxieties over a Sino-American reconciliation to gain leverage over the Kremlin, the suspicions engendered by the prospect of warming Iranian-American ties undermine U.S. efforts to shore up relations with Israel and Persian Gulf allies, who are already disgruntled with the Obama administration on issues ranging from its scolding of Egypt’s new interim government to its tepid backing of Assad’s opposition.
Nixon’s China initiative was aided immeasurably by an auspicious political climate, which is lacking in Obama’s case. By the late 1960s, the political imperative of projecting toughness toward Beijing had been overtaken by the need to burnish one’s peace credentials to a war-weary electorate, as Republicans and Democrats alike offered ideas for a new relationship with China. Moreover, the once formidable “China Lobby,” which worked to ensure that Washington recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in Taiwan as the only legitimate Chinese government, had lost its ability to mobilize popular opinion behind its cause. The staunchly anti-Communist Nixon could ruthlessly sacrifice Taiwan’s interests for the sake of courting the mainland without fearing much in the way of political retribution.
Obama enjoys no such luxury at home. Like all second-term residents of the White House, he may seek to cement his legacy abroad as his domestic agenda is increasingly stymied on Capitol Hill; a dramatic breakthrough with Iran would net him the sort of diplomatic coup about which most presidents can only dream. A rapprochement, however, would require Congressional repeal or scaling back of the intricate web of economic sanctions it has enacted against Iran over the years. No two issues promote greater bipartisanship today than stout defense of Israel and maintaining an economic stranglehold on Iran, as Democrats are determined to thwart Republican efforts to make inroads with Jewish voters. Congressional Democrats, who have recently displayed willingness to defy Obama on a number of issues, are not inclined to sacrifice core political interests on behalf of a president who won’t be running again for re-election.
Obama’s premature confinement to lame-duck status, moreover, undermines his credibility abroad. Mao Zedong could negotiate confidently with Nixon, knowing that he was coasting to reelection and would be in a position to deliver what he promised. A marginalized Obama, unable even to secure Congressional approval of a limited missile strike against Syria or to prevent a government shutdown, will limit Rouhani’s enthusiasm for making risky compromises, as he faces his own uphill struggle in satiating powerful domestic factions wary of U.S. intentions.
A limited deal that reduces Iran’s enrichment activities may still result from this intriguing round of maneuvering, but the strategic and political stars are aligned against a grand bargain. Obama will not be flying to Tehran to create his own Beijing moment.
Michael Lumbers is author of Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge Building to China During the Johnson Years and a senior analyst for Wikistrat.