How the West Can Defuse Russian-Turkish Tensions

December 3, 2015 Topic: Security Region: Middle East Tags: RussiaTurkeyNATOForeign PolicySyria

How the West Can Defuse Russian-Turkish Tensions

NATO must work to keep aggression from spilling over.

Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet has transformed Russian public interest in the country’s strategy in the Middle East. In the initial stages of the Russian campaign in Syria, about 14% disapproved of it while the majority of people had a blurry understanding—apart from what had been in the mainstream news—of what Russia was seeking in the region. The disastrous incident with the Su-24 jet has triggered what may be called a “Russian paradox”: while most people still have a vague notion of what the Russian upsurge in the Middle East is all about, public support for it has quadrupled, with various groups of people, from rank and file to the experts to the opinion-makers, demanding a decisive retaliation against Turkey and more harsh actions against “radical Islamists” in Syria. “We were stabbed in the back” by "accomplices of terrorists": President Putin’s initial assessment, presented in tough terms, may have sounded too emotional, but it is a label that will surely endure and shape Russian discourse on the issue for a long while.

The possibility of such a tragedy has been discussed from the very beginning of the Russian campaign. Experts warned that once there were casualties, it would be a blow to the notion of the success that the Kremlin expected. Russian intelligence forces have noted that weapons capable of reaching Russian planes, at the heights where they operated, hadn’t fallen into the hands of the “ radicals” they bombed. In this respect, Moscow was expecting a “provocation” from the U.S., Saudis or Qataris, but not the Turks, given their dynamic bilateral relations. Certainly, Moscow knew about the ties of different groups in Turkey, including some in the government, with ISIL and other extremist Sunni groups. But Russia calculated that Ankara’s main objectives were twofold: toppling Assad, and undermining the Kurds with cheap oil from ISIL-controlled facilities as a profitable perk. None of them, in Moscow’s vision, included a direct attack on the Russians—even though disagreement over Assad has poisoned relations for a long while. The Russian narrative of the ISIL threat acquired another dimension when President Putin, speaking at the G20 Summit in Turkey, strongly condemned the financial feeding of terrorists and vowed to expose those who support ISIL through oil purchases.

When the downing of the Russian plane took place several days later, there were four specific factors that took the Russians from being speechless to being infuriated.

First, the very fact that the shoot-down took place was shocking. Regardless of Turkey’s claims, Russian officials continue to believe that Erdogan’s team overreacted. The explanation presented by the Turks as “concrete grounds” for the downing didn’t seem to hold up against criticism, no matter how you approach them. If the jet was entirely in Syrian airspace—as the heat signature allegedly reveals—then the downing was not legal in any case. If the plane indeed violated Turkish airspace and Turkish forces were able to spot it and react, the argument goes, was it all that necessary to shoot it instead of escorting it out, considering recent incidents in which other countries shepherded Turkish jets out of their airspace? In this case, however, the calculus behind the arguments seems somewhat stretched, since doubts remain how the ten warnings that the Turkish side claims it had signaled were delivered within the seventeen seconds the plane allegedly spent in Turkish airspace.

Erdogan’s later lamentations that Ankara did not know the jet was Russian seem to clash with his initial statements that Russians had repeatedly violated Turkish airspace before, and thus the Turkish government didn’t feel guilty for shooting it down. The Turkish president’s claim that he had tried to call Putin but “Putin has not returned my call” seems incredibly clumsy, since it came days after the catastrophe and bore no evidence. Finally, Prime Minister Davutoglu’s statements that Russia’s plane had to be downed because it violated Turkish airspace and because Russians have bombed the Turkmen in the region demonstrate a poor logic, mixing up root causes: was it ultimately about the Turkmen or the airspace violation?

Second, Russians were appalled by the video images of the two pilots being shot by the “Turkmen rebels”—who later turned out to be members of the right-wing Turkish group “Grey Wolves”—while the emergency helicopter that arrived to rescue the pilots was shattered by a rocket fired from the ground. Soon after the incident, media in the region reinforced the narrative put forward by the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry of the downing as a pre-planned provocation rather than a spontaneous response. That, too, helped shape a perception of an intentional hostile act rather than a “tragic mistake.”

Third, the way in which Turkish officials took responsibility for the action suggested that they were rubbing it in the Russians’ face. It didn’t take long, either, before it was perceived as a daunting challenge, together with a thick layer of national insult. Even now, as the case turns ugly for Turkey, Erdogan seems to be exacerbating the situation, galvanizing Russia’s response with warnings not to “play with fire.”

Fourth, NATO’s response to the incident stirred some strong reactions in the public as well. Moscow hardly expected the alliance to turn away from its member at a critical time. Neither did it hope to hear a strong condemnation of Ankara’s decision. Unlike previous confrontations, to the majority of Russians Moscow seemed to be the clear victim, not an aggressor. But even in this case, the West, as the Russians saw it, was trying to devise arguments defending the “bad guy.”

Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are certainly similar in many ways. Both leaders are inclined to authoritarian-style governance practices. Both have a certain vision to restore the respect (some would say fear) and the power their nations historically possessed. However, the aforementioned four factors have also transformed Russians’ perception: it's no longer just about Putin but about Russia itself. So no matter who adopted the decision to down the plane, and how, they deeply miscalculated both Putin and the Russians. Airstrikes on ISIL, its oil facilities and others the Kremlin considers “extremists” will be redoubled, not restrained, even if they bear severe implications.

Doing so drags Moscow further into the conflict. If that was an intentional calculation of those who decided to escalate with Russia, it was a short-sighted one. No matter how questionable Russian policy in the Syrian crisis may be, it is fairly predictable and dictated by a number of understandable drivers. The more insecure and vulnerable Moscow would feel, however, the more risky its policies may get. Should this happen, it will certainly turn out ugly for all the interested players.

Having a specific perception of Turkey, reinforced by a long history of wars, the downing came as a challenge not only to Kremlin officials, but to the entire population from Novocherkassk to Lipetsk (where the two killed servicemen’s funerals took place). It is a dangerous trend that is being stoked by the media as well as open discussions on the internet and social networks. Testing the limits of Russian response has never ended well for either side in recent history. Moscow is at the point where it is too ready to risk testing the limits of Turkey's counter-response. In that sense, when it says it is prepared if necessary to use S-400s, or the fighter jets that will from now on accompany its bombers, it means it.

An immediate targeted military response is unlikely. For Putin, revenge is best served cold. He might consider the long-term complications for Turkey, including political and security issues, as well as trade sanctions, tourism restrictions and businesses suspensions. The State Duma has reportedly been proposing to introduce a five-year imprisonment for denying of what is widely known as the Armenian genocide, while security experts relish on the prospects of arming the Kurds and working toward creating an independent Kurdistan. Both issues have historically been prime irritants for the Turks, but these are still brainstormed emotional arguments, not real policies up for debate. There are high-level officials in Russia, as well as serious experts, who argue against using this political heavy artillery. Although the context is extremely polarized and full of clamor for such actions, it may lead to even more dramatic consequences and stir up some of the skeletons that Russia has in its own closet.

It is important for everyone to understand that this time is not about whose story wins, Russia’s or Turkey’s. Public support from NATO may help the Turkish narrative win an international audience—or, at least, neutral treatment. However, given the scale and profoundness of public indignation in Russia, this “victory” will antagonize the country even further, reinforcing distrust and widening the chasm between Russia and Turkey—and more importantly, between Russia and the West. Who will be the winner in this case?

The incident has damaged more than just the bilateral Russian-Turkish relationship. It hampered NATO unity, though no signs of contention came to light publicly, and it made any hope for an idea of an alliance between the U.S.- and Russia-led coalitions dead on arrival. The downing of the Russian plane was the last sigh of Turkey’s "zero problems with neighbors" policy, which means Erdogan’s Turkey will now be the problem child of the transatlantic family, though its senior members may now claim otherwise.