Is China Changing the Postwar Consensus or Enhancing It?
America’s apparent retreat from championing globalization, along with its lesser enthusiasm to sustain the postwar economic and security architectures that it helped establish and lead, has created openings for China, as the world’s number two, to take on greater international responsibilities consequent with its rise. Against this backdrop, leadership transition and political developments in China has become closely watched events by an international community eager to find clues on future policy directions China may take. Will China become bolder in taking greater regional and global commitments as its pronouncements and actions suggest? Or will it be more cautious and circumspect given the risks and uncertainties? Is President Xi Jinping’s third term a move towards stability and continuity, or is it another disruption in a world already fraught with considerable unpredictability?
Xi’s third term broke the post-Deng tradition of term limits and, as such, is considered a disruptive development in domestic politics. Though there had been different accounts on the motive behind the move, the need for steady hands amidst uncertain times is one potent explanation. The United States is in decline, not so much in terms of capacity but rather largely by choice. In the meantime, China’s economy continues to gather strength, but dangers in the transition to a new normal still cast a long shadow in ongoing reforms. Therefore, the need for stability and continuity to take greater advantage of the period of strategic opportunity is imperative. The disruptive impact of Xi’s third term in China’s leadership succession is thus dampened by the perceived benefits of its intended purpose. Meanwhile, in the international realm, Xi’s third term suggest strong policy continuity.
Eroding Traditional Norms and Order
China’s growing economic power and political influence have tremendous disruptive effect. But this disruption can be good or bad depending on where one sits. The inflexibility of Western-led global governance to accommodate emerging powers has encouraged the latter to establish parallel regional and global economic and security platforms that gives due regard to their voices and interests. Xi’s “New Asian security concept” and “community of shared destiny for mankind,” while remaining nebulous and still largely aspirational, is tapping into a strong undercurrent of exclusion, domestic interference and inequality in the current security framework. His Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are responding to tremendous demand for infrastructure finance long deserted by the Bretton Woods multilateral development institutions. Thus, while there is no question that China’s rise contributes to the erosion of the traditional Western-led global order and the values they underpin, the dormant seeds for that attrition have long been there.
It is arguable whether China desires to supplant the existing order with its own, or if it simply wants meaningful reforms to take place to reflect the changing times. China is the world’s largest crude oil importer, and it makes sense for China to encourage purchases be done in yuan. But even this will not catapult the renminbi to the top from its present position in the lower rung of the world’s most traded currencies. Hence, its immediate disruptive impact tends to be overhyped, although long-term potential is present—especially if this strategy will be replicated in other key commodities that China is a major consumer and importer of. Furthermore, whether Chinese-backed initiatives constitute a better alternative to the prevailing order, or if they are even ready to substitute for the latter, remain to be established. Those who view Chinese intentions with suspicion—who think China, wittingly or unwittingly, may embolden challenges to long-standing rights, market and governance norms—may, thus, see China’s international activities as bad disruption.
Challenging the Order to Reform?