The Real Danger of Sending U.S. Arms to Ukraine

Semyon Semenchenko, commander of the "Donbass" self-defence battalion, looks on during a training at a base of the National Guard of Ukraine near Kiev June 2, 2014. REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko

Putin could regard U.S. arms transfers as a symbolic test of who dictates conditions in the Donbass warzone.

In 2015, after spending several months in the frontline zone I wrote that Ukraine desperately needs a “lousy peace” and not an arms race. Two years and several thousand deaths later, the idea of supplying Ukraine with U.S. arms has resurfaced.

As a humanitarian worker whose greatest desire is to see the intolerable misery of Ukrainian civilians come to an end, I grapple with these questions: Would American arms increase the price of Russian aggression, causing Moscow to scale back its military project in the Donbass and saving civilian lives? Or would they incite a new round of escalation and a flood of new arms into the region?

The stakes of this question are incredibly high for Donbass civilians. With both sides placing their heavy artillery adjacent to residential areas (according to the head of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission in the region), every escalation means more death and destruction for a population already traumatized by three years of war and civil strife.

I get no pleasure from the idea of Ukrainian soldiers, the men and women I see every day at checkpoints, being outgunned by Russian-armed separatists and the barely concealed Russian army. But while I hope that anti-tank Javelin rockets be used to hold Russian aggression at bay and save civilian lives, I believe we must consider other scenarios of how the addition of U.S. arms could affect this conflict.

Russian aggression is the fundamental cause, and every move Ukraine makes (defensive or offensive) is inherently a reaction to it. But this does not necessarily mean that Russia is the source of each new spike of violence in the conflict zone. I travel to frontline towns several times a week, and frequently ask residents which side starts the exchanges of artillery that crisscross above their heads. The general answer is “sometimes this side, sometimes that.” You can get the same conclusion from following the technically detailed but judgment-free patrolling reports by the OSCE.

There is reason to believe that the two largest escalation events so far in 2017 began with a “creeping offensive” by Ukrainian forces to improve their positions along the frontlines. This is an understandable move for soldiers pinned under enemy fire in vulnerable positions, but it may have triggered the massive firefights near the Svitlodarsk Bulge and between the warring sides in Avdiivka and Donetsk that took a dozen civilian lives and spread destruction on both sides of the front. Importantly, almost none of the advances were sustained.

A Ukrainian battalion commander told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty how his soldiers snuck into a no-man’s-land village outside Svitlodarsk called Novoluhanske and set up positions near the main employer, a pig farm. That night the separatists understood what had happened and began shelling the Ukrainian forces—and the farm, which was badly damaged as shelling continued into May. Just a small stretch of gardens separates the farm from the village, which itself has come under fire.

I have spent much time in that area. In the winter of 2014–15 residents lived through the hellish “artillery duel” when the separatists and Ukrainian army pounded each other’s towns with shells and rockets. Later I helped re-equip a bombed and looted kindergarten and replace the shrapnel-scarred roof of the community center. The idea of death flying into these towns again, after they have slowly pieced together a normal life and gathered money from parents to hold the kindergarten pageant, overwhelms me.

I am not suggesting that the Ukrainian forces as the sole guilty party in the continuing violence, especially considering Russia’s fundamental aggression. But whereas the creeping offensive was well discussed in Ukrainian media and even bragged about, I worry whether advocates are considering it when they calculate how U.S. arms will be used. And while we might recognize the basic moral right of the Ukrainian army to reclaim occupied land, our government has also repeatedly stated its commitment to the Minsk accords, which commit Ukraine and the separatist forces to (thus far unsuccessful) de-escalation.

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