Since the attacks of September 11, the United States has engaged in and with Afghanistan in pursuit of common strategic interests. Our cooperation with the Afghan government and Afghan people remains a key front in a generational conflict against violent extremists across the greater Middle East.  Although the extensive turmoil there leads some to believe that the United States is incapable of playing a constructive role in stabilizing and transforming the region’s politics and security situation, we cannot escape this conflict. To succeed, we need, above all, allies in the region with whom we can partner militarily and politically. Our strategies and policies going forward should include ensuring the success of this American-Afghan partnership.

The Obama years have encompassed an intense, challenging period in Afghanistan policy. The U.S. role in the war in that country, dating back to 2001, has cost more than 2,300 American lives and $800 billion in American resources, most over the last eight years. We mourn the dead and wounded and grieve for their families, and profoundly cherish their service to the nation. The mission has demanded enormous military, diplomatic and economic attention and investment.  The numerous complexities were made more challenging by difficult relations with former Afghan leader President Hamid Karzai during his latter years in office, from an unsettled Afghan political environment more generally, from the legacy of disintegration of an Afghan state that had historically never been strong, and from the dual role of Pakistan—part friend, part strategic challenge in the conflict.    

President Obama has attempted to use the prospect of possible American/NATO withdrawal from the country to induce Afghan reforms and an Afghan sense of self-reliance. But ultimately, while progress has been achieved, he concluded that he cannot end the U.S. role in Afghanistan and that he would have to hand off an ongoing mission to his successor. Fortunately, that U.S. role today is much more modest than before—less than 10 percent of earlier American troop levels, less than 20 percent of earlier financial costs, and less than 5 percent of earlier U.S. casualty rates, as of this writing late in the early fall of 2016.

The next American president will have an opportunity to settle Afghan policy onto a more durable, more effective, and less demanding course. In our view, the watchword for this new approach should be one of an enduring partnership, based on mutual commitment. We should plan for a long-term American—and coalition—role in the country that avoids the recent pattern of nearly annual reassessments of whether the United States should stay, militarily and as a major donor.  We should also avoid publicly-announced withdrawal timelines. Instead, we should take a quieter and more patient approach, consistent with the commitments the international community made at Bonn in 2011 to help make the entire 2015-2024 period the “decade of transformation” in Afghanistan.  The U.S.-Afghan partnership should be recognized as generational in duration, given the nature of the threat and the likely longevity of its future manifestations. Less attention should be placed on troop numbers, and troop caps, as the barometer of whether an exit strategy is being successfully implemented. Rather, the emphasis should be on securing Afghanistan as a crucial pillar of America’s global anti-terror campaign and as a needed contributor to stability in the region.

The U.S. and broader international commitment should not, however, be unconditional.  Indeed, the notion of conditional engagement was agreed between donors and the Afghan government in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework of 2012 and remains valid today. If the enormous investment that the world has made in Afghanistan since 2001 is to be worthy of continuation, Afghans must do their part to improve governance and economic well-being, and thereby build public support for the government. The very enormity of that U.S. investment to date, and the value of Afghanistan in the broader struggle against jihadi extremism, argue strongly for trying to sustain—and build on—the progress we have collectively achieved so far. And while there is no easy answer about how to improve U.S. relations with Pakistan, we expect that clear articulation of an enduring American commitment to Afghanistan and the region can only help in gradually reducing the distrust and rivalry that often predominate in the relationships in Central and South Asia today.

American Interests in Afghanistan:

A new U.S. president could reasonably question the importance of Afghanistan to American security. Past expenditures sacrifices do not automatically mean that the country is strategically vital to American interests today. Indeed, the first President Bush concluded back in 1989 that Afghanistan was not worth continued U.S. investment. After covert programs in the 1980s to aid the Afghan mujahedeen, conducted with the cooperation of Pakistan and several other countries, achieved their goal of defeating invading Soviet forces, the United States effectively withdrew from the region.

But ignoring Afghanistan proved unwise. Beyond the stain on America’s honor of deserting wartime allies who had done much through their own sacrifice to defeat Communism and help win the Cold War, the turmoil that ensued in Afghanistan after 1989 ultimately gave rise to the Taliban—and then to the sanctuary for al Qaeda that the Taliban provided Osama bin Laden. The 9/11 attacks were planned in that sanctuary, and the initial training of the attackers was conducted there. The U.S. disengagement also helped create cynicism among many Pakistani security officials about American motives and American dependability. Pakistan was left largely on its own to cope with the aftermath of the successful mujahedeen effort against Soviet forces, absorbing millions of refugees and other burdens. Also, our departure encouraged some Pakistani leaders to believe that we would ultimately give them a free hand in Afghanistan to pursue their own interests.

The consequences have been enormous and enduring. Pakistanis have referenced this past American behavior to call into question U.S. commitment to the region going forward. They have often then used this concern, however unreasonably, to justify Pakistan’s own policies of tolerating and in some cases supporting Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network safe havens on its territory.  These safe havens have, perhaps more than any other factor, precluded successful conclusion of the counterinsurgency campaign within Afghanistan. Absent change in Pakistan’s behavior, they are likely to continue doing so.

Even today, Afghanistan is central to what has been called the war on terror or war against Islamic extremism. It is clearly important in its own right. It also provides a location, and an ally, for watching and if necessary attacking extremists across the region.

Afghan leaders who would take America’s commitment as a given under any and all circumstances should not do so. Afghanistan may not be vital to American security in the strictest sense of the word.  But it is very important, as Americans collectively learned when we essentially ignored what happened there from 1989 through 2001.

Of all the countries in which we are militarily engaged, Afghanistan is one of the few where our armed forces are overwhelmingly welcome. Its leaders understand the danger they face and want to partner with us in confronting it—even if they do not always adequately partner with each other.  Its security forces, while still developing, are gradually becoming capable and resolute, especially in those sectors where they have strong field commanders who have achieved their positions through competence rather than patronage. To be sure, nations such as Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan are also central in this great counterterrorism challenge of our times. And Pakistan is particularly significant in that regard, with some 200 million people, more than 100 nuclear weapons, and a number of al Qaeda senior leaders and extremist groups on its territory.  But the U.S. role in Afghanistan helps create an eastern bulwark, as well as an eastern base of operations, in this wider generation-long campaign. Such an asset is crucial for the ongoing struggle that the next U.S. president will face regardless of whether he or she wishes it. To be sure, the American military posture in Afghanistan and the broader allocation of U.S. assistance resources need to be efficient and sustainable. Yet, they also should be adequate to the significant task that is still at hand.

Defining American Objectives:

Even if we know the stakes in Afghanistan, how do we define our goals? The ideal endgame for the next American president would be a successful resolution of the conflict, with Afghans securing and governing their country so that it will not again become a place where extremists can find sanctuary, and so that it can be a long-term strategic partner of the United States and its allies.

But this goal, which implies an acceptable political settlement with the insurgent elements in Afghanistan, may be too ambitious for some time to come. If overemphasized as a practical policy objective, rather than a long-term vision, it could create unrealistic expectations among the American people, renew doubts about our staying power among Afghans and Pakistanis, and give too much leverage over our policy to the Taliban.

While we strongly support the objective of a peaceful Afghanistan, we recommend a realistic attitude toward negotiations with violent armed actors. A fair amount of the Afghan resistance has historically been made up of “accidental guerrillas” who fight more for reasons of tribe or local grievance than for ideology or national-level goals. Ideally, over time, some fraction of these fighters could be persuaded in one way or another to lay down their arms and reintegrate into society and the body politic. Nonetheless, the Taliban (including the so-called Haqqani Network) remains a crucial part of the insurgency—and a durable one. And its central leadership, based in Quetta and Peshawar, as well as in Pakistan’s tribal areas and perhaps in cities like Karachi too, shows few signs of moderating its longstanding and extremist war aims. These include reestablishment of a theocratic government without a commitment to human rights (including those of women and minorities), and without accountability to Afghan citizens through processes such as elections. The Taliban also maintains strong ties to numerous terrorist groups. To hinge U.S. policy on the expectation of a compromise with such a group would be unwise.  We should aspire to work towards such a goal but not be overly optimistic about achieving it on any specific timeline.

The operational U.S. goals in Afghanistan should be twofold.In the short term, our objective should be an Afghanistan increasingly capable of handling its security challenges and governance duties with only modest foreign help. In the longer term, the goal should be a peaceful, more prosperous, and better governed country that contributes to regional security. To accomplish these objectives, the United States and other key foreign actors such as NATO allies, India, and China, as well as the EU and UN, should seek the following:

- to help sustain and strengthen the Afghan state,

- to prevent the establishment of any large-scale safe havens for al Qaeda, ISIS, and other transnational extremist groups on Afghan soil,

- to collaborate with Afghanistan against other regional extremist threats,

- to maintain, in cooperation with Afghan partners, the forces and facilities essential to confront these threats,

- to gradually contain and weaken the Taliban and other violent armed actors who continue to refuse to negotiate a peaceful and just settlement,

- to seek to change the strategic calculus of the Taliban about their prospects for defeating the Afghan government, and

- to change the behavior of regional players, particularly Pakistan, to support Afghan stability.  This could involve sharpening the incentives, both positive and negative, posed to Islamabad by Washington and other outside actors.

Accomplishing these objectives will require a steadfast commitment from the United States and its partners, an equal commitment from Afghanistan, coordinated international efforts that integrate diplomatic, development, economic, and military instruments, and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbors as well.

In other words, we should prepare and posture ourselves for what could be a generation-long struggle against extremism, with Afghanistan a key part of that struggle. However daunting and open-ended such a mission may sound, we have scaled back the level of American and other foreign commitment to the country and region to a level that is sustainable (even if we might consider modestly greater allocations of resources and modestly more expansive policies for employing those resources for a time, as discussed below).

The Mixed Picture in Afghanistan Today:

A new U.S. president might reasonably ask if all of these big words and ambitious aims are realistic for what some consider a losing effort in Afghanistan. Indeed, were certain dynamics to deteriorate further in Afghanistan, particularly in terms of the country’s politics and the performance of its leadership, at some point the United States might have to reconsider its commitment.  As we noted above, that commitment should not be seen as unconditional.  American interests in Afghanistan are very important, but they may not be existential for the United States.  Washington needs to remind Afghan interlocutors of this important distinction, even as it conveys that its strong preference is to continue to build an enduring partnership in pursuit of common strategic interests.

The overall situation in Afghanistan today is indeed fraught, and far short of the aspirations many of us harbored at an earlier time. We are aware that it could deteriorate at any moment, with the fall of a major city to the Taliban, the assassination of a key leader, or some other dramatic event—or the constant, insidious erosion of government control in certain parts of the country. Yet there is also much upon which to attempt to build:

- The security situation in Afghanistan is deeply worrisome, especially in certain sectors of the country. Yet it is not catastrophic.Though the Taliban has taken control of some districts and is threatening some important roads, and though it has realized gains in Helmand Province to the south as well as the Baghlan/Kunduz axis to the north, the Taliban controls no urban population centers or provincial capitals as of this writing in September, 2016.

- The UN estimates that war is causing about 10,000 civilian casualties a year at present, of which perhaps 3,000 are deaths—higher than at any time records have been kept this century.  Statistically, however, that is still a lower death rate from violence than countries that have come to be seen as success stories, like Colombia. Cities still bustle; the majority of markets, schools and health care clinics are still open; the population is not cowering in fear in most of the country; and citizens still enjoy unprecedented access to cellphones, TV and other media. Blast barriers and devastated neighborhoods of the type seen throughout many war zones in the Middle East today do not dominate the Afghan urban landscape—even if there is regrettably some chance that they will be needed in places if the late-summer wave of violence in Kabul and elsewhere continues or intensifies.

- Afghan security forces were unable to prevent Kunduz from temporarily falling to the enemy in the fall of 2015. But then they retook it, with limited though important American help, within a couple of weeks. They stopped the December, 2015 Taliban attack on the Kandahar airfield, though 35 civilians still lost their lives. They also repulsed coordinated Taliban probes against a number of other regional centers in the immediate aftermath of the Kunduz debacle. Earlier in 2015, moreover, the Afghan army planned and conducted three major operations essentially on its own, two of them involving multiple corps (each corps is about 25,000 strong, and each has specific geographic responsibilities). The Afghan Army seems particularly improved in the east, with strong commanders in the 201st and 203rd corps (two of Afghanistan’s six main army corps).  The Taliban do remain resilient. They have gained some net holdings since NATO’s force levels declined by 90 percent starting in 2011, and since its formal role in the war effort ended in late 2014.  But Taliban gains, while certainly worrisome and growing in provinces such as Helmand, Paktia, Khost, Baghlan and Kunduz, have been limited, as measured by affected population.

- There is still nepotism, ethnic factionalization, and corruption in the military and police. But President Ashraf Ghani, working with Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, has retired more than 70 ineffective senior military officers since coming to office in 2014. While Afghan forces still spend too much time at checkpoints, rather than on offensive operations, they are improving in the latter category. They are also showing great bravery (suffering more than 5,000 fatalities a year in recent times).  Afghans clearly are fighting—and dying—for their country. That said, we acknowledge being concerned about the slow pace of reform in some sectors of the Afghan security forces, and the retention of some undeserving leaders in key positions of authority.  Indeed, the rate of reform, and of replacing mediocre but politically connected commanders, may have slowed in 2016. Two or even three or four effective army corps commanders, out of six, is not an adequate number.

- The coalition government of national unity of Ghani and Abdullah, inaugurated in September of 2014 after a major election controversy, then consumed half a year in quarrels over formation of a cabinet and other such disputes. After a relatively quiet interlude, the relationship of these two leaders and their respective followers deteriorated further in the summer of 2016. We are collectively very concerned about this dynamic—yet it is important to bear in mind that however heated at times, the push and pull remains essentially political, rather than violent.

- While preparations for overdue parliamentary elections are significantly behind schedule, Afghanistan’s overall track record on holding national votes has had some relative successes.  Today, the parliamentary elections are delayed partly because many Afghans wish to see electoral reforms prior to such a vote, and the reforms have proven difficult to achieve. The United States and other foreign actors need to strike a balance between pushing for these reforms and elections, while staying flexible on modalities and on timing.

- Afghanistan remains a corrupt, patronage-based society. Still, there has been progress.  Beyond some of the improved appointments in the military and cabinet, Ghani and Abdullah have tightened oversight in the awarding of government contracts. Macroeconomic management, tax collection, and the budgeting process have made notable gains. However, there is no question that corruption and patronage have slowed down the pace of development and growth in an economy already hammered by the great reduction of international spending, as U.S. and allied troops withdrew most of their forces over the last half decade. Afghanistan’s economy grew at only about 1.5% a year from 2013 through 2015 following an average rate of about 11 percent a year from 2007 through 2012. That economic downturn helps explain, in part, the high rate of emigration from Afghanistan in recent times, fostering a brain drain that must be halted.

- The Afghan people are worried. Yet they have not abandoned a vision of an economically developing, peaceful, and just Afghanistan. In a 2015 Asia Foundation survey, they expressed more concern about the country’s future than at any other time in the last decade, with only 37 percent voicing optimism (down starkly from 54 percent in 2014, when elections and the presidential transition process were taking place). However, a substantial majority—75 percent, essentially unchanged from the recent past—expressed contentment and happiness with their lives despite it all. That is partly a reflection of some of the positive attributes that many of us have come to appreciate about Afghans. It also may reflect their view that, as bad as things are, the nation is not on the verge of collapse. And while two-thirds say the security situation is not good, more than two-thirds express confidence in their nation’s army and police.

The Path Ahead:

It is not our purpose here to recommend a detailed way forward for the United States in 2017 and beyond. A new president and his or her advisors will have to carry out that task, after first wrestling with the big strategic questions we discuss above and taking stock of actual conditions as they present themselves in the region next year. We would only wish to identify several of the lines of analysis and inquiry that any such review should squarely address:

- Is a U.S. troop presence of some 8,500 Americans, as now planned, adequate? What strategy should guide their employment? What force mix is most appropriate? We would counsel less attention to numbers, and less public emphasis on the size of the American troop presence as the central metric in evaluating the success or failure of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The stability of Afghanistan and our ability to keep pressure on extremists in the region matter more than continual progress towards a smaller international military presence. But that said, it is worth noting that three years ago, U.S. commanders developed an option requiring 5,000 more foreign troops, and more intelligence capabilities, than are now envisioned. That larger posture, in conjunction with other NATO forces, would have provided the ability to work with each of Afghanistan’s six major Army corps throughout the country, while also providing counterterrorism and intelligence and training capabilities. Some of the deterioration in the Afghan security environment in recent times can be directly traced to the absence of these U.S./NATO capabilities—though Afghan leaders themselves must accept their fair share of the blame.

- Is U.S./NATO airpower being used intensively enough?  President Obama gave authorities to commanders to target ISIL in 2016.  He subsequently gave authorities to expand certain operations against the Taliban as well. But since the Afghan air force is not likely to be fully built for some years, there is a case for further reassessment. It will be important to ask if the relaxation of rules of engagement that President Obama provided to American/NATO forces in Afghanistan in 2016 should go further, allowing even more substantial use of their airpower against the Taliban.

- How should Washington try to engage Afghan politics? Political and diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan today are focused on managing immediate crises, of which there is never any shortage. It would be highly desirable to change this dynamic. Indeed, given the daunting challenges, the United States can be flexible about how the future government is structured, and about when already-overdue parliamentary and district council elections will be held, as long as such decisions reflect general agreement among Afghan political leaders including President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah. Political processes in general should comport with the Afghan Constitution and with the goal of achieving as much reasonable political consensus as possible. (In this context, it is worth noting that the Afghan Constitution allows only two terms per person over a lifetime.) The United States should help Afghans remain politically united and improve governance, while remaining alert that some there would likely seek to manipulate us for their own purposes. For the longer term, we should engage constructive groups across Afghan society and encourage them to find ways to press for deeper political reforms.

- Can development assistance be better focused? Ongoing U.S. development assistance levels of about $1 billion a year (in addition to the $4 billion annually that the United States is still providing to support Afghan security forces) are complemented by comparable aggregate donations from other governments, multilateral development banks, the United Nations and select NGOs. It is very important to continue the long, hard task of improving accountability and efficiency in dispersing assistance and reducing corruption, while improving the delivery of government services. That means, in part, channeling more funds through the national government while carefully monitoring their use, so as to improve public finance. Ideas like strengthening the role of the U.N. Special Representative to coordinate the aid flows in partnership with the Afghan government are worth examining. And predatory corruption in particular needs to be targeted—blatant theft of large sums of funds from the public purse.

- How should the United States adjust its Pakistan policy? Washington and Islamabad have common interests in many areas. Moreover, it is critical that this nuclear-armed country of 200 million remain stable. We wish to see a Pakistan that is at peace with its neighbors, peaceful internally, and economically thriving. Sustaining operations in Afghanistan without Pakistani ground lines of communication, while possible, would be very difficult and costly. These considerations argue strongly for cooperation.

However, it is clear that the course of action we have pursued since the early 2000s has not produced the needed changes in Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan. Pakistan tolerates and, in some cases, supports the forces that target and kill U.S. military and civilian personnel, other foreigners, and many Afghans. The Taliban has safe havens within parts of Pakistan and access there to funds and equipment. The United States needs to oppose Pakistan’s role in these dynamics at every turn. In its dealings with Islamabad, Washington should prioritize these issues even more than on requesting Pakistan’s help with peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.    

Some believe that Pakistanis tolerate the Taliban out of conviction that America will again desert them—just as it did in 1989. But the United States has already stayed in Afghanistan 15 years this time, with no plans to leave. Under our proposal it would envision staying in the region a good deal longer.  This is desirable, and it should help allay Pakistani fears that it will again face an Afghanistan in chaos or an Afghanistan dominated by its rival, India. Our purpose should be to change Pakistan’s calculus over time, while recognizing that whatever policies we adopt, Islamabad will likely not change its Afghanistan policy quickly (even if civilian leaders in Pakistan decide they favor that outcome).

This serious situation calls for a fundamental review of available options by the next U.S. administration. Without advocating these as a group, we would suggest serious consideration of some or all of the below (though some of us are more wary of the last two options):

- The United States could take further steps to pressure Taliban sanctuaries within Pakistan (with or without the support of Islamabad). The May, 2016 killing of Mullah Mansour, the head of the Afghan Taliban, while he was traveling through southwestern Pakistan indicates the kind of direct action against the Taliban and Haqqani Network that could make an important difference.

- The Obama administration and Congress have already reduced Coalition Support Funds to Pakistan in recent years, and curtailed the use of Foreign Military Financing as well. But even today’s reduced amounts of U.S. assistance could be cut further. If Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan does not improve, in fact, the U.S. Congress will likely see to that, whatever the next American president may wish.

- Targeted economic sanctions could be selectively applied against certain specific organizations and individuals; Washington could encourage other countries to consider similar steps.

- Pakistan could even be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, a finding that would not only be embarrassing to the country but also harmful to its economic prospects, given the likely influence on potential investors.   

In more positive terms, Washington might also sketch out a vision of an improved relationship with Pakistan if Islamabad would show more forthright and consistent support for the goals of NATO in Afghanistan. This outcome would be highly desirable for broader American interests, given Pakistan’s central role in the stability of the entire region—and its ability to upend that stability.  Washington should underscore that it could only be realized after Pakistan had verifiably acted to end its policies of sanctuary and support for the insurgents.

Conclusion:

The situation in Afghanistan today is difficult. But it may not be measurably worse than one might have projected back in 2012 or 2013, when the Taliban resistance had already proven itself resilient in the wake of a NATO troop surge, and when elections loomed in Afghanistan as President Karzai’s second term in office neared its end. Compared with that benchmark, and in light of the fact that NATO withdrew 125,000 of the world’s best soldiers over the last five years and then circumscribed the role of U.S./NATO airpower, some deterioration was to be expected.  The situation also remains considerably improved, in terms of the economy and human rights and human welfare, from what it was before—not only in the 1980s and 1990s but even in the early years after the overthrow of the Taliban.  Since then, life expectancy has increased at least 10 years, child mortality has been cut at least in half, several million more children including millions of girls are in school, GDP per capita has more than doubled, a ring road has been completed (even if security conditions along it are not consistently as good as they should be), and many millions of Afghans have unprecedented access to cellphones, internet and media. And, the United States has a coalition of international partners willing to stay the course with us.

While dangers are always present, new possibilities lie ahead. Determined collaboration between the White House and Congress as well as Afghan leaders can break the cycle of yearly approaches to the brink of the policymaking cliff. That can in turn help create a longer time horizon for security, political, and economic reforms that will surely take an additional decade or more even to reach a modest degree of success. In light of the continued extremist threat in Central and South Asia, and thus the importance of Afghanistan to western security, this is a burden that we can afford to bear—and one to which we should mutually commit in partnership with the Afghan people and government.

Ambassadors to Afghanistan

Ryan Crocker

James Cunningham

Robert Finn

Zalmay Khalilzad

Ronald Neumann

Military Commanders in Afghanistan

John Allen

David Barno

John Campbell

Stanley McChrystal

David Petraeus

Special Representatives for Afghanistan/Pakistan

James Dobbins

Marc Grossman

Afghanistan Scholars

Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Brookings Institution

Seth Jones, RAND Corporation

Clare Lockhart, Institute for State Effectiveness

Michael O’Hanlon, The Brookings Institution

Bruce Riedel, The Brookings Institution

David Sedney, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Earl Anthony (Tony) Wayne, Center for Strategic and International Studies