Bottom Line: America Needs a Smarter Russia Strategy

This means standing firm on both Ukraine and Syria and certainly not condoning Russian power-projection abroad. Simply engaging in damage limitation will not do; a comprehensive strategy is in order.
 

For all of the understandable focus on the future of U.S.-China relations, no bilateral relationship is more important to the United States in 2015 than the relationship with Russia.

Moscow’s foreign policies exacerbate—and, in some instance, are the very causes of—several vexing issues currently facing U.S. decision-makers, from Moscow’s 18-month old intervention in Ukraine to its harboring of Edward Snowden to its military support for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.  Yet if the Obama administration has a coherent strategy for dealing with Russia then it is certainly well hidden from public view.

When Obama came to office, relations between the U.S. and Russia were perhaps the poorest they had been since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relations were plagued by Russian opposition to a missile defense system in Eastern Europe; Kosovo’s recent declaration of independence from Russia’s historic ally Serbia; and lingering uncertainty over whether NATO would continue to expand eastward, a question brought to the fore by the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008.

An early goal of Obama’s presidency was to put U.S.-Russia relations on a sounder footing, an ambition announced in public just two months into his first term when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously presented her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov with a button emblazoned with the word “reset” (in English, at least). By spring 2010, the diplomatic offensive was beginning to bear fruit: the New START arms control agreement was formally signed in April of that year and Bush-era sanctions against Russia were lifted the following month.

Obama’s rapprochement with Russia proved to be relatively short lived, however.  In particular, Russian fears about possible NATO expansion were never fully allayed. When Vladimir Putin returned to the Russian presidency in May 2012 he made no secret of his plans to pursue a Russia-dominated “Eurasian Union” as a counterbalance to the West. And although Obama had succeeded in bringing Moscow to the table over nuclear arms control, Russia’s conventional forces were heavily bolstered under both Putin and the caretaker presidency of Dmitry Medvedev.

Setbacks to the relationship abounded throughout 2012. Not only did the Russian navy and air force conduct provocative military exercises in the Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico, but a high-profile diplomatic fallout saw Putin introduce a ban on U.S. citizens adopting Russian children in response to the Obama administration’s sanctioning of Russian human rights abusers.  By July 2013, when Russia agreed to grant asylum to Edward Snowden, few could disagree that the “reset” had been a comprehensive failure.

Russia’s invasion of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent interventions in Eastern Ukraine have been the dramatic climaxes to this breakdown in relations, making it terribly difficult (although perhaps not impossible) for Obama to publicly pursue a renewed rapprochement with Russia for as long as Ukraine’s territorial integrity is being violated. But at the same time, the Ukraine crisis is really a symptom of the badly deteriorated U.S.-Russia relationship and not an independent cause of it. If U.S.-Russia relations had been sturdier in late 2013 and early 2014—if Russia believed that the U.S. would be willing and able to halt its aggression against Ukraine, for example, or alternatively if the two countries were operating on a cordial basis—then the political crisis in Ukraine might never have happened, and certainly could have been contained more easily than it actually was—or wasn’t, as the case may be.

The truth is that, on Obama’s watch, the United States has been relatively ineffective at shaping the decision-making calculus of Putin. Certainly, Putin will have given little thought to American sensibilities or interests when he sanctioned the annexation of Crimea. Of course, the point is not that President Obama ought to be blamed for not exercising complete control over his counterparts in foreign capitals. No president can or should be held to such an unfair standard.  But it is the job of the U.S. government to adopt a coherent policy towards even the most antagonistic of adversaries. So how should Obama deal with Russia now that his initial preference for a cooperative relationship has been frustrated by Russian intransigence?

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