Why Russian Liberals Lose
by Nicolai N. Petro
Now that the results are official and, for the second time in eight years, the liberal opposition parties failed to gain even a single party-list seat in the Russian parliament, perhaps it is time for an honest discussion of why they so consistently fail to attract the support of the Russian public.
Granted, the country's booming economy does not make their argument for removing Putin an easy one-the latest IMF annual report says that, in terms of purchasing power parity, Russia's contribution to world growth in 2007 will be half as large as that of the entire European Union and much higher than Japan's.
Still, with a potential electorate as high as 40 percent, several well-known cultural and political figures in their corner and plenty of money from business elites to support their cause, it is simply astonishing how badly Putin's opponents have botched their case.
The roots of this latest electoral debacle, in which the liberal opposition lost more than half of their already small electorate, must can be traced back to the fateful decision made four years ago to forge some highly questionable political alliances.
In a misguided effort to gain publicity, moderates like Vladimir Ryzhkov, Irina Khakamada, Grigory Yavlinsky, Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov, embraced two highly controversial figures. The first was entrepreneur and chess champion Gary Kasparov who, as a member of the council of the U.S.-based Center for Security Policy, was known to have close ties to highly influential, as well as vociferously anti-Russian, American neoconservatives. The second is Eduard Limonov, leader of the rabidly ethno-nationalist National Bolshevik Party (NBP).
Limonov, who has called for the use of "Serbian tactics" to regain regions of the former Soviet Union with large Russian populations, is much more than an "accidental ally" of these liberals, as reported in the American press. He approached the group that spawned "Another Russia", the "Committee 2008: Free Choice", soon after it was established in March 2004, to recommend the expertise of his "fighters"-expertise like brandishing a fake grenade to occupy St. Peter's Church in Riga, Latvia, for which several NBP members served jail time. Limonov himself was convicted of illegal arms purchases in April 2001 and served two years in jail, before being released on parole.
So bad is Limonov that even the pugnacious leader of the far left "Working Russia", Viktor Anpilov, himself no stranger to confrontations with authorities, eventually could no longer stomach being part of "Another Russia." Its political agenda, he said, had become "basically to get out into the streets and brawl."
In American politics this sort of coalition would be as unthinkable as Al Gore and Bill Richardson forging an alliance with American chess legend Bobby Fischer and ex-Klansman David Duke. In the bizarre world of Russian opposition politics, however, Limonov, who was once labeled an extremist in the Wall Street Journal, has become a steadfast comrade-in-arms of Kasparov, now a contributing editor to the same newspaper!
While several former allies, including Yavlinksy and Kasyanov, have parted company with Another Russia, others like Kasparov, Ryzhkov and Nemtsov continue to justify this alliance as necessary to circumvent the Kremlin's control of the media.
But it is hard to believe that there are very many people in Russia who don't know what the opposition stands for. For one thing, more than a quarter of the population have regular access to the Internet, whose Russia domain remains totally politically unfiltered and heavily saturated with criticism of President Putin. 13 percent of the populace (twice that many in Moscow and St. Petersburg) even say that the Internet is their main source of information.
Moreover, even before the current election season, media surveys showed that the two leading liberal parties, Union of Right Forces (SPS in Russian) and Yabloko, received significant national television coverage. In 2005 they accounted for 23.8 percent of all times that political parties were mentioned on the country's seven major TV channels, while in 2006 this figure was only 14 percent. If this seems low, consider that it is far more than both parties combined have ever achieved in national elections.
When surveyed last year, by a nearly four to one margin Russians said that opposition parties were able to freely express their views on national television and in national newspapers. Even 56 percent of Communist Party voters agreed! None of this even takes account that during the past month-the official campaign season-each party running for the Duma received three hours of prime national television air time, and that the televised party debates, in which all parties except United Russia chose to take part, were watched by about the same percentage of people that watched the final U.S. presidential debates in 2000.
So while Kasparov contends that the only reason that the Russian people shun the liberal opposition is because of the regime's control over the media, Grigory Yavlinksy is probably much closer to the truth when he told a reporter that his liberal party Yabloko already has 97 percent name recognition. The problem is not that the opposition cannot get its message out to the Russian public. The problem is that the messengers have completely alienated their natural constituency: Russia's rapidly growing middle class.
Consider what a middle class voter would do if faced with the following choice: to support a political movement that unites a former chess champion with links to American neocons and whose family resides overseas; a former prime minister, popularly nicknamed "Misha 2 percent" for allegedly taking that much in kickbacks while in office; and an ex-punk rocker, released from prison just a few years ago, who vows to restore the Russian empire by any means necessary. The sum total of their political agenda: "A Russia without Putin!"
Or, to support the party of the current president, which has pledged to continue the policies that have already increased wages from $81 per month to $550 per month, dramatically increased social spending and reduced poverty from 27 percent to 15 percent. As any pollster will tell you, this is a "no-brainer."
But why run a campaign against the interests of the middle class? Perhaps some Russian liberals are just not aware of how much the country has improved economically. Earlier this year, Grigory Yavlinsky boasted to a reporter that he hardly reads the press anymore
("I have aides to do that") and hasn't watched Russian television in four or five years!
But these are minor public relations gaffes in comparison to the ill-concealed contempt for the Russian people to whom, ostensibly, they are appealing for support. As Boris Berezovsky, who claims to be funding the opposition from his exile in London, puts it: "The problem is that, for centuries, the Russian authorities have been violating the Russian people, turning it into cattle."
This bovine image of the Russian electorate is a favorite among the country's liberal elite. From Yuri Afanasyev's comment in 1991 that: "Many of our people seem reduced to a condition resembling that of cattle and, what is more frightening, they do not ask to live any other way", to the outrageous statements by former Deputy Prime Minister Alfred Kokh that Russians are incapable of earning money and "can't make anything new" (Kokh, by the way, then became the manager of the Union of Right Forces' 2003 Duma campaign). Cattle, obviously, need cattle herders, of which there seems to be no shortage among the Russian liberal opposition.
Their utterly cynical assumption that politics, at least in Russia, doesn't need to appeal to the voters at all, but is really about replacing the "bad" people-herders with "good" people-herders, has lead the opposition directly to the scorched earth policy that was adopted in the current Duma campaign. What does it matter how people vote, or even if they vote at all, for as Limonov vowed at the last Moscow rally before the elections, Another Russia does not intend to accept any results as legitimate.
Small wonder, then, that most Russians view the liberal opposition as simply wanting to take away the prosperity they have worked so hard to obtain? Nor is it any wonder that the Western media's uncritical adulation of this opposition, and of Another Russia in particular, is viewed by Russians with deep suspicion?
Far from indicating a retreat from democracy, the Russian electorate's decisive rejection of the current liberal opposition is a good sign that the country is progressing toward a mature democracy. Indeed, we can thank our lucky stars that the overwhelming majority of Russians have far too much common sense to vote for such extremists, even when disguised in "liberal" clothing.
Nicolai N. Petro served as the U.S. State Department's special assistant for policy on the Soviet Union under George H.W. Bush, and now teaches international politics at the University of Rhode Island (USA).
Putin's Russia Is 'A Different Country Now'
by Brian Whitmore and Robert Coalson
Vladimir Putin has a plan. So say the billboards that have that have sprung up like mushrooms across the country, proclaiming: "Putin's Plan Is Russia's Future." So says Koreiskiye LEDchiky, a rock band from Vladivostok, which recently released a song proclaiming: "Putin's Plan is top of the line. Isn't it hot?"
And so say the bureaucrats from the pro-Kremlin United Russia party who made the president's plan their electoral platform.
But just what this plan is, no one can say, even though Sunday's legislative elections were cast as a referendum on the Russian people's confidence in Putin and the direction he wants to take the country. Given United Russia's overwhelming victory, the Kremlin leader's new mandate could turn out to a blank check.
"The vote affirmed the main idea: that Vladimir Putin is a national leader, that the people support his course, and this course will continue", outgoing State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, who heads United Russia, said after returns showed the party winning a massive two-thirds majority in parliament. The results, combined with United Russia's dominance of regional legislatures, mean the party will have the ability to single-handedly change the constitution.
So what will Putin, who led the United Russia candidate list, do with his new power? In a nationally-televised speech broadcast just days before the vote, the president gave one of the clearest indications yet about his intentions. "The country is now entering a period of full renewal of supreme legislative and executive authority. And in this situation it is especially important for us to ensure continuity in its [political] course", Putin said.
Sunday's carefully choreographed victory for United Russia was the first step in a Kremlin blueprint to establish an even more authoritarian, centrally-controlled and vertically integrated regime-a new and enduring political system based on the Soviet principle of one-party rule.
This new regime will dispose of the troublesome issue of the unpredictable transitions of power once and for all by concentrating authority in the hands of a tight-knit party-based elite centered around Vladimir Putin. A cardinal change in this emerging system will most likely be the eventual elimination of direct presidential elections.
"They want a strong authoritarian state of the Soviet type without the Soviet idiocy", Olga Kryshtanovskaya, head of the Center for Elite Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology, recently told RFE/RL. "The idiotic Soviet economy and the idiotic Soviet ideology were minuses. All the rest they want to bring back and preserve: a state system without a separation of powers."
This ambitious agenda explains why Putin and his inner circle were not content with just a clear majority for United Russia; they needed the appearance of a crushing mandate-and a two-thirds constitutional majority-for sweeping change.
The Evil 90s
In the weeks leading up to Sunday's vote, Putin repeatedly played the fear card-fear of a return of the lawless oligarchic rule that followed the Soviet collapse, fear of conniving foreigners who would steal Russia's riches and do the country harm, fear of the chaotic uncertainty that marked the entire decade of the 1990s.
Speaking to banner-waving United Russia activists on November 21, Putin called his opponents "scavenging jackals" seeking funds from "foreign embassies" to weaken and destabilize the motherland. And in his November 29 address to the nation, the president sternly warned of diabolical adversaries who "want to reshape and muddle plans for Russia's development, change the political course supported by our people, and return to the times of humiliation, dependence, and disintegration" that followed the fall of the Soviet Union.
The campaign against the 1990s was part of an effort to discredit-and lay the groundwork for disposing of-the country's existing political system.
In October, Russian media quoted State Duma Deputy Viktor Alksnis as saying the country's 1993 constitution "was accepted in an emergency situation, . . . is bad in itself, and does not fulfill its role." Likewise, in an interview published on the pro-Kremlin website kreml.org on November 7, Aleksandr Kazakov, founder of the Great Russia Center, predicted the destruction of the existing political order following the Duma elections.
"Already today it is clear that after the December elections, in which a substantial majority of Russian citizens will vote for Putin, the system of power in the country can be destroyed", Kazakov said. "This is simply because that system is highly unstable and, more importantly, does not have a place for the leader of the nation."
Even before the tsunami of agitprop against the current order, public opinion polls showed that Russians were already skeptical of the existing constitution. Public opinion polls published late last year found that only 20 percent of Russians think the 1993 constitution protects their rights and freedoms, while 33 percent think it plays no noticeable role. Similarly, a Public Opinion Foundation poll found that 50 percent of Russians believed the constitution should be revised, with changes such as eliminating presidential term limits or extending the president's term of office the most frequently mentioned improvements.
The Specter of Chaos
The move toward a more authoritarian regime after Moscow's tentative, tumultuous, and clumsy experiment with democracy in the 1990s fits into a well-established pattern in Russian history.
From the mayhem of the Time of Troubles in the early 17th century, to the disorder that followed the collapse of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, to the free-for-all that marked the period following the Soviet breakup in the 1990s, Russian history has been characterized by long periods of autocracy punctuated by short intervals of turmoil and chaos. The chaotic interludes, in which liberalism sometimes briefly thrived, are associated in many Russians' minds with ill-intentioned foreign intervention.
This experience, says Edward Keenan, a professor of Russian History at Harvard University, has led a majority of Russians to feel that the only alternative to a firm authoritarian order is complete anarchy. This, he says, explains why such a large percentage of Russians want Putin to remain in power even if that means sacrificing democracy and hard-won civil liberties.
"The avoidance of chaos is deep in that political system. And the expectation on which that is founded, I think, is that any price is worth paying to avoid chaos", Edward Keenan recently told RFE/RL. "People don't really want to leap into the unknown. They have been there. It's happened before, over and over again. The post-Gorbachev period, the Yeltsin period, is a period not only chaos, but of enormous anxiety about the future for all the people who lived through it."
Steven Pifer, a Russia expert formerly with the U.S. State Department and now a senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Putin could have broken the cycle and established a more democratic regime-if he so chose.
"I'm not sure it had to be this way. Putin could have taken a different course seven years ago and there could have been a more normal transition", Pifer told RFE/RL. "And he could have done quite a bit in terms of what he wanted to do in terms of political stabilization. I don't think he needed to walk as far back on democracy.
But instead, Putin and his inner circle of KGB veterans turned to a familiar model.
Andropov's Ghost
Putin and many key members of his inner circle-Federal Security Service chief Nikolai Patrushev, Federal Antinarcotics Service head Viktor Cherkesov, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov and Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Viktor Ivanov-all entered the KGB in the mid-1970s when Yury Andropov was at the spy agency's helm.
They were strongly influenced by his ideas. "They thought he was simply a genius, that he was a very strong person who, if he had lived, would have made the correct reforms", Kryshtanovskaya told RFE/RL.
Andropov led the KGB from 1967 until 1982, when he became Soviet leader. He wanted to modernize-and to a degree to liberalize-the Soviet economy and make it more competitive with the West. But Andropov was no political liberal. Unlike Mikhail Gorbachev, and later Boris Yeltsin, Andropov wanted to preserve the authoritarian Soviet political system and give the KGB a greater role in running it.
The model of authoritarian modernization he envisioned, Kryshtanovskaya says, resembles the one carried out by China's Communist leaders. "Andropov thought that the Communist Party had to keep power in its hands and to conduct an economic liberalization. This was the path China followed", Kryshtanovskaya told RFE/RL. "For people in the security services, China is the ideal model. They see this as the correct course. They think that Yeltsin went along the wrong path, as did Gorbachev."
Andropov died in 1984, less than 15 months after becoming Soviet leader, and was never able to implement his plan. But now, more than two decades after Andropov's death, the group of fresh-faced KGB rookies he once inspired are now poised to take Russia down that road not taken.
All Power To The Party
Few doubt that major changes await Russia in the coming months.
In a commentary published in "Izvestiya" on November 29, Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the pro-Kremlin Politika think tank, predicted that Putin will become leader of United Russia and State Duma speaker.
"Backed by this majority, and using his indisputably authoritative image, Putin would be able to transform the legislative branch into a powerful independent center of power", Nikonov wrote. "This would be especially effective if combined with control over the party which a substantial proportion of Russia's elite, including regional leaders, have already joined."
Kryshtanovskaya told RFE/RL that Kremlin strategists have been "working on the United Russia scenario for a long time", painstakingly creating a vast network of party organizations stretching down from Moscow to cities, towns, and villages across the country.
"So much money was spent and so much strength was used to create this huge network of party organization down to the very lowest level. It looks very much like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", Kryshtanovskaya said.
At the same time, we can expect changes within United Russia itself. Politically useful allies in its leadership, such as Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov and Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiyev, will likely be jettisoned, and the party's political council will be stacked with KGB-associated figures from Putin's inner circle.
Kryshtanovskaya added that with a two-thirds majority in the Duma, United Russia will be able to establish de facto one-party rule. "This would allow them to control the president, the prime minister, the governors, and practically everybody", Kryshtanovskaya said. "All power will be with the party and everybody will be subject to party discipline. And the high council of the party will be like the Soviet politburo."
And Putin would likely assume a role akin to that of the Soviet-era general secretary-the country's real supreme ruler.
The Incredible Shrinking Presidency?
For such a scenario to work, it would entail a major downgrading of the presidency. The constitution and other legislation would need to be changed to remove the key levers of power-supreme command of the armed forces, control of law-enforcement and security services, the nuclear "suitcase"-from under the president's control.
The president's direct link with the voters, which gives the office added legitimacy, would also need to be severed. A similar change was made with regional governors in 2004 when the law was changed so they were nominated by the president and confirmed by regional legislatures-which are now dominated by United Russia. Taken to the national level, this could mean that the Duma would confirm a president nominated by the leadership of the dominant Duma faction-United Russia.
What happens with the presidency will become clearer on December 17, when United Russia nominates its candidate for the March presidential election. It is widely expected that the party's candidate, who will likely sail to election, will be a pliable Putin ally-possibly St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko or Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov. It seems likely that the March 2, 2008, presidential election could be the last time a Russian president is directly elected by popular vote for some time to come.
"There is no doubt this is a different country now", Boris Nadezhdin, a leader of the opposition Union of Rightist Forces-which failed to win seats in the Duma-told RFE/RL's Russian Service. "We have returned to the Soviet Union. It is not parliament or the next president that will have real power, but the United Russia party."
And it is a delightful irony of history that a small group of glum Communists will be sitting in stony-faced opposition when the pro-Kremlin Duma deputies raise their hands to restore the Soviet model of power.
Brian Whitmore is a senior correspondent and Robert Coalson is a Russia analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. They are based in Prague.
Rapid Reaction: Russia's Elections-The Day After
by Nikolas K. Gvosdev
United Russia's overwhelming mandate comes as a result of an electoral process most Western countries find to be neither free nor fair. So what to do now?
First, the U.S. will have to come to terms with the democracy paradox that is Russia-that in a country which cannot be described as a democracy in procedural terms (due to the way elections are carried out), the end results are still in general alignment with the popular will. This is not a case where state pressure and use of administrative resources frustrated the desires of the electorate. It is therefore a government whose policies are viewed by most people as legitimate. So the approach of "standing with the people, not the regime" is not likely to work.
Second, the methods the EU successfully used against Austria after the election of Jorg Haider-isolation and public pressure-are not feasible. There is going to be a good deal of rhetoric calling for the United States and Europe to "do something" about Russia. The problem is that there are no real sanctions that can be employed against Russia that would not carry a major cost for U.S. or Western interests. The United States, in critical need of a continued inflow of dollars to sustain its federal and current account deficits, is not going to want to do anything which causes Russia, now the world's third largest holder of currency reserves, to begin moving more of its holdings out of greenbacks into other currencies. As with China, there is now a growing interdependency between Russia and the West that makes it difficult for the West to pressure Russia in a cost-free fashion. And "moral suasion" is not really an option: Russia is also far less interested in ensuring how it carries out its internal, domestic affairs conform to Western expectations.
"Selective partnership" may return as a guiding paradigm for how the U.S. should conduct its relationship with Russia. For selective partnership to work, however, the threats (or benefits) must be reasonably equivalent for both sides. This is manifestly not the case. Therefore, unless the United States is prepared to seriously consider what quid pro quos it would be prepared to offer to gain meaningful, as opposed to token, Russian support, on the issues of greatest importance to U.S. interests, there is going to be no meeting of the minds.
Earlier this year, I noted:
This has to be the starting point for any discussions of where the U.S.-Russia relationship is now headed.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of The National Interest.
Inside Track: Is Putin's Russia Fascist?
by Alexander J. Motyl
Just what sort of political system has Vladimir Putin constructed in Russia? The Kremlin likes to speak of something called "managed democracy"; many observers prefer to call it "authoritarian." A few brave souls have even suggested that fascism might be an appropriate designation.
The correct term matters. First of all, it's important to call things by their real names and not engage in unnecessary obfuscation. Second, calling systems by their real names enables us to draw policy-relevant conclusions. If Russia really is democratic, then the current deterioration of Russia's relations with the West is likely to pass, as common values and common perspectives assert themselves over time. If, alternatively, Russia really is authoritarian-or even fascist-then the world may want to prepare for a further worsening of relations with an increasingly truculent Russia. Third, knowing just what Russia is now is especially important in light of Putin's imminent departure from the Russian presidency. If he's actually constructed a coherent political system, then that system will likely survive his withdrawal into the shadowy parts of the corridors of power. If, on the other hand, that system is only transitional, then Putin's leave-taking may provoke a crisis and, conceivably, a return to greater democracy.
One last introductory point. It's a mistake to think that calling Russia fascist necessarily means pursuing a policy of confrontation. There is no reason whatsoever why one cannot engage a fascist Russia; indeed, one could argue that engagement might be imperative precisely because Russia is fascist. It's no less a mistake to believe that calling Russia democratic necessarily means pursuing a policy of engagement. It's obvious that democratic states can be aggressive and act contrary to one's interests. And, although it may be true that, in the final analysis, "democracies do not fight", it is no less true that, in the lengthy run-up to that famed final analysis, they do not necessarily cooperate.
What Is Fascism?
Fascism is often used as an epithet, especially by the left, but it actually is a perfectly respectable social science term that refers to a particular type of political system. Everyone can agree that fascist states are authoritarian-that is, they lack the fundamental attributes of both democracy and totalitarianism. Unlike democracies, fascist systems lack meaningful parliaments, judiciaries, parties, political contestation, and elections. The key word here is meaningful: in fascist systems, as in all authoritarian systems, parliaments are rubber-stamp institutions, judiciaries do what the leader tells them, opposition parties are marginal, and electoral outcomes are preordained. Unlike totalitarian states, fascist states do not penetrate into every aspect of a country's political, economic, social, and cultural life; fascist states do not propound all-embracing ideologies that purport to answer all of life's questions. Instead, like all authoritarian states, fascist states attempt only to influence and control these dimensions of life and they prefer to espouse limited worldviews.
Like authoritarian states, fascist states are highly centralized and hierarchical, they give pride of place within the authority structure to soldiers and policemen, usually secret policemen, and they always have a supreme leader. Indeed, there can be no fascist state without a supreme leader. Like authoritarian states, fascist states limit freedom of the press, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. Like authoritarian states, fascist states also reject socialism and embrace capitalism-which means that they tacitly acknowledge private property and the autonomy of capitalists. And like authoritarian states, fascist states generally espouse some form of hypernationalism glorifying their nation and its fabulous past, present and future. But fascist states also go further than authoritarian states in fetishizing the state and its glory and power.
But fascist states are not just run-of-the-mill authoritarian states. The latter typically connote images of dour old men ruling a sullen population. Fascist states, in contrast, exude youth and vigor and they always implicate the population in its own repression. Fascist leaders strut; they want to appear youthful, manly and active. They also appeal to those qualities in the population, usually coopting the young into their movements or parties. No less important, fascist states are popular: They incorporate the population into the system of rule, promising it a grand and glorious future in exchange for its enthusiasm and support. Fascist leaders are especially popular, presenting themselves as the embodiments of a nation's best qualities and as the only hopes for its future.
Not surprisingly, fascist states tend to be aggressive-sounding and oftentimes aggressive states. The soldiers and policemen that run fascist states have a natural proclivity to toughness and weaponry. The hypernationalism, state fetishes, and cult of vigor of fascist states incline them to see enemies everywhere. The cult-like status of leaders encourages them to pound their chests with abandon. And the population's implication in its own repression leads it to balance its self-humiliation with attempts to humiliate others.
In sum, fascist states are authoritarian states with a few special characteristics thrown in: strong and vigorous leaders, cults of strong and vigorous leaders, and supine populations that willingly accept strong and vigorous leadership and thereby actively engage in their own self-repression. Fascist states are thus authoritarian states that glorify strength and vigor in the ruling elites and whose subject populations also glorify strength and vigor in the ruling elites.
Is Russia Fascist?
Seen in this light, Franco's Spain, Pinochet's Chile, and the Greece of the colonels were really just your average authoritarian states. So, too, is today's China. In contrast, Mussolini's Italy was clearly fascist, as was Hitler's Germany (even though it also had totalitarian aspirations). So, too, might Chavez's Venezuela, but only if he stops short of instituting genuine socialism. What of Putin's Russia?
- Its democratic institutions are at best moribund, having been transformed into pliant tools of the Kremlin;
- civil society and the press have been severely circumscribed, in a manner that approximates Hitler's Gleichschaltung (or coordination) of society in 1933-1934;
- representatives of the military and secret police-the siloviki-dominate all ruling elites and suffuse them with their antidemocratic ethos;
- the state promotes capitalism while making sure to control its strategic heights by means of controlling key industries, especially in energy, defense, mining, and manufacturing;
- the Russian state is unabashedly glorified to the point of representing a genuine fetish;
- Vladimir Putin is the undisputed leader, and his image exudes vigor, youth, and manliness;
- a variety of rabidly pro-Putin youth groups act as the vanguard of the state;
- the population overwhelmingly supports Putin, and has done so since he assumed the presidency;
- hypernationalism, a growing mistrust of both internal and external foreigners, and a corresponding glorification of Russia's past (including its criminal Stalinist period) and present are the official worldview;
- Russia has taken to asserting its "rightful" place in the sun by engaging in energy blackmail vis-à-vis Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states, cyber-wars against Estonia, provocations against Georgia, Polar land grabs, and other forms of aggressive behavior.
Of all these factors, Putin's projected vigor and the population's willing self-abnegation are central. Like Mussolini, Putin favors stylish black clothing that connotes toughness and seriousness. Like Mussolini, Putin likes being photographed in the presence of weapons and other instruments of war. And like Mussolini, Putin likes to show off his presumed physical prowess. Russians, meanwhile, have consistently supported Putin to the tune of 70-plus percent. The standard explanation for such enthusiasm is that, although Putin may have actually done little to improve their lives materially, they are grateful to him for having restored their sense of pride, in themselves and in their formerly humiliated country. Just this same sense of pride was at the core of Germans' support of Hitler.
Indeed, it is striking just how similar post-Soviet Russia's developmental path resembles that of post-World War I Germany. Both countries underwent strategic defeats, lost empires, and experienced intense national humiliation. Both countries then experienced extreme economic hardship under the stewardship of weak and corrupt democratic regimes. Both countries blamed democracy and its internal and external supporters for their ills. Both countries turned to hypernationalism, state fetishization and strong-man rule. In both countries strong men seized power-by legitimate means, by the way-and exploited popular willingness to submit to domination to establish their authoritarian regimes.
Although Putin's Russia possesses the defining characteristics of fascism, they have not yet assumed the form of a consolidated, coherent and hence fully-stable political system. These characteristics have emerged haphazardly only in the last few years, and although they may now all be in place, it is not yet clear that they are here to stay. In that sense, Russia today resembles Germany in 1933 or Italy in the mid-1920s. Russia could follow in their footsteps, or it could falter and find its way back to some form of democracy. In particular, Putin's announced departure in 2008 will be a test of just how stable this system is. Russia may therefore be best termed an unconsolidated fascist state. If the system remains as is, or even hardens after Putin leaves the presidency, then one will be able to say that the transition has ended in full-fledged fascism. If the system breaks down, or undergoes significant change in the direction of democracy, then the transition will have proven unsuccessful.
Challenges for Fascist Russia
An unconsolidated fascist Russia faces three challenges.
(1) All fascist states scare their neighbors and provoke them to defend themselves against perceived threats emanating from the behavior and bluster of the fascist states. In that sense, fascist hypernationalism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy-effectively creating the very enemies it invoked as the reasons for its justification. As a result, Russia will create ever more suspicious and terrified neighbors the longer it remains fascist or unconsolidated-fascist. Those neighbors will, over time, band together, seek allies, and/or attempt to enhance their security militarily and economically and to view their own Russian-speaking populations as potential fifth columns. Their defensive reactions will only succeed in persuading Russia's ruling elites that continued power enhancement is imperative, both in defense of the fatherland and in defense of their "abandoned brethren" in the non-Russian states. At some point in this vicious circle, tensions can easily translate into armed conflict, especially if pockets of Russians living in the non-Russian states appeal to Russia for "fraternal" assistance.
Strong fascist states, when faced with non-fascist "encirclement", may seek to assert their dominance over their neighbors. Of course, since all states are potential enemies, strong fascist states tend to engage in war and overreach, resulting in ultimate defeat. No state is strong enough to defeat an ever larger coalition of opponents. Weak fascist states-like Russia-can respond to non-fascist encirclement with attempts to increase their own power or with still greater chest-beating. Either way, their neighbors get more terrified, and the cycle continues.
(2) Fascist states are inherently unstable states for three distinct reasons:
- Cults of vigorous leaders cannot be sustained as leaders inevitably grow old or decrepit. A continual rejuvenation of the supreme leader might solve the problem were it not for the fact that fascist leaders do not want to give up power. Sooner or later, therefore, fascist leaders lose their core legitimacy, and when they do, both their followers and the submissive population begin to look for alternative idols. If Putin really leaves the scene and retires to his country estate, he will at least temporarily halt Russia's transition to fascism. If, as most analysts suspect, he continues to pull the strings in some other capacity, he will only accelerate Russia's transition. In any case, Putin, though young today, will not remain young forever. And an old and decrepit leader will not be able to make the case for youth, vigor, and manliness in typical fascist style.
- Popular humiliation and the willingness to submit to unconditional authority are weak foundations on which to build states. Sooner or later, Russians will not feel humiliated and, when that happens-as it surely will, once their prosperity and exposure to the world and its blandishment increases-they will be far less inclined to accept leader cults and authoritarian rule by shadowy siloviki. To be sure, Russian political culture may be authoritarian, and it will sustain fascism. But strategic sectors of Russia society-the middle class, the educated elites, and the young-will increasingly reject that culture and prove to be a source of new thinking about Russia's politics.
- Fascist regimes are invariably fragmented. Extreme centralization of power in a supreme leader is supposed to ensure elite coordination and submission; instead, as in Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, it inclines elites to compete for the leader's favor, to amass resources, to build empires, and not to cooperate with their colleagues-turned-competitors. Fascist regimes are thus brittle, and when supreme leaders falter-as they inevitably do-or leave the scene, successor elites engage in cutthroat competition to assume the mantle of authority. In so doing, however, they not only weaken the regime, but they also expose the system as less then the imposing monolith that they project to the submissive population.
(3) Transitional states-like Russia-are especially unstable, because transition, whether to or from democracy or to or from fascism, is an inherently unstable process. The next two years will be especially difficult for Russia, as it copes with a genuinely post-Putin political system or with a seemingly post-Putin system still run by Putin. Either way, Russian politics will be exceedingly unsettled. If Putin really leaves, Russians will have to determine who, if anyone, can replace him as a charismatic, strong, and vigorous leader. If no such person can be found, many of the attributes of Russia's transitionally fascist system will begin to wither away. If, alternatively, Putin remains the puppet-master, then some tensions will inevitably arise between him, as the de facto leader, and his successor, the de jure leader. That will inevitably affect the effectiveness of the system and its capacity to retain popular support.
In sum, a fascist Russia faces the very serious risk of breakdown in the not too distant future. Overreach could stretch the resources of the state and result either in humiliating military defeat or in a progressive decay of its institutions. Leadership cults usually only work as long as the founding leaders-the unquestionably charismatic founders and "law givers"-are still vigorous. Humiliated populations will eventually abandon humiliation for more satisfactory forms of self-identification. Intra-elite infighting saps the system of its strength and undermines its image. And transitions are intrinsically destabilizing periods. Russia's sad fate may be that it will confront some combination of all these risks in the next few years.
Challenges for the World
Whatever happens in Russia, the rest of the world is in for a rough ride. At worst, Russia will become a consolidated fascist state-and the possibility of expansionism and overreach will become all too real. At best, Russia will become an unstable transitionally fascist state-and the potential for a complete breakdown of the system will become a near-term reality. How, then, should the rest of the world respond?
First of all, by recognizing that Putin's Russia is not a democracy, but an authoritarian fascist state. Just calling Russia by the right name immediately suggests that complacency is inappropriate.
Second, by recognizing that Russia is, and will long remain, too weak a military power to be a serious threat to the world. Russia's armed forces are still decrepit, and its nuclear weapons, though fearful, are useless as an instrument of foreign policy. But Russia can exert leverage over its neighbors and much of the world by virtue of its possession of enormous energy resources. Pursuing lesser energy dependence on Russia would not only reduce that leverage; it would also deprive Russia of the resources for possible military build-ups.
Third, by recognizing that the Russian people's current self-abnegation is necessarily temporary and that, sooner or later, significant elements will seek self-empowerment and self-rule. That segment of Russian society should be supported, encouraged and nurtured-and the easiest and most effective way of doing that is by integrating Russia into the world and exposing it to all forms of global processes.
Fourth, by recognizing that a fully fascist or unstable Russia is an immediate threat to its neighbors-the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Their nerves should be soothed, and their security should be supported. Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states all have good reason to be wary of Russia. Repeated Russian invasions, brutal attempts at colonization, and Russia's unwillingness to reject its Stalinist past would be reason enough to be suspicious. Add to that Russia's slide toward fascism and the continued unwillingness of the Western European states to recognize that there is cause for alarm-and it is no surprise that Russia's non-Russian neighbors feel as if they were being treated primarily as inconvenient obstacles to steady deliveries of Russian oil and gas.
Last, by recognizing that a fascist Russia will not long remain fascist. Sooner rather than later, fascist Russia will break down. The choice before the world may be whether that breakdown occurs as a result of the internal systemic weaknesses of all fascist systems or as a result of aggression and overreach. The former would obviously be the preferable scenario-but it will happen only if Russia's non-Russian neighbors remain secure and stable, and never become modern-day versions of pre-World War II Czechoslovakia or Austria.
Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.
