The Lessons of Euromaidan

What it taught us about Ukraine—and about Russia.

After a three-month standoff on the streets of Kyiv, the Yanukovych government dissolved within a 48 hour period and Mr. Yanukovych vanished. The opposition leaders are now in charge of the country, but the protesters are staying in the streets. Presidential elections are scheduled for May. This turn of events has been dizzying and offers many lessons to the careful observer about Ukraine’s political culture and where the country is heading.

REPRESSION AS A POLITICAL LOSER

The first lesson is that repression of civilian demonstrators is a political loser in Ukraine. This crisis began as a protest of tens of thousands against Mr. Yanukovych's decision to walk away from a trade association agreement with the European Union. When he tried to drive them off the streets by force in late November, he failed and faced demonstrations of hundreds of thousands. For weeks thereafter, Mr. Yanukovych tried to avoid the large-scale use of force because he understood that it was not popular in the country.

The second lesson is related. Ukraine's forces of order—the police, the security services and the military—are not reliable instruments for repressing peaceful citizens. During the Orange Revolution and this crisis, the military was not at all involved in crowd control. (In fact, during the Orange Revolution, the army issued a warning to a specially groomed police unit that it would protect protesters if the police unit tried to crack down on them.) In both crises, the regime had to rely on select police units—not even all special police (Berkut) units. Mr. Yanukovych never had enough police to clear the streets by normal crowd control methods. So in frustration, and with advice from his Russian friends, he chose last week the high-casualty strategy of live fire and snipers—to terrorize protesters off the streets. Unfortunately for the Yanukovych government, this only enraged the protesters and the international community; and his demise followed rapidly.

THE DANGERS OF EXCESSIVE GREED

Another reason for the implosion of Mr. Yanukovych's support was his failure to heed Hyman Roth. Roth was a mob kingpin in The Godfather Part II, modeled on the real-life Meyer Lansky, who prospered because "he always made money for his partners." In the last two years of his presidential term, Mr. Yanukovych, his son Oleksandr and their small circle were seen as gaining wealth not only at the expense of the Ukrainian people, but also of their fellow oligarchs from the east. As a consequence, there was no rallying in the Party of the Regions to President Yanukovych when the end came.

UKRAINE'S EAST-WEST DIVIDE IS WEAKENING

The crisis also demonstrated that the traditional East-West ethnic, language and cultural splits in the country are weakening. Mr. Yanukovych's support base was in the east and south, regions, which have a larger percentage of ethnic Russians and Russian language speakers than the rest of Ukraine. When Mr. Yanukovych lost his Presidential bid in 2004—after his effort to steal the vote failed—he recouped politically by campaigning relentlessly in the east and south. What's more, during the Orange Revolution a good number of senior political figures from the east spoke publicly about the need for some kind of federal arrangement that would give them greater autonomy from Kyiv. Some even spoke of secession.

Reflexively, Yanukovych headed east February 22 when his support evaporated in Kyiv. But when political leaders of the east met in Kharkiv that day, there were several thousand demonstrators in the streets expressing support for the changes in Kyiv. That never happened during the Orange Revolution. There were also few strong voices for regional autonomy this time around. In fact, Rinat Akhmetov, the richest man in Ukraine and major bankroller of the Party of the Regions, and Ihor Kolomoiskyi, the billionaire from Dnipropetrovsk, spoke out on the importance of maintaining the country's unity.

BRUSSELS' SCALPEL TRUMPS MOSCOW'S BLUNDERBUSS

The past months have also demonstrated that the EU's scalpel was far more effective than the Kremlin's blunderbuss in Ukraine. Moscow's threat of an economic boycott played a visible role in Mr. Yanukovych's decision to back away from the trade deal with the EU in November. He found it convenient to blame his decision on Moscow; but his real motivation was domestic. The EU had insisted throughout the negotiations that any deal required the release from jail of Yulia Tymoshenko, Yanukovych's rival in the 2010 presidential elections and the country's most formidable politician. Mr. Yanukovych had hoped that the EU would drop this condition; by late November, he realized that the EU was serious about Tymoshenko's release.

When the protests were three weeks old, Mr. Yanukovych stopped in Moscow and returned to Ukraine with the gift of lower gas prices and a loan package worth up to USD $15 billion. He thought that this present would solve his political problem, but the protesters were unimpressed and the demonstrations continued. In February, Mr. Yanukovych went to Sochi for the Olympics and to see Mr. Putin. While we do not know what Mr. Putin said, we do know that Sergei Glaziyev, the Kremlin’s point man for Ukraine, was urging the use of force to deal with the demonstrations. Shortly after returning from Sochi, Mr. Yanukovych authorized the use of live fire and snipers, which took scores of lives.

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