The Dangers of Challenging Iran to a Foreign Policy Fight

An Iranian soldier stands guard in front of a picture of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini during the anniversary ceremony of Iran's Islamic Revolution in Behesht Zahra cemetery

Donald Trump’s recently laid out Iran policy presages full-spectrum confrontation with the Islamic Republic.

The pursuit of a U.S.-led security order in the Middle East has been a drain on American blood and treasure for over half a century. Despite the outsized attention U.S. strategists have given the region, America’s interventions have served more to demonstrate the limits of U.S. power, namely that it cannot conduct nation-building, effectively confront local insurgencies, restore order to ungoverned spaces, address the drivers of terrorism, or—perhaps most strategically impairing—deal flexibly with every regional power.

Plaguing the inability of the United States to confront the Middle East’s challenges has been a lack of foresight on behalf of U.S. decisionmakers; a problem exacerbated by the false narratives they are often informed by. Nowhere has this strategic handicap been more evident than with respect to U.S. policy towards Iran, which apart from President Obama’s second term, has been characterized by maximum hostility and minimum dialogue since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Rather than tamp down the tensions that inflame the region and disentangle the United States from its quagmires, Donald Trump’s recently laid out Iran policy presages full-spectrum confrontation with the Islamic Republic. The Trump administration is not only reverting from President Obama’s second-term policy of diplomatic engagement to the status quo ante of relentlessly pursuing ways to bring pressure on Tehran, but it is escalating U.S.-Iran tensions to unprecedented levels.

Trump’s October 13 speech controversially “decertifying” Iranian compliance with the July 2015 nuclear deal marked the most inflammatory anti-Iran speech by a U.S. president since George W. Bush’s 2002 “Axis of Evil” State of the Union. Moreover, the vociferous attacks Trump’s speech and accompanying White House fact sheet made on Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC)—two core bastions of the Iranian state and body politic—signify a reckless ruling out of even the possibility of diplomacy with Iran.

While Trump’s speech lacked specifics on how Iran will be confronted, administration officials have made their overarching aim clear: aggressive pushback against Iranian regional influence. Trump himself framed his case against the nuclear deal in terms of Iran’s regional activities violating the “spirit” of the accord.

National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster recently declared that the administration’s Iran strategy “integrates all elements of national power” with the aim of “neutralizing the government of Iran’s destabilizing influence.” The focus, he stated, would be on “revitalizing our traditional alliances and regional partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian subversion” and establishing “a more stable balance of power in the region.”

McMaster is correct in stating that the region desperately needs a stabilizing balance of power, but to suggest this means encaging Iran and giving U.S. regional partners carte blanche to pursue their own agendas rests on a mistaken assumption: that Iran has fundamentally aggressive designs on the region.

A sober assessment of Iran’s regional posture reveals not an expansionist power bent on achieving regional hegemony—as Rex Tillerson and other U.S. officials have claimed—but a state chiefly concerned with deterring foreign attack and preserving its strategic autonomy.

After 1979 revolution, borne out of a milieu of widespread humiliation over two centuries of foreign domination of Iranian affairs, a new Iranian state emerged structured on indigenous Shia political philosophies blended with traditional republicanism. The Islamic Republic, being the outcrop of a popular revolt that overthrew a monarch and demanded independence from outside machinations, was immediately viewed as threatening by the status-quo powers of the day—namely the conservative sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf and powers aligned with either the U.S. camp Iran had detached itself from or the Soviet camp.

However, since the revolution Iran has neither amassed the wealth or military capabilities associated with an offensively-primed hegemonic power. Instead, its national-security doctrine has been centered on gaining effective deterrence in line with its threat perceptions, top among which have been an American and/or Israeli military attack.

To achieve deterrence, Iran has relied on a low-cost military doctrine centered on developing a range of asymmetric capabilities, such as missiles tipped with conventional explosives, anti-ship missiles, attack speedboats, and mine-laying vessels. Iran’s military spending is in fact dwarfed by its regional rivals.

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