The United States Should Look East with India
According to the insightful, Nobel Prize winning Amartya Sen, India is prone to being mischaracterized. Accordingly, the United States must see the bigger picture and look beyond India’s fickleness and vacillation in order to recognize that there is a bidirectional relationship that needs to be maintained.
This lesson is important to recall during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit last week. As India’s foreign-policy tentacles reach further east and west, Washington’s expectations for U.S.-Indian relations need to remain steady. While India can be a fulcrum for leveraging U.S. interests in both Central and East Asia, it should also be an anchor partner that practices a different brand of democracy that may align with the United States on many—but not all—things. The United States should support India in its efforts to broaden its neighborhood interests and should not be alarmed when India aligns itself on occasion with China or Russia.
Former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh believed that India’s Look East policy would represent a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and place in the global economy. And India’s engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been on a swift trajectory since a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed in 2010. Modi’s actions can be seen as an actualization of Singh’s vision of economic liberalization. The Look East policy is rapidly becoming an Act East policy; this escalation signals an engagement that extends beyond Japan to other Southeast Asian countries.
With the solidification of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) on the horizon for 2015, India’s reach will extend from the Indian Ocean to the shores of the Pacific Ocean. Overland, beyond the Indian Subcontinent, India will have access to Vietnam and Singapore. Myanmar plays a key role as the route for major connectivity between India's landlocked northeast and southeast. Connectivity corridors like the Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-modal Project are rapidly transitioning into development corridors.
Prior to making his way to the United States, President Modi visited Japan. While Japan and India are basking in the afterglow of what is being lauded as a resounding success, the nature of this special strategic and global partnership remains subject to interpretation. For the time being, the relationship can be characterized by strategic plans to lessen Japan’s dependency on China for certain assets and materials while enabling India to build its critical infrastructure and economy. Japan sees India as a defense partner as well as an economic treasure trove, and Modi’s intentions seem clear: countering China’s increasing strategic, military, and economic influence and expansionist tendencies is a shared concern.
Following Modi’s visit to Japan, President Xi Jinping of China visited India. The trip has not been hailed as an overwhelming success because expectations for greater investment by China were unmet. China’s model for project finance tends to be accompanied by Chinese workers, which appears to be a sticking point for the human capital and labor-rich market of India. The visit was also marred by a standoff between Chinese and Indian soldiers on the disputed Line of Control (LoC). All of this is in stark contrast to Modi’s U.S. charm offensive, aimed at garnering support from the U.S. commitment to democracy and the considerable Indian American diaspora.
This being said, India’s relationship with China—which represents an entirely different model of governance than India and the United States—is a mixed one, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) brings China’s influence to Eurasia. China has been dangling a carrot to India by offering to upgrade their observer status to full membership. Nonetheless, these bi-directional pushes do not exclude China and India’s precarious relationship. As India continues to seek an invitation to join the ranks of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum of which seven out of the ten ASEAN member states are also members, enlisting Chinese support to extend this invitation necessitates diplomatic finesse.
India’s increased engagement in Japan, Vietnam and Myanmar will antagonize China, but Modi is unlikely to allow his foreign policy to be held hostage. Instead, India will likely work proactive policy to deal with states like Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Japan—all potential allies in the question to protect economic and strategic interests in South China Sea and Indian Ocean region against Chinese adventurism.