On the campaign trail, Donald Trump asked whether a strategic partnership between the United States and Russia could emerge for solving the Syrian Civil War and containing and destroying the threat of the Islamic State. Translating campaign statements into governing policy is not an automatic or easy process, which raises the question: could this proposal actually take shape as a viable strategic concept?

Where U.S. Policy Currently Stands

The Obama administration based its approach to Syria on three core assumptions: that the regime of Bashar al-Assad would fall quickly and be replaced by a broad, pro-democratic coalition; that success in Syria would not require much effort or investment on the part of the United States, because U.S. allies in the region would be prepared to take the lead in doing the “heavy lifting” of assisting Assad’s ouster and in reconstructing a post-Assad Syria; and that Russia would not be prepared to expend resources to prop up Assad in Syria, because the Kremlin did not have any vital interests in his survival. None of these assumptions have stood the test of time. Indeed, the U.S. position in the Middle East has been damaged as radical Islamist groups have used the chaos of the Syrian Civil War to gain bases that allow them to destabilize the entire region, while Russian action—first to forestall U.S. military action over Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in 2013, and then to intervene directly in 2015 to turn the tide of the war in Assad’s favor—has created the impression, not only in the Middle East but around the world, that the United States is feckless and in decline while Russia is a resurging global power.

The Trump administration has inherited a U.S. policy on Syria that is characterized by a series of contradictions. While the United States is unwilling to become directly involved in the fight against Assad, it continues to provide aid and assistance to opposition groups seeking his overthrow. It is asking U.S. allies and U.S.-backed groups in Syria to focus more attention on combating more extreme jihadi elements, such as Islamic State and the Nusra Front, rather than joining with them in the fight against Assad. It continues to try to persuade Iran and Russia to abandon Assad and to encourage him to give up power, and to get every outside actor in Syria—from the Gulf emirates, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to Russia and Iran—to focus their efforts on combating the Islamic State as the first priority. None of these efforts is particularly successful, especially since the other players in Syria, as well as the Syrian government itself, know that the United States is not prepared to undertake any sort of major action in order to push its preferred outcomes.

There is no low-cost, no-risk approach that will achieve the entire U.S. wish list for Syria: no Assad, no Islamic State, no Russian or Iranian presence, no conflict between different Syrian factions and their outside sponsors, no more refugees, no more terrorism, and a pro-American democratic regime taking power. There is no magical force of moderates capable of simultaneously destroying the Islamic State and overthrowing Assad, who can also then reconstruct an effective state that will be secular, democratic and pro-American. There is also no foolproof plan that can insert U.S. military forces into the region and guarantee that there will be no unacceptable losses or risks of major escalation that could lead to unpleasant second- and third-order effects. If the United States is not willing to intervene on a massive scale in order to impose its own will, it must decide whether the fight against Islamic State or Assad’s overthrow is more important, and whether it can live with a Syria where U.S. adversaries, starting with Iran, may still be able to exercise influence.  It must acknowledge that if the United States is not going to risk large amounts of its own blood and treasure to change the outcome of events in Syria, it becomes necessary to find solutions that can win the support of other stakeholders in the outcome of the Syria conflict.  Russia is among the most important of these interlocutors.

Russian Interests and Approaches on Syria

It must be recognized that the United States seriously misread Russian interest and intentions in Syria, and miscalculated the extent to which Vladimir Putin would risk taking losses to ensure that Bashar al-Assad did not fall. This derived, in part, from continuing to ignore signals from Vladimir Putin that he would be prepared to take more assertive action to secure the regime’s internal independence to run Russia, defend the Russian position in the Eurasian space and ensure that Moscow’s “voice and veto” would be respected by Washington when it came to other global issues. When it became clear to the Kremlin that the Obama administration “reset,” like the Bush administration’s outreach, was not going to lead to U.S. acquiescence to these demands, Moscow looked for ways to limit U.S. freedom of action around the world.

When it came to Syria, three broad streams of Russian interests have been at play in the decision to support Assad.

Based on what happened in recent instances of regime change, like Ukraine and Iraq, Moscow had little confidence in America’s promises that Russian interests in Syria would be respected if Moscow acquiesced to Assad’s overthrow and his replacement by a pro-American coalition. Russia did not expect that its contracts would be honored, its supporters included in a new administration (or safeguarded from retribution), or its military facilities in the country—especially the naval station in Tartus, at present the only Russian base outside the territory of the former Soviet Union—would be left in its possession. Indeed, since the intervention began in 2015, Russia has not only overhauled the Tartus facility, but also concluded an agreement with Assad to turn the Khmeimim air base outside Latakia into a permanent Russian facility. These two assets now allow Russia to deploy a formidable anti-access/area denial umbrella in the eastern Mediterranean and to be able to project power throughout the Middle East in a fashion that has not been seen since Soviet times.

At the same time, the Putin administration did not buy into confident American proclamations about the division of anti-Assad forces into clear “moderate” and “radical” camps, instead operating from the assumption that armed opposition to Assad was a sign of either direct or indirect support for radical jihadi groups—groups that also were targeting the interests of the Russian state within Eurasia and even inside Russia’s own territorial borders. To the extent that anti-Assad forces have also drawn on recruits from some of the restive Muslim-majority parts of Russia itself, aiding the Assad regime was a way for Moscow to encourage would-be Russian jihadis to leave Russian territory to fight (and die) in Syria. Russian officials have been quite open that their assistance to Assad has been driven, in part, by the strategic logic that it was easier for Russia to fight such forces in Syria than to face them back home inside Russia’s borders.

Finally, Moscow decided that showing its willingness to stand by an ally even in a time of trouble was absolutely necessary in order to reassure other strategic partners, elsewhere in the Middle East and in Central Asia, that the Kremlin was reliable and would defend its friends even against significant Western pressure. Moscow has contrasted this steadfastness with apparent American fecklessness in abandoning long-term allies and partners, such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt once the optics of the Tahrir Square revolution changed Washington’s public-relations calculus, to suggest to other authoritarian leaders that Russia would prove more reliable than U.S. promises. This apparent reliability, even in the face of widespread Western criticism of the Russian role in supporting Assad, has been useful in sustaining Moscow’s relations with other strategic countries, like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and has helped Russian efforts in making diplomatic inroads with traditionally staunch U.S. partners, like Turkey and Egypt.

From a geostrategic perspective, Moscow also has concluded that its ability to operate in the Middle East as a player of influence is enhanced by stabilizing and prolonging a de facto division of the region between a Sunni coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, and a Shia coalition, headed by Iran. Assad’s outright overthrow would upset that balance, and weaken the Iranian strategic position by cutting off its access to its Hezbollah proxies in Lebanon. While Iran and Russia do not see eye-to-eye on all issues, Moscow is more comfortable than Washington with allowing the Islamic Republic a degree of influence in the region, while Russia’s ability to present itself as a necessary interlocutor between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel guarantees that its presence will be needed in the region. In a more realpolitik assessment, a continued Shia-Sunni “cold war” across the region also guarantees that Sunni extremists are less likely to focus on Russia if they continue to be involved in fighting in the region.

In support of its agenda in Syria, Russia follows an approach based on its own counterinsurgency experiences, as well as those of its partners, like the government in Algeria: Elements of this approach include the use of overwhelming conventional force to crush opposition forces and demonstrate to civilians that support of the rebellion comes at a high material and human cost; efforts to find opposition forces willing to defect and join the side of the government, while pushing other “moderate” forces closer to the jihadi extremists; and a willingness to entertain options that would allow Kurds and Sunnis to enjoy relative independence from the Assad government in Syria, in return for ceasing combat operations against Damascus. This latter strategy is also open to allowing groups sponsored by Turkey or the Gulf Arab emirates to have defined spheres of influence in the country. In pursuing this approach, therefore, operations against the Islamic State have not always had the highest priority.

Russia’s willingness to use indiscriminate and brutal force in Syria runs up against an American way of warfare that stresses precision and proportionality, and looks to avoid large numbers of civilian casualties. Russian action also has caused problems in Europe, where even pro-Russian European politicians like British foreign secretary Boris Johnson have loudly condemned Russian military actions in Syria. Indeed, Russia narrowly avoided having new sanctions enacted, in addition to the ones the European Union continues to maintain as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s efforts to jury-rig a political settlement that keeps the Assad government as the preeminent actor, but creates limited zones for compliant opposition groups, contradict American preferences for a post-conflict Syrian settlement grounded in the will of the people. Such a settlement would also work against U.S. preferences for implementing a more comprehensive containment policy against Iran.

In turn, Russia has concerns of its own. Since the mid-2000s, Russian strategists have noted that conflict and instability in the Middle East invariably draws in the United States, which means that Washington has less time, energy and attention to focus on thwarting Russia, especially in the Eurasian space. The refugee crisis generated by the Syrian Civil War has also created tremendous problems within the European Union, and is weakening EU solidarity in standing up to Russia over issues like Ukraine, while the increased terrorism that has resulted has strengthened more pro-Russian political movements across Europe. Russia is thus in no hurry to “solve” Syria.

Moscow is also well aware that many in the U.S. national-security establishment view any cooperation with the Kremlin as temporary, and that when Russia has helped the United States with tackling other issues like Afghanistan, North Korea and Iran, its “reward” has been increased American scrutiny and pressure. Significant portions of the Russian strategic establishment worry that cooperative action on Syria to rapidly end the crisis then would then free the United States and Europe to resume efforts in Ukraine that Moscow considers hostile to its interests.

U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Syria: Difficult, But Not Impossible

While there are considerable obstacles, there are ways in which the United States and Russia to cooperate on Syria. However, it is essential that if the new administration signals it is interested in pursuing such options, it must do so from a position of American strength and resolve. One of the main problems facing the United States today is that the Kremlin has assessed that America is “all talk and no action” when it comes to Syria. U.S. diplomats, for instance, have delivered long, heartfelt condemnations of Russian actions, while little has been done so far to actually change Russia’s calculations about what it can achieve on the ground, despite a multiplicity of statements about possible U.S. actions. U.S. messaging on Syria over the past several years is a stark lesson in the truth of Theodore Roosevelt’s precept, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”

Thus, the first challenge the new team will face is ensuring that Putin does not misinterpret Trump’s willingness to consider cooperative measures with Russia as U.S. capitulation to the entire list of Russian preferences for the future of Syria, and the region as a whole. A Trump administration would also need to calibrate its rhetoric with whatever elements of America’s national-security toolbox it would be prepared to use to defend any stated red lines. For any proposed cooperation to succeed, Moscow would have to understand that Russia would pay a steep price if it failed to accommodate U.S. interests in Syria or uphold its end of any bargain.

Moscow needs to understand that it cannot unilaterally write the end of the story in Syria—even with Iranian help—and present the world with a Russian fait accompli. Here, the United States has some important cards to play. Russia has been able to stabilize the Assad regime and help it regain momentum on the battlefield, but even with Iran’s help, Russia lacks the ability to restore Assad’s control over all of Syria. While Moscow gambled that a limited military intervention would succeed in altering dynamics on the battlefield, it lacks the means to wage a determined military campaign to bring about a decisive Assad victory. Moscow needs a political settlement, which can only come about with the active participation of the United States and its allies. Russia’s own security is imperiled if all it can achieve is an uncertain stalemate, which only increases the risk that unsettled conditions in Syria could lead to new terrorist attacks within Russia itself.

Moreover, reconstructing the country, in order to encourage refugees to return and drain the swamps that foster the growth of extremist movements like the Islamic State, will require immense resources. Even the low-end estimates of Syria reconstruction now surpass $180 billion—and Moscow and Tehran do not have such funds at their disposal. China has not shown much interest in bankrolling Syrian reconstruction. Even the “New Development Bank,” the alternative to the World Bank set up by China, Russia and other non-Western powers, only has $100 billion in base capital. Stabilization in Syria can only come about with the active participation of America’s Gulf and European allies, and with America’s willingness to use its influence in bodies like the World Bank to locate the necessary capital.

It is thus possible to negotiate a series of quid-pro-quo arrangements that will secure key American objectives and mitigate some of the Russian actions that most violate American interests and values. Some of these quid pro quos are already in place, due to Russian negotiations with other players in the region, and can serve as the template for U.S.-Russia talks. These include:

1. Creating limited safe havens and “no bomb” areas for those Syrian opposition groups that have clearly separated from jihadi organizations, with an eye to allowing members to decamp from government-controlled areas, and making these territories de facto autonomous zones—areas where countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia may also be able to exercise influence. The Russia-Turkish dialogue on the role and capacities of the Turkish “Euphrates Shield” zone in Syria, and that no-fly zone, which has been respected by Russian aircraft, provides a model for future policy. The U.S. experience in creating de facto Kurdish zones in northern Iraq after the Gulf War provides a template for how the United States and its partners could set up these areas and facilitate the expulsion or neutralization of extremist elements.

2. Clear red lines on Iranian activity in Syria. Israel has already maintained an extensive dialogue with Moscow about what Iranian actions are intolerable from an Israeli perspective, which has in the past resulted in Israeli strikes in Syria that have nevertheless not provoked conflict with the Russians. The two countries have an ongoing deconfliction process, and Israel has relied on Russia to help moderate Iran’s behavior and military capabilities.

3. Agreements on continued strikes against Islamic State, with an eye to its eventual destruction. This requires frank talks about identifying Islamic State fighters and bases to the satisfaction of both Russians and Americans (so that not all non-regime elements are targeted by Russia as ISIS) and, more importantly, about how former ISIS territory is to be administered: what portion under direct Syrian regime control, what part under opposition groups with the help of outside powers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia who will also maintain cease-fires, and balancing Kurdish aspirations for autonomy with Turkish concerns about the rise of a second powerful Kurdish entity on its borders.

4. Enshrining a balance of power via a power-sharing framework—perhaps akin to the Taif accords that ended Lebanon’s civil war, or the Dayton Accords that ended Bosnia’s, but one that would be enforced by all parties. Here, another sense of “betrayal” from the Russian perspective is important. Moscow reluctantly acceded to the EU-brokered agreement for a staggered transition of power in Ukraine in February 2014, only to have the opposition repudiate it and move to depose Viktor Yanukovych immediately from the presidency, with no repercussions enforced by the agreement’s Western guarantors. A price for Russian cooperation on Syria is the retention of Assad for the near future, even if a long-term departure is understood and accepted by Moscow—but any sign of a bait-and-switch approach will torpedo any political arrangement with Russia.

The coordination to make a Syrian compromise work and to pursue greater action against Islamic State has the potential to restore frayed U.S.-Russia contacts in the diplomatic, intelligence and military realms. Because these arrangements would require intensive action, a beneficial side result might be to habituate parts of the Russian and U.S. national-security apparatuses to greater cooperation and joint work, of the type that was envisioned but never fully realized after the 9/11 attacks. Development of a workable process for regulating the Syria conflict might also serve as a prelude to a similar process on Ukraine—finding a balance of power and interests that all sides can live with. Russia would also expect that constructive behavior on Syria would be reflected by some consideration for sanctions relief.

At his speech at the Center for the National Interest in April 2016, then-candidate Donald Trump said, “Some say the Russians won’t be reasonable. I intend to find out.” A fresh approach to the Syria question may provide the opportunity to test his assumption.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, a contributing editor at the National Interest, is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views expressed here are his own personal assessments.

This paper will appear in the Center for the National Interest’s forthcoming publication, “A New Direction in U.S.-Russia Relations? America’s Challenges and Opportunities in Dealing with Russia.”

Image: Vladimir Putin meets meeting with Defense Ministry officials. Kremlin.ru