Mohamed Morsi, chairman of the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party, and Ahmed Shafik, a former prime minister, will both seek public support on the June 16–17 runoff election. They have little in common. Mr. Morsi represents the theocratic agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood, while Mr. Shafik, who belongs to the old guard of President Mubarak's regime, offers a secular program. Yet there is one theme that unites the two finalists, as well as most other candidates who were dropped in the first round: they all strongly criticize the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem and Israel’s settlement policy. Both have declared that if Israel will not get involved in serious negotiations with the Palestinians on the two-state solution, Egypt will feel free to review the Camp David accord, signed in September 1978 by President Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin.
It is too early to predict what they mean by "reviewing" the accords. It will be difficult to cool further the diplomatic, cultural and economic relationship between the countries. Relations have been nearly frozen since Mubarak’s removal from office. A long-standing deal under which Israel was supplied with Egyptian natural gas is practically dead. The Israeli embassy in Cairo was ransacked by an angry mob last September. Israeli journalists are not allowed to visit Egypt, and very few businessmen dare to enter the country. On a different level, Egypt is leading the Arab diplomatic campaign calling on the international community to force Israel to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Since Egypt and Israel have a mutual interest in preventing Al Qaeda from penetrating into the Sinai Peninsula, it is unlikely that the new government in Cairo will cut the lines of communication between Egypt and Israeli intelligence. The new president will learn soon enough that a decision to violate the peace treaty with Israel will spur a decision by the U.S. Congress to cut the generous economic support that Egypt has been enjoying as a result of this treaty. Added tensions between Cairo and Jerusalem could also affect Egypt's access to American weapons.
Knowing that, Israel takes into consideration that even after more than thirty years, the peace treaty with Egypt remains a contract between leaderships and not between the two peoples. Now that the Egyptian people have a voice, their leaders will have to listen. Since the economic situation in Egypt makes it difficult for the leadership to feed the people with more than bread and hummus, they feed them with free hatred of Israel and its American allies.
Unfortunately, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's settlement policy—and President Obama's helplessness to influence it—makes it easy to market animosity against Israel. A brief look at the Palestinian Chapter of the 1978 Camp David Accords, accompanied by a comparison with the 2012 map of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, demonstrates that this document has become irrelevant.
For instance, in 1978, Israel and Egypt agreed there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza over a period not exceeding five years. President Jimmy Carter was also a witness to Israel's written commitment to withdraw its military government and civilian administration as soon as a self-governing authority could be freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas. At this stage, Israeli armed forces were to withdraw into specified security locations.
The Camp David Accords drew a clear time line of no more than five years for the negotiations that were to resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and security arrangements. It stressed, "The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements." The parties agreed that Egypt and Israel would work together and with other interested parties to establish mutually acceptable procedures for a prompt, just and permanent resolution to the refugee problem.