PROFESSOR Ross and I agree on at least three very important points: China's ongoing buildup poses a serious challenge to our strategic position in East Asia; left unaddressed, current trends will diminish our ability to extend credible security guarantees, thereby undermining our regional alliances and possibly weakening deterrence; and, working together with our friends and allies, we should be able to maintain a favorable military balance, despite China's current dynamism. Where we disagree is in our assessment of the urgency and precise dimensions of the challenge, what needs to be done in response and the obstacles that may stand in the way.
There is an odd discontinuity between Professor Ross's sober appreciation of many aspects of the problem and his seeming complacency about their solution. He correctly acknowledges the potential threat to U.S. power-projection forces from Chinese submarines, antiship ballistic missiles, antisatellite (ASAT) weapons and computer-network attacks. But, having done so, he proceeds to assume each danger out of existence.
It is no doubt true that the U.S. Navy's anti-submarine-warfare capabilities are "constantly improving," albeit after more than a decade of post-cold-war neglect. But Chinese subs are getting better too and, just as important, they are becoming far more numerous. Finding, tailing and, if necessary, sinking all of them would be no mean feat. Doing it quickly, to clear a path for the timely arrival of U.S. carriers would be harder still. (Given the relatively short reach of the aircraft they carry, it is simply not true that holding the carriers back further from China's coasts would "not significantly degrade" their effectiveness.)
