Japan Should Steal a Strategy from China's Playbook
Recent tensions in the South China Sea have been receiving an inordinate amount of attention, especially following Beijing’s island and infrastructure construction activities as well as missile deployments, the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation operations and incidents involving coast guard forces and fishermen.
By contrast, tensions in the East China Sea (ECS) appear to have abated. But the picture can be misleading; while Chinese coastguard intrusions into waters surrounding Japanese-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have appeared to decline in numbers, the present and foreseeable future situation remains far from comforting.
There is not merely the China Coast Guard’s introduction of armed patrol vessels off the disputed isles. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to expand its air and naval force projection capabilities in the ECS, with an eye beyond into the Western Pacific open waters.
China’s Burgeoning A2/AD and Force Projection Capabilities
Beijing has nowhere in the ECS to build “islands,” except for the numerous offshore hydrocarbon platforms it has built—they ostensibly also have a surveillance role—to count as permanent structures to assert its claimed sovereignty over the disputed gas fields and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
However, even while the PLA Navy (PLAN) is still trying to get to grips with its nascent aircraft carrier capabilities, the PLA is already ramping up its ability to project force from China’s mainland bases, with two broad strategic objectives: firstly, to impose an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) umbrella against American intervention and Japanese military operations in times of contingencies in the ECS; and secondly, to expand China’s access into the Pacific Ocean and safeguard its broader national maritime interests.
The steps undertaken to date have been incremental but no less significant. At present and into the foreseeable future, the PLA’s conventional military capabilities are set to continue improving. These have greatly narrowed the gap between Chinese and Japanese (and American) capabilities that existed a decade ago.
But more ominously, besides enhancing physical military capabilities, long-range PLA air and naval forces have regularized “out-of-area” training missions beyond Chinese exclusive economic zones. They ply the open ECS waters around the Japanese Southwest Islands (Nansei Shoto), regularly transiting the international waterways—especially the Miyako Strait—and airspaces to enter the Western Pacific.
If one recalls the past incidents involving PLAN submarines near Japanese shores and the more recent activities by Chinese intelligence-gathering aircraft and vessels, it is obvious that in the longer term, Beijing seeks to further entrench its military presence in the ECS.
The observed, recurrent patterns of PLA activities indicate a particular interest in the Nansei Shoto.
Towards a Solution for Japan
While the PLA’s burgeoning capabilities in the ECS are troubling, one notes that A2/AD works both ways. The Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is equally capable of establishing its own defense posture that can complicate Chinese military activities in the ECS or the western Pacific Ocean.
Operating from the Nansei Shoto along the eastern edge of the ECS and reaching out westwards, the JSDF can create a hard-to-penetrate layered defense network or “fan” consisting of land-based antiship and antiaircraft missiles, submarines, antisubmarine aircraft, surface combatants, “smart” and “dumb” sea mines, and fighter jets. The JSDF also has the added advantage of operating from a defensive posture.
The recent activation of a coastal surveillance unit on Yonaguni Island at the far southern end of the Nansei Shoto might be viewed as a first step towards a viable Japanese A2/AD strategy. Plans call for similar units on other islands up the entire chain. While billed as “surveillance” units, these outposts are slated to be equipped with mobile antiship missile batteries and air-defense systems to bolster Japan’s A2/AD capabilities.
However, even though a Japanese A2/AD strategy for the Nansei Shoto and broader ECS is conceptually simple, it is not easy to implement. So far, the JSDF has not managed to establish an effective joint capability—either operationally or in terms of command and control structures—to include lack of sophisticated communications networks allowing seamless inter-service communications as a manifestation of this problem.
While the JSDF is blessed with a technologically advanced and professional force, the JSDF suffers from deficiencies in operational readiness and integration between the three branches: the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF).