The Missing Element in Trump’s NSS: A Competitive Strategy
Throughout a legendary forty-year career as head of the Pentagon’s internal think tank focused on long-term strategy, Andy Marshall developed the concept of “Competitive Strategy” as the key to advancing America’s national interests in a ruthlessly competitive world of geopolitics. Marshall focused on the Soviet Union during the Cold War and contributed to Reagan’s successful defeat of the USSR; later on, he shifted his attention to China’s rise. However, all of America’s post–Cold War presidents avoided adopting an explicitly competitive strategy aimed at revisionist powers such as China or Russia. The Trump administration’s recently released National Security Strategy (NSS) strongly indicates that this is about to change.
Most of the National Security Strategies since the end of the Cold War have not designated rivals or competitors. The frequent Clinton National Security Strategies blithely saw the world in a noncompetitive light. Clinton’s 2001 NSS began “As we enter the new millennium, we are blessed to be citizens of a country enjoying record prosperity, with no deep divisions at home, no overriding external threats abroad.” The 2002 and 2006 Bush-Era NSS documents focused largely on the threat of international terrorism; the 2006 NSS identified China and Russia as “key US partners.” President Obama’s first NSS in 2010 emphasized the possibilities of cooperation with Russia and China while minimizing conflicts of interest. In a change of tone, however, the rather brief 2015 NSS was much more pessimistic about the international security landscape, stating that “Russia’s aggression in Ukraine makes clear that … the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted.”
The new Trump NSS goes much further in recognizing the return of intensified great power competition. Now the harder task for White House and Pentagon strategists already working on a rumored classified version of the NSS is to design what Marshall called a “Competitive Strategy” in response. Such a strategy essentially focuses on finding and exploiting asymmetries in long-term great power competition. The way to articulate such a strategy is to conduct what Marshall called a “net assessment” of the relative position of you and your adversary across military, economic and diplomatic spheres. What would be the elements of Competitive Strategies against an increasingly assertive Beijing and a resurgent Moscow?
The Russian Federation has increased its global political role through much the same means as did the Soviet Union: devoting a larger portion of national resources to great power competition than its competitors. Its limited economic base is a clear vulnerability as a result. Given the smaller relative size of the Russian (versus Soviet) economy, the state has become heavily reliant on energy exports. Oil and natural gas now account for 36 percent of Russia’s national budget. And Russia’s nuclear exports contracts are worth more than $300 billion dollars, representing 60 percent of the international market in nuclear reactors.
The NSS proposal for “energy dominance” will help to target this Russian dependence, taking advantage of growing American strength in the energy sector. The United States passed the Russian Federation as the world’s top producer of natural gas in 2009; Trump has consistently trumpeted U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports as a means to redress America’s balance of trade problem. Such exports also aim to challenge Russian energy strength in the European market, as Trump himself declared in Warsaw in July. But there are other opportunities too: reinvigorating U.S. nuclear exports, particularly through new government contracts to recently bankrupted Westinghouse, could also diminish Russian nuclear exports. It might also improve U.S. relations with India, Egypt, and Hungary, all purchasers of Russian equipment.
Shifting attention to China, the authors of the Trump NSS clearly believe that attempts to bring Beijing into the liberal international order as a responsible partner have failed. But demographics, sustained economic growth, and the relative homogeneity of China’s population all suggest that China’s power will continue to grow in the long-term. How could a new Competitive Strategy better protect U.S. interests in the face of China’s rise?