Deterrence Isn't Enough to Keep Syria from Using Chemical Weapons

Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology stress fire. DVIDSHUB/Public domain

A policy based primarily on counterproliferation is challenged by its limited use of diplomacy.

Images from the attack on Khan Sheikhoun on April 4 showed victims limp, with pinpoint eyes and frothing mouths, as emergency responders rushed to strip clothes from bodies and hose away chemical substances. For many, the U.S. strikes on a Syrian air base two days later were a satisfying response and long overdue in a protracted, deadly civil war that has left millions of families shattered, Daesh emboldened and Assad seemingly immune.

The following day, the World Health Organization issued a statement that symptoms, including the lack of visible external injuries, were consistent with exposure to nerve agents. Some of the victims sent to Turkey for treatment, who later died, reportedly tested positive for sarin. Taken together with conclusions by the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) that Syrian forces deployed chlorine as a weapon on at least three occasions in the northern province of Idlib in 2014 and 2015, a number of capitals, including Washington, concluded that Assad was responsible for the attacks. The Trump administration claimed that it struck Shayrat Air Base, from which it said the attack on April 4 had been launched.

After the attacks on Khan Sheikhoun, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) issued a statement that it had already begun collecting and analyzing data. Its investigations and conclusions provide vital independent, third-party evidence on violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, for the international community to decide upon action. Accordingly, there is concern that the strikes ordered by Trump were too hasty—that time for the OPCW and the JIM is needed to investigate and confirm sarin use, and identify who is responsible, before military action is taken.

The need for investigation is underscored by previous sarin attacks in Syria. Inquiries confirmed the attacks at Ghouta back in August 2013 released sarin on a relatively large scale, but the perpetrators have never been formally identified. There is convincing evidence that surface-to-surface rockets were used, which the Syrian military, not the opposition, were believed to possess. However, the UN Security Council excluded the Ghouta attacks from the JIM’s mandate, limiting its scope only to investigating allegations that the OPCW has confirmed involved chemical agents since 2014. Moreover, an OPCW report from last August detailed discoveries of precursors for agents like soman and VX at several undeclared facilities in Syria. In other words, while the OPCW has verified that all of Syria’s declared chemical weapons have been destroyed, it has not been able to confirm the entire program has been eliminated.

The U.S. strikes are likely a one-off, sending a “message” that the use of chemical weapons will no longer be tolerated, although the messaging required further clarification and explanation. White House press secretary Sean Spicer said last week that the administration would respond in a similar fashion “if you gas a baby or if you put a barrel bombing to innocent people.” Spicer had to later clarify that if the barrel bombs—a weapon routinely used by Syrian forces—contained chemical agents, then a military response would be possible. President Trump stated that the United States would not get involved with Syria, but would continue attacks if the use of chemical weapons is repeated. As the messaging is being refined, the Trump policy seems to be one of counterproliferation.

In their Final Communiqué on April 10–11, G-7 leaders stated that U.S. action against the Shayrat airfield “was a carefully calibrated, limited in scope response” to the attacks at Khan Sheikhoun “in order to prevent and deter the proliferation and use of deadly chemical weapons in Syria.” After the meeting, U.S. secretary of state Rex Tillerson stated the U.S. strikes were a matter of national security: “We do not want the regime’s uncontrolled stockpile of chemical weapons to fall into the hands of ISIS, or other terrorist groups and want to attack the United States and our allies.”

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