America's Grand Strategy Disaster
While the United States today faces a whole host of challenges from the rise of China, Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea, the question of Iran’s nuclear program to the ongoing civil war in Syria it faces a much more basic challenge that pales in comparison to all the rest. America does not have a coherent, functioning grand strategy.
No nation—superpower or otherwise—can afford to conduct its foreign policy in such a manner. And of course, the United States can implement a grand strategy—we have done it before and we can certainly do it again. The question seems clear: does America want a grand strategy when it comes to its foreign policy goals and aspirations?
It is beyond dispute that the failure to articulate a grand strategy is certainly dangerous. Unless the U.S. and its adversaries understand what the nation seeks to achieve, the boundaries to permissible challenges, and the limits to its forbearance—we are asking for a crisis, which will emerge when other states underestimate what truly matters to Washington. And America itself may be confused as to what it really values until it struggles during a moment of crisis.
What is Grand Strategy?
The first place to begin is with the question of what grand strategy is in the first place. Some define it in narrow terms, relating it to military and national security concerns; while others define it broadly to mean political, economic, technological, and military matters. For myself, grand strategy, in its simplest form, is a fundamental awareness and articulation of what a nation seeks to achieve in foreign policy—what kind of world it hopes to build and what resources it will employ to operate in that world.
In the late 1940s, George Kennan defined the concept of containment, which provided the intellectual foundations of American grand strategy for the remainder of the 20th century. During the next forty or so years, generations of American policymakers and the people—whether democrat or republican, liberal or conservative, interventionist or isolationist—knew what the United States stood for in the world, and the purpose behind its foreign policies. They knew in the most elegant sense that the United States had committed itself to prevent the spread of Soviet communism—no matter what. For decades, policymakers in Washington pursued policies that sought to contain the power and influence of Moscow. Through persistence and strength (including a number of debatable policy choices), we won that struggle despite the fact that no one—and I mean literally no one—saw the defeat of the Soviet Union coming.
Why is it Important for the U.S. to Have a Grand Strategy?
Fundamentally, it is critical for the United States to have a grand strategy. Without one, the nation, its leaders, and people will experience a sense of drift and confusion. How do we know what is important, what threatens our interests, when we should act, and what instruments of power should we use? Essentially, a coherent grand strategy provides the United States with an overarching sense of purpose in its international affairs. It helps to build domestic support and provide international clarity for its foreign policies. Indeed, there is no excuse for not having one.
In a recent article in the New Yorker, David Remnick quotes President Obama, as saying that the United States does not need a new grand strategy. Remnick writes, “Obama told me that what he needs isn’t any new grand strategy—‘I don’t really even need George Kennan right now’ states Obama ‘but, rather, the right strategic partners.”
On the contrary, a new grand strategy is precisely what the nation needs. I would argue the current sense of confusion in American foreign policy today traces directly to Washington’s failure to articulate a post-containment grand strategy for the U.S. Keep in mind that grand strategy tells the United States, as examples, who its “strategic partners” are and what they should seek to achieve through collaboration.
The problem for the U.S. is that containment no longer provides a coherent grand strategy. For some, America is perceived as pursuing a strategy of containment as it tries to “contain” China with its "pivot" or "rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific—while avoiding the word “contain.” In the case of Iran, Washington for years has relied on a strategy of economic sanctions as a way to "contain" Iran's nuclear aspirations. A mere Google search of containment will show that the idea is still very much on people's minds.
As I wrote in 2012, containment as a basis for grand strategy died more than twenty years ago. While it was once an immensely successful policy, the risk of adhering to containment or believing that we do not need a modern grand strategy promises certain foreign policy failures.
Still, it is easy to see why states continue to fixate on containment. Societies and their leaders find great solace, especially in times of economic and political duress, by following familiar policies that once produced successes. Even when these ideas make little strategic sense, familiar, well-established ideas are reassuring to the public, particularly in unsettling times. Unfortunately, going back to the old and reliable simply won’t work—and could invite disaster.
What Undermines Grand Strategy
It is understandable for states in the midst of public exhaustion with war and a slow economic recovery after the great recession to have less interest in foreign policy. This is natural, but what is worrisome is that America’s leadership seems committed to disengaging from the world, which has friends and allies deeply concerned—while encouraging competitors to pursue their own strategic interests.