Strait Talk: Taiwan's Politicians are Split on Keeping the ‘Status Quo’
Less than six weeks before Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election in January, presidential candidates in Taiwan have stepped up efforts to sway voters in their favor. Among key issues that matter to all voters—job growth, retirement and the health of the national economy—much focus has been placed on how the cross-strait relations should proceed in the future. A consistent polling result since 1996 has shown that a steady one-third of the Taiwanese people chose to maintain the “status quo” with mainland China and to leave the future relationship undecided. Based on the polling, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the major opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have respectively defined the concept of the “status quo,” each with a different focus on handling the competing relations between the Taiwan public and mainland Chinese leadership. While the KMT emphasizes international and legal aspects of the concept, the DPP’s definition is more domestically driven, related to Taiwan’s democratic system. But what exactly does the Taiwan public want in a cross-strait relationship?
What’s the “status quo”?
In early March 2015, President Ma Ying-jeou reaffirmed that his administration would continue its cross-strait policy to “maintain the status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. His policy rests on two pillars: 1) no announcement of unification or independence and no use of force under the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution to resolve cross-strait issues; and 2) promoting the peaceful development of cross-strait relations on the basis of the “1992 consensus” that accepts “One China” but allows the two sides to have their respective interpretations. In his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore in November, President Ma explained the legal aspect of his interpretation of the “status quo” concept by upholding the 1992 consensus. According to Ma, the ROC Constitution only allows one China to exist; “two Chinas,” “one China and one Taiwan” or “Taiwan independence” is not allowed in the constitution.
The 1992 consensus, which keeps the concept of “One China” but accepts strategic uncertainty surrounding its precise definition, not only allows wiggle room for Beijing and Taipei to conduct cross-strait exchanges but also complies with the ROC Constitution. Aside from the legal front, President Ma’s interpretation of the “status quo” concept has an international focus. In his opening remarks at the Ma-Xi meeting, President Ma proposed five points of maintaining the status quo of the cross-strait relations. He explicitly named such status quo as one “to maintain the peace and prosperity in the Taiwan Strait,” appearing to raise the awareness of the international community that the conditions in the Taiwan Strait impact the entire region. Along the same line, the KMT presidential candidate Eric Chu in his recent article in the Washington Times maintained that the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait “fits the national interests of not just Taiwan and China, but also the United States.”
Compared to Ma’s international and legal focus, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen’s interpretation of the “status quo” concept highlighted a domestic aspect. A day before the Ma-Xi meeting, Tsai has argued that the difference between hers and President Ma’s “status quo” by definition lies in Taiwan’s “democracy,” which she defined as “the right for the twenty-three million people in Taiwan to choose and determine their own future.” Commenting on the Ma-Xi meeting on November 7, Tsai again underlined the significance of defending “the value and rights to which the Taiwanese people adhere.” She criticized President Ma’s “yielding attitude” toward President Xi in his opening remarks, in which Ma mentioned “One China” of the 1992 consensus without touching on the respective interpretations by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
In fact, back in early June at a San Francisco press reception, Tsai revealed that the DPP’s definition of the “status quo” has a domestic focus. On the basis of the “existing ROC constitutional order” and the “accumulated outcomes of more than twenty years of negotiations and exchanges between both sides of the Strait,” Tsai’s “status quo” means: 1) sustaining the freedom and democracy enjoyed by the people of Taiwan; and 2) preserving the current status of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
What do the people want?