PROFESSOR AARON Friedberg's concern for the China threat rests on three arguments: that China's military modernization has been so successful that it could soon undermine U.S. maritime supremacy and give China the confidence to launch a war against American forces; that the decline of American supremacy may soon erode U.S. alliances in East Asia; and that the U.S. response to China's military buildup has been woefully inadequate.
China has made progress in developing a narrow range of capabilities, including missiles and submarines, which challenge U.S. surface vessels. But Professor Friedberg's worst-case assessment fails to consider either Chinese vulnerabilities or U.S. strengths. U.S. cyber-warfare capabilities, its long-range conventional missiles and its ability to dominate space-based communications systems make China's offensive capabilities highly vulnerable to American retaliation. Perhaps China could launch a surprise attack, but then what does it do on the third day of the war, after the United States has degraded its communication, reconnaissance, and targeting systems and then engaged China with its superior and secure air and naval capabilities? The notion that China might launch a war against the United States is the essence of the "1 percent doctrine" that contributed to many of the George W. Bush administration's costly and ultimately counterproductive international and domestic security policies.
