How Trump Can Take on Iran (Without Sparking War)

Donald Trump at the ceremony to swear in Defense Secretary James Mattis. Wikimedia Commons/Secretary of Defense

What’s the endgame when you’re facing an immovable regime?

When former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn put Iran on notice last month for its test of a ballistic missile, it was music to the ears of Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu.

Even though the Israeli prime minister has, as Martin Indyk put it, lost his “wingman” on Iran (ousted national security advisor Michael Flynn), he still came to the White House this week expecting to solidify the Trump administration’s support for a more hawkish stance toward Tehran. He will leave Washington with an assurance from President Trump to more aggressively challenge Iran’s regional policies. But before the White House translates its rhetoric into reality, it needs to carefully consider the wisdom and practicality of rolling back Iran’s regional influence based first on American, not just Israeli interests, and carefully weigh the benefits of a more confrontational policy toward Iran against the potential costs, risks and consequences. More than likely, a tougher policy against Iranian assertiveness in the region isn’t going to work. Here’s why.

The Options Suck

The United States should sanction Iran for testing ballistic missiles in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions, and hold Tehran accountable for strict compliance with its obligations under the nuclear agreement. It should also impose sanctions against Hezbollah to deter and punish its acts of terrorism. But does Washington have the will, the capacity and the allies to effectively challenge and roll back Iran’s regional behavior and influence? Chest thumping might make the Trump administration feel good and look tough, but the options it has to contain, let alone roll back, Iran’s influence are severely limited because of Iran’s superior geographic, demographic and political advantages, and the support of committed and capable local allies.

In Iraq, the United States needs Iran’s cooperation, and the fighting power of the Shia militias it controls, to defeat ISIL. It also needs to work effectively with an Iraqi government that is under Tehran’s sway. The number one priority of U.S. and Iraq military forces is to liberate Mosul from the Islamic State and then prevent it from reconstituting elsewhere in Iraq. The very last thing the United States needs now is a proxy war with Iran it can’t win. It’s no wonder why voices at DOD are cautioning against designating the entire IRGC a terrorist organization—an act that would almost certainly put U.S. forces at greater risk in Iraq (and throughout the region).

In Syria, the United States has lashed itself to a weak and disorganized opposition and is squaring off against an Iran that has more assets and allies on the ground, including militarily capable Shia proxy forces from all over the region and Hezbollah units. It also benefits enormously from Russia’s military presence in the country. More importantly, Syria is vital to Iran’s interests in preserving Alawite rule in Damascus and maintaining a window into Lebanon. As long as the Trump administration continues to give priority to defeating the Islamic State in Syria, believes it can secure Russian cooperation in this fight, and wants to preserve the nuclear agreement with Iran, it will be reluctant to take on Iran in Syria.

And in Yemen, Iran is aligned with rebel Houthi forces. They are tough fighters and benefit from the support of the previous regime. The irresponsible and ineffective Saudi bombing campaign in Yemen has only bolstered their popularity. What exactly is Washington going to do to contain Iran? Increasing U.S. support for the Saudi air campaign will further tarnish America’s already battered image. Backing one Yemeni faction against the Houthis will further enmesh the United States in a messy civil war without having much impact on the ground. Boarding and seizing Iranian naval vessels bound with weapons to Yemen is unlikely to be effective and risks a serious U.S.-Iranian confrontation. The only vital U.S. interest in Yemen is destroying Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—an interest shared by Iran.

Is it possible that the Trumpians understand these realities? It’s still early, but for all its blustery anti-Iranian rhetoric, the United States’ actions have yet to match its words. After saying during the campaign that he would walk away from the nuclear agreement with Iran, the president has, at least for now, decided to stick with the accord. When Flynn put Iran on notice, he did not say one word about holding Iran to account in Syria for its support of the murderous Assad regime. The administration has yet to aggressively challenge Iranian resupply of the Houthis, while its previous enthusiasm for designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization appears to be waning. Both Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and CIA director Mike Pompeo see Iran as the most serious threat to U.S. interests in the region. Still, the Trump administration is showing uncharacteristic restraint toward Iran, and Netanyahu hoped to use his meeting with the president to stiffen the White House’s backbone on Iran.

What To Do?

Pages