How Turkey's Geopolitical Ambitions Could Change the Middle East
On December 26, 2017, Turkey expanded its military presence in Qatar by deploying hundreds of Joint Force Command troops to its military installation in Doha. This troop deployment gained significant media attention, as it came just one day after the release of a report revealing that the Turkish military intervened on Qatar’s behalf to prevent Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from launching a coup against Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in June.
The Turkish government’s decision to flex its military muscles on Qatar’s behalf underscores a major shift in Ankara’s Middle East strategy. Since the July 2016 coup d’etat attempt, Turkey has transformed itself from being a destabilizing revolutionary actor to the Middle East’s strongest supporter of state stability. In recent months, Turkey has underscored its commitment to preserving state stability in the Arab world, by supporting the reunification of Syria under a strong central government and vociferously backing Libya’s UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).
Turkey’s adoption of a pro-stability agenda in the Arab world can be explained by Ankara’s heightened concerns about internal unrest after Erdogan’s authority was challenged by the July 2016 coup attempt. As Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan believed the coup attempt was orchestrated by rogue military units inspired by Islamist cleric Fethullah Gulen and facilitated by external forces, Turkey has sought to undercut nationalist insurgency movements and counter destabilizing foreign involvement in regional conflicts. This strategy aims to prevent Turkish-style coup attempts from occurring in other parts of the Middle East, and recreate the network of stable nation-states that preserved collective security in the Arab world prior to the 2003 Iraq War.
In order to consolidate its position as the Middle East’s leading guarantor of collective security, Turkey has refined its approach to inter-state diplomacy and showcased its formidable coercive capacity to the international community. In contrast to the unwieldy balancing act that upheld Erdogan’s pre-Arab Spring “zero problems with neighbours” approach, Turkey’s current stabilization role is upheld by selective tactical partnerships with regional actors possessing similar geopolitical objectives. These partnerships have expanded Turkey’s network of allies in the Arab world and ameliorated the reputational damage caused by Erdogan’s incoherent responses to the Arab Spring.
The deterrent effect provided by Turkey’s formidable military resources, which include the second largest standing army in NATO, has also strengthened Ankara’s ability to act as a regional stabilizer. Countries seeking to counter Turkish objectives have often been forced to shelve their plans as they fear an aggressive retaliation from Turkey which could be detrimental to their security and regional power projection ambitions.
Turkey’s commitment to strengthening fragile states in the Arab world is exemplified by its expanded diplomatic and military involvement in Syria. Even though Turkey provided vital material support for Sunni rebel groups seeking to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the first years of the conflict, and continues to view Assad as an illegitimate leader, Ankara’s current policy preference is for the reunification of Syria as a stable centralized state.
Although Erdogan recently described Assad as a “terrorist” who has no place at the bargaining table, Turkey’s unofficial Syria strategy views the political ambitions of Kurdish nationalist groups, like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Democratic Union Party (PYD) as the biggest impediments to stability in Syria. The Turkish government believes the formal establishment of two centers of power in Syria, one in Damascus led by Assad and one in Rojava led by Kurdish nationalist factions, could trigger a wave of partitions that undercut the territorial integrity of Middle East states, and destabilize eastern Turkey by empowering the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
In Turkey’s view, the preservation of a unitary state in Syria will avoid these pitfalls and facilitate the re-establishment of a politically stable Syrian nation-state. A unitary state structure would have a legal framework that ensures an eventual regime change in Syria produces an opposition government that exercises political power over the entire country. This outcome would be highly beneficial for Turkey’s geopolitical interests, as it would allow Syria to potentially become a Turkish ally if Assad were to fall from power.