Sleepless in Ankara: The Post-Erdogan Government's Big Challenges
Turks are set to head to the polls this August to directly elect a president for the first time in the country’s history. Until now, the president was elected by parliament. The switch to election by popular vote will change the very nature of the president’s role that, despite holding few constitutional powers, was designed to ensure top-level political neutrality and counterbalance the wide scope of the government’s executive authority. The upcoming elections will upend this institutional quasineutrality, impacting both domestic Turkish politics and the country’s regional role.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister since 2003, is the presidential candidate for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). He is being challenged by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the former head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, who entered the race as the joint candidate of Turkey’s two largest opposition parties, and Selahattin Demirtaş, the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) candidate. But many expect Erdogan to win, given his continued popularity.
An Erdogan victory would be a watershed moment for Turkish politics. His uninterrupted, decade-long rule as the country’s omnipotent top executive will come to an end. The AKP will need to find a new leader and the country will have a new prime minister for the first time in over ten years. Erdogan has made no secret of his plan to introduce a U.S. style executive presidency in Turkey. But after failing to carry out the required constitutional amendments as prime minister, Erdogan, as president, would be forced to establish a modus operandi with the government and its new leadership—at least until he could gain enough support for a constitutional change. The relationship between an Erdogan presidency and the new AKP government is therefore set to be the first critical systemic challenge that Turkey will face after the election.
But Erdogan will leave Turkey’s new government to face a series of more substantive challenges in the areas of domestic governance, economic performance and foreign policy.
Since transitioning to multiparty democracy in 1950, Turkey has gradually worked to improve its democratic credentials. The AKP’s most impressive achievement in this respect is its curbing of the military’s political influence and normalizing the civil-military relationship. Equally important, though still a work in progress, will be a lasting settlement of the Kurdish problem. Turkey has also managed to establish a democratic tradition with a range of now mature institutions of representation including robust political parties, a functional executive, a lively parliament and well-performing local administrations.
But a genuinely liberal democracy needs institutions of restraint to keep the power of the executive in check. A free and independent judiciary, a pluralistic and free media and a vibrant and unthreatened civil society are essential features of such a system of governance. Yet the performance of Turkey’s democracy in these three key areas is starting to erode. While in office, Erdogan viewed elections as the sole instrument of democratic legitimacy, and as a result overemphasized the importance of the institutions of representation to the detriment of the institutions of constraint. This fetishism of the “national will” led to majority rule but proved inimical to democratic progress.
A related and equally important challenge is the government’s ability to tolerate dissent. When leaders identify themselves with the national will, almost every form of opposition, whether violent or nonviolent, tends to be viewed as an illegitimate attack on the elected government. The 2013 Gezi protests were a real test of the country’s democratic maturity. Here, the Turkish government failed. Instead of being celebrated as a colorful demonstration of peaceful dissent, the Gezi protests turned into symbols of polarization and witnessed a heavy-handed police crackdown. To overcome these democratic shortcomings, the main task of the post-Erdogan government will be to reestablish a balance between the institutions of representation and the institutions of constraint, while allowing for a more liberal understanding to emerge on the role of dissent.