Taiwan and Remaking the Case for a League of Democracies
On September 15, the United States hosted the Ninth Community of Democracies Governing Council Ministerial in Washington, DC. The lead up to the meeting was clouded by growing concerns about the Trump administration’s lack of emphasis on the role of values in U.S. foreign policy. In his remarks, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson went at length to address such doubts at the gathering with senior government officials and civil society leaders from around the world. The Secretary stated unequivocally:
Our shared values translate to more dependable security partners and reliable allies . . . [a]t a time of growing efforts to undermine democracy, it is all the more critical that we work together to bolster and promote this form of governance. So despite the challenges of our day, now is not the time to step back from our democratic commitments. Now is the time to strengthen and sustain them. We cannot become complacent. Rather, we must continue our active advocacy and engagement.
Indeed, it is critical that democracies work closer together to not only promote but also preserve democracies in the face of growing influence operations by authoritarian governments. As the secretary highlighted: “This ministerial could not come at a more critical moment. Across the globe, democratic nations and peoples are under threat.” While the secretary stopped short of calling for a League of Democracies—a coalition of “like-minded nations working together in the cause of peace”—his speech nevertheless clearly underscored the need for democracies to come together and defend against the “threat” to freedom globally. This is a necessary step in the right direction.
Past efforts to create a League of Democracies floundered in the face of disagreements among democracies over the necessity and intent of such a grouping of like-minded countries. There were concerns that the coalition would not be effective as it excluded powerful countries such as China and Russia, and that it could trigger a new Cold War. However, the conditions that made such counterarguments reasonable have changed considerably over the past decade, and the new reality as well as urgency for a coalition of democratic countries are more important than ever. To be sure, there is a clear rise of “authoritarian influencing” or influence operations by authoritarian governments, and a concert of democracies may be the only countermeasure to effectively preserve democracies—and U.S. leadership is key.
Yet, even in past efforts, a critical link was missing. Despite being a democracy, Taiwan is not even a member of the Community of Democracies. Setting aside the technical constraint due to Taiwan’s unique international status, Taipei’s exclusion from that body flies in the face of the values that it purportedly represents. Taiwan’s exclusion, however, begs a more parochial question: how does Taiwan’s democracy serve U.S. policy objectives?
The starting point for that analysis should be with the Taiwan Relations Act. The TRA states, among other things, those goals as:
• to declare that peace and stability in the [Western Pacific] area are in the political, security and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;
• to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
• to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.
In pursuit of those objectives, Taiwan’s democracy serve five key roles and functions:
1. Symbolic Value: Taiwan represents a successful case in which U.S. democracy promotion efforts contributed, in part, to bringing about a successful and stable regime transition from authoritarian to a full-fledged democratic system.
2. Domestic Political: Democratization has had a moderating effect on Taiwan’s domestic politics, especially as it relates to cross-Strait relations.
3. Geopolitical: Democracies share common geopolitical interests to work effectively together, namely their people’s desire to preserve their democracies.
4. Cross-Strait Relations: Taiwan’s democracy has a demonstration effect on Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China. The only hope for China to become democratic is if Taiwan remains free and democratic.