5 Reasons America Should Not Fight Iran, Russia and Assad in Syria
The idea du jour circulating inside the Trump administration and among terrorism experts and Syria watchers alike is that ISIS cannot be destroyed in Syria unless Bashar al-Assad is removed from power and Iran’s presence and influence are drastically curtailed. And in a perfect world, this indeed would be the best possible outcome to prevent ISIS and other jihadi groups, including Al Qaeda, from ensconcing themselves there. But needless to say, the Middle East isn’t a perfect world. U.S. retaliation against another chemical-weapons attacks, as the White House threatened late Monday, would be both necessary and justified. (Assad and his military would “pay a heavy price,” the statement read.) But pursuing an ambitious mission against Iran, Assad and the Russians in Syria is dangerous, imprudent and unnecessary to protect vital American security interests. Here are five compelling reasons why.
The United States Can’t Eradicate ISIS in Syria
In his inaugural address, President Trump spoke about eradicating radical Islamic terrorism from the face of the earth. It cannot be done. Syria alone will remain an incubator for jihadists and Salafists of all stripes due to a toxic brew of poor governance, bleak economic opportunities, sectarian hatreds and beleaguered Sunni communities. And its ideology and propaganda will still be able to feed on the resentments and sense of victimhood and grievance among the Sunni population. Those who argue for a more assertive policy in Syria are right that, unless these problems are addressed, ISIS and other jihadi groups will continue to thrive even without the caliphal proto-state. But even the most risk inclined in the Trump administration cannot envision that kind of U.S. commitment in Syria, which would entail the United States and its allies committing thousands of troops and billions of dollars to militarily defeat all of their adversaries in Syria and to occupy, stabilize and reconstruct the country. Indeed, the president himself has strongly argued against nation building. Containing jihadists is realistic; ridding them from Syria is a pipe dream.
There’s No Foreseeable Stable End State for Syria
The idea that confronting Iran or trying to weaken the Assad regime in an effort to remove him from power or force him into a negotiated political transition is chimerical. That’s been evident for several years. Even if the United States made a commitment to take Assad out, it would lead to more chaos, no organized force aligned with the West to replace him and a mad scramble among all kinds of groups—Sunni jihadists like ISIS and Al Qaeda, pro-Iranian Shia militias, Alawites and Kurds—to consolidate control over real estate, making the situation worse. Assad was unprepared for a negotiated political transition before Russia’s intervention in 2015 helped turn the tide in his favor. He certainly would never agree to such an outcome now that he controls most of the critical cities and regions in Syria. Moreover, the Russians, who may ultimately want a political solution as an exit strategy, don’t seem to be in a hurry for one—and Moscow won’t be pressured and intimidated into accepting one, given what it has invested in Syria. Thus, even if getting rid of ISIS, in theory, means ridding Syria of Assad and Alawite domination, reducing Sunni grievances and stemming Iran’s influence, it simply isn’t feasible at a cost the American Congress and public are willing to pay. And if there is no attainable stable end state, the Trump administration’s moves to deepen military and civilian involvement in Syria need to be carefully weighed and evaluated against the precise objectives that an escalating commitment is designed to achieve. Those who are pushing for a more aggressive role in Syria have never identified the relationship between more U.S. engagement and any conceivable end state.
We Don’t Want a War with Iran