Donald Trump's Big Trip to Asia: What Can Washington Do to Reassure ASEAN?

Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Chafee (DDG 90) leaves Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii, U.S. on June 13, 2017. Courtesy Kelsey L. Adams/U.S. Navy/Handout via REUTERS

Trump has an opportunity to begin shaping Southeast Asia's geopolitical map in America’s favor.

Last month, the White House announced that President Donald Trump will travel to Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam and the Philippines in November. In Vietnam and the Philippines, he will participate in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit, respectively. This is a great itinerary for Trump’s first presidential foray into the region—the lineup includes three of Washington’s five regional allies; Asia’s two largest economies; three of America’s top six trade partners; the crisis-prone Korean peninsula; a flight over the contested South China Sea; and two major summits in a region in which, as the saying goes, half of diplomacy is just showing up. In short, the trip will present the president and his team with a great learning opportunity and a superb chance to advance America’s interests in Asia.

Media attention—and likely the president’s as well—will almost certainly be focused on President Trump’s efforts vis-à-vis North Korea and with respect to trade. These have been priorities for the Trump administration from day one. With “Rocket Man” lobbing missiles over the Japanese home islands and Beijing placing unrelenting pressure on the administration of Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, it’s easy to let Asia’s traditional hotspots distract from the Southeast Asian subregion. But it is in the latter half of his trip that the president will have an opportunity to begin shaping the region’s geopolitical map in America’s favor.

Mixed Signals from The White House

Before President Trump can do so, however, he must first reassure Southeast Asian elites that he understands the region’s importance and that he sees the ASEAN member states as more than tools with which to enact his North Korea policy. Over the first eight months of his presidency, signals have been mixed.

One of Trump’s first actions as president was to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the high-standards free trade agreement that would have tied together twelve Pacific Rim countries, including four from Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei). The TPP was an imperfect trade agreement, but Trump’s withdrawal, without even an offer to renegotiate, threw under the bus American negotiating partners that had expended political capital in their respective capitals. The withdrawal signaled, unintentionally or not, that the new administration was content to see China take the lead in establishing the regional trade order.

The maritime Southeast Asian states were likewise disappointed that four full months passed by after the inauguration without a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea, in contravention of expectations that the new administration would eschew Obama-era timidity on the issue. There have now been four such exercises since late May—the president reportedly eschewed earlier FONOPs to avoid antagonizing China as Washington sought Beijing’s assistance with North Korea—and Trump has reportedly approved a plan for regular patrols into next year, but how these operations fit into a U.S. strategy for the South China Sea—or whether such a strategy even exists—remains an open question.

To be sure, there have been welcome signals of engagement in the region as well. Over one weekend in late April, President Trump had separate phone calls with President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore and Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha of Thailand—the leaders of America’s two allies in Southeast Asia and of a very close security partner (Singapore). The president invited all three leaders to the White House (none has yet visited). One can take issue with the president’s outreach, in particular, to Chan-ocha (he’s a coup leader) and Duterte (human rights abuses have been on the rise since he came to power), but the closely scheduled phone calls marked an unambiguous signal that the Trump administration values its oldest partners in the Southeast Asia.

This past summer, U.S. special operators and surveillance aircraft provided support for the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their battle with ISIS-linked militants, which laid siege to the southern city of Marawi. The events that have unfolded in Marawi are tragic, but American engagement should have served as a potent reminder to the anti-American Duterte that Chinese money cannot begin to match the value of the U.S.-Philippines alliance. There is a reason the annual joint military exercises are dubbed “Balikatan,” which means “shoulder-to-shoulder” in Tagalog. The Philippine defense minister has just announced a return in 2018 to a fuller schedule of bilateral exercises after Duterte ordered a more limited set in 2017.

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