Real Democratik

September 1, 2004 Topic: Great Powers Regions: Americas Tags: AcademiaCold WarIslamism

Real Democratik

Democrats have lost their way on foreign policy. The party has been stuck in post-Cold War drift--confused by the Somalia syndrome, wedded to outdated notions of alliances, and unable to get its arms around America's enormous power. Democrats have overemphasized the importance of transnational issues and "soft power", ideas that, while important, do not play a dominant role in international affairs. Americans instead want a foreign policy that reflects the reality of U.S. power while remaining committed to the values of which they are proud.

There is an alternative path, one that will put Democrats on a course that is both realist and promotes traditional Democratic values. "Real Democratik" is firmly rooted in the fact that the structure of international relations, defined as the distribution of capabilities among states, heavily shapes the policies of states. The contemporary international order will be marked for at least the next several decades by unprecedented American unipolarity. Despite the debacle of the Iraq occupation, Real Democratik views this unipolar world as normatively good and empirically inevitable.

Democratic foreign policy must take advantage of the current unipolar world to prolong and improve this benevolent order, and Democrats must promote core U.S. interests. Only an American-led order can bring stability to the turbulent post-9/11 world, and only this order can facilitate the spread, where appropriate, of democracy and human rights. Multilateralism should be the instrument of choice for a Democratic administration--though unilateral action is appropriate to protect vital U.S. interests. The new course will require a steadfast period of repair to the damage caused by President George W. Bush's predilection for unilateral policies. If these policies are not halted, they will continue to provoke other states, hasten the decline of America's unipolar era, and make more difficult the pursuit of America's vital interests.

Politically, Real Democratik's hard-nosed approach to U.S. interests will appeal to conservative Democrats and independents, while its clear preference for multilateral action and promotion, where possible, of American values will appeal to more traditional Democratic constituencies. The prescriptions elaborated in this essay argue that Washington can and must "walk and chew gum at the same time": America can focus on its vital interests without ignoring the moralistic vein so deeply embedded in its history.

The argument of this essay is presented in two parts. The first, theoretical section argues that unipolarity is the seminal aspect of international relations, but that a set of interconnected factors (including alliances, institutions, legitimacy and terrorism) also can affect the duration and nature of the unipolar order. Because it is so important, unipolarity must be the starting point for incisive analysis of both international affairs and American foreign policy. The second part provides a policy framework by weaving together theoretical considerations and concrete U.S. foreign policy goals into specific policy recommendations.

Realities of the International Order

Democrats have had a hard time coming to grips with the unprecedented power possessed by the United States, a stark problem because the extent of America's predominance is remarkable. Today's structure is marked by unprecedented U.S. unipolarity. In 2002, America's military spending was more than double that of the expanded EU, seven times that of China and Russia, nine times that of France, Japan, and Britain, and ten times that of Germany. America commands an overwhelming superiority in conventional, nuclear and other capabilities and is widening its already huge qualitative advantage by far outspending others on research and development. American economic predominance is somewhat less profound, but still very significant. America's GDP in 2002 was 1.5 times that of the expanded EU, 2.6 times that of Japan, about 6.1 times that of Germany, France and the UK, and 8.5 times that of China. This economic dominance surpasses that of any other great power in modern history. The numbers for the EU--America's closest statistical competitor--must be discounted severely in the military realm (where EU budgets, capabilities and organization are low) and to a significant extent in the economic realm (where breadth has predominated over depth in EU enlargement and the outcomes of constitutional and other issues central to union are unclear). While American dominance in these categories is clear, what makes the extent of U.S. unipolarity historically unprecedented is dominance in each category simultaneously.

Unipolarity is the primary reason that other great powers have not and will not soon balance against America's preponderant power. Formal balancing can take two forms: organized anti-U.S. alliances or internal military buildups to counter America. Balance of power theory predicts that preponderant power should give rise to opposing power, because preponderance makes lesser powers feel threatened. However, less powerful states should be expected to balance only when they believe that doing so can be effective.

The current unipolar structure strongly deters balancing, primarily because no coalition of states could expect to rival America's dominance. In effect, the balance of power has been suspended. The gap between the United States and other states is just too big for competition to be fruitful. Balancing is suspended for several other reasons as well. The U.S.-dominated order provides goods to other nations which they value. America's military presence in Asia, especially in Japan, plays the key role in sustaining regional stability, and the United States is the central actor in maintaining an open international trading system. States are reluctant to balance against an order that provides them significant returns. Additionally, America's geographic position as an offshore power reduces the perceived threat by regional powers, most of which lie in Eurasia. Finally, all regional powers face constraints on balancing from within their region; were China, for example, to increase its power to balance against the United States, India would feel threatened and respond. For all these reasons, but especially because of America's overwhelming material predominance, American unipolarity will last for at least the next several decades and is the structure within which U.S. foreign policy will be formed.

The claim that unipolarity explains behavior in contemporary international relations is consistent with current events--consider the unilateralist run-up to the war and, until confronted with failure, occupation in Iraq, and the strong-handed rejections of the Kyoto protocol and the International Criminal Court. If the balance of power were operating, the Bush Administration's unilateral policies should threaten other states, and so induce balancing against the United States. Yet despite these provocations, formal balancing has not occurred.

The strongest objections have come from our estranged liberal democratic allies in Brussels, Paris and Berlin over the Bush Administration's Iraq policy. But even these objections do not constitute balancing against U.S. power. Though both France and Germany have continued to differ with the administration on key aspects of postwar Iraq and other issues, both have also made strong efforts to repair their relationships with the White House. Also, the EU as a whole hardly opposed American power; the new entrants, Italy, and pre-election Spain were supportive. These policies show why those who see the EU as a rising power which will soon balance against the United States are mistaken--its members did not balance, individually or collectively, even when they would be most expected to do so.

Similarly, China, Russia and Japan opposed the United States on Iraq, but all sought to compartmentalize the disagreement, and no formal balancing occurred. Bush's unilateralist policy toward Iraq was an excellent hard-case test for the dominance of unipolarity, and system structure easily passed. Structure, then, both deductively and empirically, is by far the most important element in determining state behavior.

Yet today's unipolar structure cannot predict the duration of the unipolar epoch, nor can structure predict specific outcomes--America can still lose on certain issues. The duration of unipolarity and specific outcomes depend significantly on strategic choices made by Washington. Current tactical acts of balancing against the United States could have systemic impact over the long haul if the causes of balancing are not addressed and it deepens and spreads. While system structure and the distribution of material capabilities are the most important determinants of state behavior, other aspects of the international order can play an important role in determining the duration of unipolarity as well as specific outcomes. American behavior, alliances and partnerships, international institutions, and the place of terrorism in the international order, will all play secondary but important roles in determining specific outcomes as well as the length of the American era. No hegemonic era has lasted forever. America's policy must not rest on structure alone, but use all tools at its disposal in order to prolong unipolarity, imbue it with constructive content, and affect specific outcomes.

The Nature of American Policy

Since the United States is the world's superpower, its specific characteristics will affect the nature of the international order. Two American attributes in particular will affect the duration and content of unipolarity and specific outcomes. The first is the legitimacy of U.S. power--the extent to which American means and ends in foreign policy are viewed as just by other nations; the second is American domestic support for an internationalist foreign policy.

American legitimacy has plummeted and anti-Americanism has skyrocketed as a result of the mistakes made during the Iraq venture--Abu Ghraib being the most damaging example. A hegemon viewed as illegitimate will need to spill much more blood and treasure to run its order than a legitimate one. Thankfully, however, the United States does have a wellspring of historical legitimacy from which it can still draw. American legitimacy traditionally flowed from a proclivity toward restraint and its status as a liberal democratic power. Restraint reassures other nations that U.S. power is not threatening to their vital interests, and thus reduces balancing tendencies. That America is a liberal democracy also tends to be reassuring in that checks and balances on foreign policy exist, and policy decision-making is reasonably transparent and predictable. Legitimacy is key to persuading other states to support Washington's policies, and this support may be key to prevailing on outcomes such as Iraq, where even American unipolarity cannot prevail alone.

Skeptics of the durability of an American era have argued that it will be a "hollow hegemony", that the American public does not have the stomach to maintain order in international relations for a prolonged period. While post-Cold War fatigue may have given reason for worry, 9/11 changed public opinion in a seminal way. In 2002, 71 percent of Americans supported an internationalist foreign policy, and support for multilateralism was also high. Recent post-Iraq data show that a solid 81 percent support a U.S.-led multilateral battle against terrorism. A strike on the U.S. homeland could dent these numbers, but both the long-term nature of the terrorist threat and Americans' awakening from post-Cold War slumber make "hollow hegemony" unlikely.

Alliances & Partnerships

The multilateral policies of a dominant power should both prolong the hegemonic order and increase the chances that it will attain a specific goal. Multilateralism alleviates weaker states' fears of hegemonic power and reduces their motivation to balance, because it gives those states some voice and role in setting the policy of the hegemon. Multilateralism increases the dominant power's chances of prevailing in specific difficult cases because it brings additional influence and resources to bear.

Alliances and partnerships are key forms of multilateralism. By binding a hegemon's power to other countries through formal or informal commitments, alliances and partnerships are effective ways of reassuring other states about preponderant power and thus of discouraging balancing. They also increase the hegemon's legitimacy by enlisting partners in foreign policy.

Three points about American alliances and partnerships rise to the fore. First, because of its vast asymmetry of capabilities, America's views will carry inordinate weight in alliance actions and policies. True consultation and incorporation of the views of others is possible by a United States concerned about reassurance and system maintenance, but at the end of the day, America will usually have its way on critical matters. Second, informal, issue-oriented partnerships may become a more common and useful form of American-led collective action than formal alliances. Focused partnerships with Russia, India, Pakistan and Australia, for example, may be more relevant to key problems than traditional pacts. Third, the future of the transatlantic relationship is in jeopardy. Much of the U.S.-European rift is over Iraq and the Bush Administration's unilateralist orientation. But the gap is deeper and extends to truly differing views of the Israel-Palestine peace process, of Yasir Arafat, and of the utility of diplomatic relations with Iran. These issues will continue to divide the United States and Europe. And today's anti-Americanism across Europe is so deep that any president will only manage a partial repair.

International Institutions

Playing by common rules of international institutions such as the UN and WTO is another way a hegemon can bind to other states and reassure them that its power is benign. Institutions are a particularly effective means to form consensual decisions and implementation processes among states. Because they are consensual, these decisions carry legitimacy that unilateral decisions do not. Iraq demonstrates, for example, that the UN can be invaluable in affecting specific outcomes even under American unipolarity. The Coalition Provisional Authority was unable to deliver any semblance of stability; only an international institution has brought any hope of stability and a minimally acceptable outcome to the operation. The UN and special envoy Lakhtar Brahimi brokered the appointment of Interim Prime Minister Ayad Alawi, established a credible plan for the transition to sovereignty and elections, and brought some increased support for reconstruction from the international community.

As with alliances, institutions under unipolarity will usually reflect America's policy preferences. And institutions are likely to be somewhat weaker in the future, given that a U.S.-European condominium lay at the heart of post-World War II institutions and that today's transatlantic rift is likely to last.

Terror's Role in the International Order

Terrorism is a new factor that will, on balance, be a strong driver for multilateral action, for it poses an unprecedented threat to international stability and is likely to prompt new levels of U.S.-led internationalist engagement.

Unipolar states have historically challenged rising powers that threaten the existing order. Terrorism is a threat without precedent; it does not challenge system structure (the distribution of capabilities), but could challenge the American-led order if large doses of chaos infect international relations. Terror could, for example, impart lifestyle-changing levels of fear into populations, limit open societies and reduce the movement of people and goods.

Fighting terrorism requires high levels of multilateral cooperation on matters ranging from intelligence to foreign assistance, as the threat is diffuse and localized. Since the threat will be long term, America's engagement is likely to be long term. Because of the nature of terrorism's threat to the international order and the citizenry's reaction to 9/11, the United States is very likely to seek a strong multilateral effort.

A final effect of terror on international relations is that it has reinforced the role of the state and weakened the role of transnational actors. America in particular, and the Western community in general, have sought to increase their internal capabilities to protect borders, monitor the presence and movement of people within borders, and procure the national means to fight terror. On balance, this will have a slowing effect on integrationist and federalist movements and give impetus to realist behavior.

America's future foreign policymaking will be conducted within a unipolar order, but one where the longevity of unipolarity and specific outcomes depend on American approaches to certain key attributes of international relations. In particular, multilateral action is preferable both to maintain the order and to help the United States prevail on policy outcomes. Unilateral action may well be justified in critical cases, but the cost of inducing anti-U.S. balancing and possibly endangering policy outcomes must be recognized and addressed. The remainder of this essay will implement the theoretical analysis above to discuss the main failings of Bush Administration grand strategy, describe America's grand strategy under Real Democratik, and lay out the key elements of an effective Democratic foreign policy agenda.

The Bush Years

The Bush Administration got the nature of the current era right: President Bush and his advisors understood that this is a period of prolonged unipolarity, of unrivaled and unconstrained U.S. power. The Bush record goes downhill quickly after that. Many of the administration's strategic and tactical choices constitute a list of what not to do if the goal of American grand strategy is to prolong unipolarity and prevail on tough policy issues.

The Bush Administration has shown contempt for international arrangements of any flavor that constrain America's power. Its record is one of reluctance to imbue the UN with influence; one of dividing America's key alliance during the signature episode of its foreign policy record; and one of eschewing restraint to the point of publicly announcing a doctrine of pre-emption. The Bush policies have even forsaken statesmanlike courtesy, declaring an "old" and a "new" Europe and openly snubbing foreign leaders who opposed U.S. policy.

The quickest way to undermine a unipolar order is to use power in a manner that alienates other significant nations, thereby encouraging early steps toward balancing. The Bush Administration's policies have initiated this process; one example is the world's virtually united opposition to renewing U.S. immunity from the International Criminal Court in the UN General Assembly earlier this year. A second presidential term that pursues these policies would severely undermine America's interests. The extent of U.S. predominance is so great that the most likely effect of a second Bush term would not be formal balancing but "estranged unipolarity"--an unprecedented and chaotic order where much of the world rejects American leadership even though it cannot challenge American power.

The Iraq War is an excellent example of a U.S. policy undermining both the American-led order and key American policy goals. Given the information on hand in March 2003, the war appeared justified, the goals being twofold: to eliminate (the still unaccounted for) Iraqi WMD, and to send a strong message to the region that Saddam had no place in the post-9/11 world. But the means used by the Bush Administration in the run-up to the war and during the occupation failed, weakening the international order. If the Bush Administration had more vigorously pursued a multilateral coalition, Russia and possibly even France might have acquiesced. Russia was on the fence, weighing its interests in Iraq, its support for the UN, and public opinion opposed to the war against its new post-9/11 partnership with the United States. A more committed American effort to court Russia and to accommodate Russia's agenda--for example by repealing the antiquated Jackson-Vanik Amendment--could have won Russia over. French demands focused on more time for inspections. Postponing the operation until autumn might have brought French acquiescence, especially if Russia had been convinced to go along with the war. Only Germany was beyond reach, as Gerhard Schro der won re-election on an anti-war platform. But a coalition that was not opposed by Russia and France would have brought much more legitimacy to the operation and would have avoided alienating the UN as an institution--thus better preserving the international order.

Regarding the specific policy goal--success in Iraq--multilateral efforts both before and after the war would have facilitated success. A more truly international force and earlier administration of the occupation by the UN would have helped avoid the extremely violent Iraqi reaction against American troops. That only the UN's appointment of an interim government has offered any hope demonstrates that much earlier multilateralism would have been prudent policymaking. Iraq shows clearly that a even a unipolar power needs help on hard-case issues. It now appears to the world that Winston Churchill was right, that "Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing . . . after they have exhausted all other possibilities." Real Democratik will prove him wrong.

Real Democratik Grand Strategy

Democratic foreign policy should seek to prolong the existing American-led order and to promote key American goals in international affairs. Washington also should seize the opportunity that unchallenged power offers to craft new initiatives that promote the interests of many states.

Democrats need to be up-front about the benefits and potential of the current order--perhaps best referred to publicly as the Western order. Today's unipolarity offers unprecedented stability regarding interstate conflict just as the world faces a new and diffuse threat from international terror. American power and nuclear deterrence have made great-power war unthinkable. Regional rivalries in Asia and Europe have been markedly dampened by the American military presence. A relatively open world trading system benefits all. America is a democratic, market-oriented hegemon that views these traits as morally good and provides incentives for their spread. The United States is at its core a benevolent superpower without rival. The Bush Administration's bungled venture in Iraq and brazen diplomatic tenor has masked this reality to many Americans and much of the world. The great challenge to Democrats will be to repair this damage.

In order to prolong America's unipolarity and increase the likelihood that other nations will help the United States prevail in hard cases, Democrats will need to change course before it is too late. America must opt for multilateral action whenever possible. Democrats must infuse alliances and focused partnerships with real meaning by consulting with other nations before the fact and incorporating their concerns whenever possible into U.S. policy, notwithstanding America's asymmetric strength in the alliances. Washington should show restraint to assure other nations that its power is not threatening. The United States will need to restore its legitimacy and power to persuade.

Democrats will need to help return authority to the UN through a consistent willingness to compromise--not after the fact, but before crises become wars that the United States may not be able to control alone. And Washington must clearly articulate to the American people and the world why the American era is worth supporting, why engagement promotes American interests rightly understood and why a disengaged America would be a disaster for all. Under Real Democratik, unilateral action may be required to promote vital U.S. interests. But possible long-term costs to the country's grand strategy, especially increased anti-U.S. balancing, would be carefully weighed before acting unilaterally. Real Democratik would rarely sacrifice strategic advancement for tactical advantage.

Policy Priorities & Prescriptions

Unipolarity also offers unprecedented freedom to use American power in creative ways to improve the nature of the international order. Wherever possible, U.S. grand strategy should take an expansive view of America's interests, one which includes and serves the interests of other nations as well. Washington's initiatives on security, energy or poverty stand a high chance of success. The following policy priorities and prescriptions seek to capture this remarkable window of opportunity.

Real Democratik prescribes a progressive, Democratic set of realist policies to promote American foreign policy interests under unipolarity. In the turbulent post-9/11 era, hard-nosed national security goals must take the front seat--both on their merits and because public opinion is focused on them. Under Real Democratik, the United States has three vital interests: waging war on terror, advancing the non-proliferation regime and ensuring secure energy supplies. On these issue, Real Democratik prescribes the vigorous pursuit of multilateral efforts and unilateral contingencies should multilateralism fail. America also has a host of fundamental interests, which Democrats should pursue earnestly whenever possible. These include advancing democracy and human rights, strengthening great-power relations, preventing conflicts and combating disease, drugs, crime and trafficking in people. Democrats must pursue aggressively vital and fundamental interests simultaneously. Tradeoffs will exist, for example, between security and democracy goals; but by setting priorities and appropriate time frames on the one hand, and by adopting multi-track policies on the other, Democrats can pursue an effective and appealing brand of realist policy. This is the essence of Real Democratik.

The War on Terror

Democratic leadership should bring the strongest possible multilateral coalition to bear in the War on Terror. America will need to draw on restored legitimacy, alliances and partnerships and institutions. Focused partnerships will be especially important, given the diffuse nature and Middle Eastern origin of terrorism. That means close political and military cooperation with Russia, Pakistan, India and nations in the Middle East--as well as with America's traditional allies. Paramount among these are close and strong relationships with the EU and its member states. They have stronger political influence and contacts in the Middle East, and the EU has a large foreign aid program there. The EU is a key financial backer of the Palestinian Authority, which means that the Europeans will likely be central to Middle East peace efforts.

To improve cooperation, the United States and the European Union should establish a standing joint body focused on Middle East policy. Currently, the Quartet--the United States, the EU, Russia, and the UN--is the only such body, but it is too narrow in focusing only on the peace process and too inclusive in that Russia or the UN could impede consensus. However, success in the War on Terror is so vital that unilateral action will be justified for discrete actions or operations--to apprehend an Al-Qaeda leader or eliminate a terrorist training camp. In these instances, the time required to gain the support of allies likely will not be available.

Iraq is a new node in the War on Terror, and regardless of past rationales and tactics, success there is now a vital interest. But success must be defined realistically: an integral Iraqi state with some degree of representative government. The American presence should be internationalized as quickly and fully as possible, until that probably distant time when Iraqis can provide their own security. And America should encourage the UN promptly to assume its missions and should continue to seek financial commitments from other nations.

Non-Proliferation

American-led multinational efforts again will be the key to success, both in policy toward potential proliferators and in implementing new initiatives. Washington must lead a more intensive international effort to secure fissile material at sites around the world. America must also lead a multilateral coalition to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, so that countries can no longer build the components of nuclear weapons and then withdraw from the regime and build a bomb. North Korea and Iran are the key concerns, and in both cases the United States does not have the diplomatic access or legitimacy to pursue alone a fruitful diplomatic track. The EU, Russia and China do, but they lack Washington's power to back up carrots with sticks. The Bush Administration has been paralyzed on policy toward both countries--it has no coherent policy toward Iran and only this past summer decided to engage North Korea, having wasted three years during which that country built nuclear weapons. Real Democratik prescribes multilateral engagement to secure our vital interests, and then unilateral action if that fails. The United States should close ranks with the EU, Russia and China and attempt to reach a de tente with Iran. Iran would need to forgo its ambition to obtain a nuclear fuel cycle, desist in its support for all terrorist groups, and recognize a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. In return, the American-led international community should offer Iran security guarantees that regime change will not be a policy, a gradual relaxation of economic sanctions, a genuine voice on regional security issues, and access to civilian nuclear energy with safeguards against diversion of fuel.

If engagement fails on non-proliferation issues, the United States should pursue unilateral action. If, after a genuine attempt at de tente has been made and evidence clearly indicates that Iran is building a bomb, unilateral military action would be justified. The damage this could cause to the unipolar order would be acknowledged but fully justified on security grounds.

Energy Supply

On this third and final vital interest, American power should focus on building a security architecture and economic arrangements that secure access for the West to key world energy sources. Russia is a rapidly growing source of energy and could be central to diversifying American supplies; estimates indicate that its oil reserves may be second only to Saudi Arabia's. Washington-led efforts that include the EU should more aggressively provide incentives for Russia to develop the infrastructure to bring its energy to world markets. For example, construction of a pipeline from Siberia to the White Sea could by 2009 add a volume to world supplies equal to 20 percent of America's annual imports. Both incentives and pressure must be applied to the Russian government to reform institutions that impede bringing Russian supply to world markets.

On the Persian Gulf, the United States should help develop a regional security structure that protects Western access to oil. The large and long-term American troop presence in the region gives Washington significant leverage in this project. Given that regional rivalries remain deep in the Persian Gulf region, America should use current security arrangements in Asia as a model. American military might in Asia and the key role of bilateral relations between Asian powers and the United States have dampened regional rivalry and helped keep the peace. Political volatility and anti-Americanism will make this project more difficult in the Persian Gulf. But especially if Iran becomes either a willing participant or a benign player in a new security structure, American power can create conditions under which access to Persian Gulf energy is more secure.

As with proliferation and the War on Terror, unilateral contingencies need to be available. A recalcitrant Iran, a revolution-stricken Saudi Arabia, or acts of terrorism could restrict Western access to Persian Gulf oil. America imports 20 percent of its oil from the Gulf, the EU 30 percent and Japan 88 percent. Unilateral U.S. military action to preserve access to this region's resources must remain an active contingency.

Fundamental Interests

The United States also has a range of fundamental interests, which Democrats should pursue earnestly whenever possible. These include advancing democracy and human rights, strengthening great-power relations, preventing conflicts and combating disease, drugs, crime and trafficking in people. Democrats must pursue aggressively vital and fundamental interests simultaneously. Tradeoffs will exist, for example, between security and democracy goals; but by setting priorities and appropriate time frames on the one hand, and by adopting multi-track policies on the other, Democrats can pursue an effective and appealing brand of realist policy. This is the essence of Real Democratik.

The War on Terror

Democratic leadership should bring the strongest possible multilateral coalition to bear in the War on Terror. America will need to draw on restored legitimacy, alliances and partnerships and institutions. Focused partnerships will be especially important, given the diffuse nature and Middle Eastern origin of terrorism. That means close political and military cooperation with Russia, Pakistan, India and nations in the Middle East--as well as with America's traditional allies. Paramount among these are close and strong relationships with the EU and its member states. They have stronger political influence and contacts in the Middle East, and the EU has a large foreign aid program there. The EU is a key financial backer of the Palestinian Authority, which means that the Europeans will likely be central to Middle East peace efforts.

To improve cooperation, the United States and the European Union should establish a standing joint body focused on Middle East policy. Currently, the Quartet--the United States, the EU, Russia, and the UN--is the only such body, but it is too narrow in focusing only on the peace process and too inclusive in that Russia or the UN could impede consensus. However, success in the War on Terror is so vital that unilateral action will be justified for discrete actions or operations--to apprehend an Al-Qaeda leader or eliminate a terrorist training camp. In these instances, the time required to gain the support of allies likely will not be available.

Iraq is a new node in the War on Terror, and regardless of past rationales and tactics, success there is now a vital interest. But success must be defined realistically: an integral Iraqi state with some degree of representative government. The American presence should be internationalized as quickly and fully as possible, until that probably distant time when Iraqis can provide their own security. And America should encourage the UN promptly to assume its missions and should continue to seek financial commitments from other nations.

Non-Proliferation

American-led multinational efforts again will be the key to success, both in policy toward potential proliferators and in implementing new initiatives. Washington must lead a more intensive international effort to secure fissile material at sites around the world. America must also lead a multilateral coalition to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, so that countries can no longer build the components of nuclear weapons and then withdraw from the regime and build a bomb. North Korea and Iran are the key concerns, and in both cases the United States does not have the diplomatic access or legitimacy to pursue alone a fruitful diplomatic track. The EU, Russia and China do, but they lack Washington's power to back up carrots with sticks. The Bush Administration has been paralyzed on policy toward both countries--it has no coherent policy toward Iran and only this past summer decided to engage North Korea, having wasted three years during which that country built nuclear weapons. Real Democratik prescribes multilateral engagement to secure our vital interests, and then unilateral action if that fails. The United States should close ranks with the EU, Russia and China and attempt to reach a de tente with Iran. Iran would need to forgo its ambition to obtain a nuclear fuel cycle, desist in its support for all terrorist groups, and recognize a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. In return, the American-led international community should offer Iran security guarantees that regime change will not be a policy, a gradual relaxation of economic sanctions, a genuine voice on regional security issues, and access to civilian nuclear energy with safeguards against diversion of fuel.

If engagement fails on non-proliferation issues, the United States should pursue unilateral action. If, after a genuine attempt at de tente has been made and evidence clearly indicates that Iran is building a bomb, unilateral military action would be justified. The damage this could cause to the unipolar order would be acknowledged but fully justified on security grounds.

Energy Supply

On this third and final vital interest, American power should focus on building a security architecture and economic arrangements that secure access for the West to key world energy sources. Russia is a rapidly growing source of energy and could be central to diversifying American supplies; estimates indicate that its oil reserves may be second only to Saudi Arabia's. Washington-led efforts that include the EU should more aggressively provide incentives for Russia to develop the infrastructure to bring its energy to world markets. For example, construction of a pipeline from Siberia to the White Sea could by 2009 add a volume to world supplies equal to 20 percent of America's annual imports. Both incentives and pressure must be applied to the Russian government to reform institutions that impede bringing Russian supply to world markets.

On the Persian Gulf, the United States should help develop a regional security structure that protects Western access to oil. The large and long-term American troop presence in the region gives Washington significant leverage in this project. Given that regional rivalries remain deep in the Persian Gulf region, America should use current security arrangements in Asia as a model. American military might in Asia and the key role of bilateral relations between Asian powers and the United States have dampened regional rivalry and helped keep the peace. Political volatility and anti-Americanism will make this project more difficult in the Persian Gulf. But especially if Iran becomes either a willing participant or a benign player in a new security structure, American power can create conditions under which access to Persian Gulf energy is more secure.

As with proliferation and the War on Terror, unilateral contingencies need to be available. A recalcitrant Iran, a revolution-stricken Saudi Arabia, or acts of terrorism could restrict Western access to Persian Gulf oil. America imports 20 percent of its oil from the Gulf, the EU 30 percent and Japan 88 percent. Unilateral U.S. military action to preserve access to this region's resources must remain an active contingency.

Fundamental Interests

The United States also has a range of fundamental interests that are very relevant to American security and values but do not directly affect the strength of the unipolar order or American security. These interests will be priorities for Democrats.

A Real Democratik foreign policy supports the spread of democracy and human rights wherever possible. Americans believe democracy is a core component of the desired human situation, and the resulting moralistic streak in American foreign policy thankfully will remain. The key is to adopt realistic time frames and expectations for specific countries.

The evolution of states to democratic polities over the long term is highly desirable for several reasons. First, as history teaches us, modern liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. The data is subtle, because democratizing nations do cause trouble and democracies fight with non-democracies. But as an end-goal, a world of liberal democracies would likely be a peaceful one. Second, democracies' foreign and security policies are more transparent and predictable, lending stability to international relations. Third, the policies of mature democratic nations are subject to checks and balances, which tend to prevent aggressive and misguided foreign policies. So on both moral and security grounds, Real Democratik supports the spread of democracy.

But post-Cold War empirical data must also inform Washington's approach to global democracy. Policy toward the states of the former Soviet Union, presided over by liberal institutionalists in the Clinton Administration, failed to produce democracy in the non-Baltic former Soviet space. With the potential exception of Georgia, none of these states meet any reasonable definition of liberal democracy, and most are backsliding toward authoritarianism. Bush Administration policy in Iraq and the Middle East, presided over primarily by neoconservatives, has not brought democratic reform to the region. Chaos in Iraq is serving as a deterrent to, not a beacon for, democracy. The Middle East does not have the historical or cultural traditions for democracy to grow; most regional leaders actively oppose it. The spread of democracy is not happening, either under liberal or neoconservative policymaking, and attempts to force it are backfiring.

America must become more judicious about where it chooses to promote democracy, and realistic about the length of time global democratic reform will take. Real Democratik would focus on countries with some tradition of indigenous democracy (ironically, Iran is an excellent example), and recognize that transitions to democracy often will span several generations. Most importantly, the United States should pursue a two-track policy on democracy. The choice between security and democracy goals is to some extent a false one, as President Reagan demonstrated when he pursued de tente and human rights simultaneously as policies toward the Soviet Union. Given the immediacy of terrorist and proliferation threats, security concerns must be paramount. But where we have leverage, we must judiciously apply it on behalf of liberal democracy and human rights. American ambassadors in capitals around the world should continue to speak out on behalf of democracy and human rights, and our democracy assistance programs must be especially active in countries with significant indigenous political will for democratic reform. Balancing national security interests with democracy will require tradeoffs, two-track policies and tailoring policy to specific countries. But to move any faster is very likely to be counterproductive and even dangerous.

The nature of America's bilateral relationships with regional powers will affect the ability to prolong unipolarity, the attainment of specific American interests, and regional stability. Key regional powers include South Africa, Nigeria, France, Germany, Britain, Russia, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Brazil and others. The strongest possible bilateral relations with these nations will facilitate the formation of multilateral coalitions and pursuit of America's vital interests. Because of their influence, support for or acquiescence in the current order by regional powers is important to its maintenance. For example, regional powers carry great sway over smaller countries in their regions, and well-managed relations with them will ease the burden of preventing destabilizing regional wars. The African powers especially should receive increased attention by Democrats and be encouraged to show leadership. Africa has become a target and breeding ground for international terrorism and is prone to destabilizing regional conflicts, some of which are adjacent to the Middle East.

Real Democratik would focus on key areas where multilateral action could prevent conflict, on effective development assistance that addresses both poverty and root causes of unrest, and on failed or failing states that are safe-havens for terrorists. America must invest more heavily in training and equipping its armed forces for peacekeeping missions, and the United States should encourage other countries to do the same. Washington must be willing to organize and lead international forces, ensuring that they can deploy quickly when needed. For example, if peace ever comes to the Middle East, it is likely that international peacekeepers will need to enter Gaza or parts of the West Bank and possess very high skill levels. America should lead efforts to develop the capacity to quickly deploy integrated and highly trained peacekeeping forces.

America must also do all it can to promote development in African and other developing states, including leading the way in reducing trade barriers. Effective foreign aid not only reduces poverty and suffering, but also helps address terrorism by creating jobs and educational opportunities, as well as improving health care among populations that are vulnerable to terrorist movements. The Bush Administration has taken a step forward in the development arena by increasing funding for development and by establishing the Millenium Challenge Account (MCA). This new program targets assistance on countries that have already implemented reform, increasing the chances that aid dollars will be effective. But the MCA's criteria are so strict that relatively few countries qualify, and its funds this year will reach only 2.9 percent of the world's poorest people. Democrats must do better, keeping the principles of the MCA but also finding prudent ways to reach more people.

Similarly, Washington needs to pay more attention to nations on the verge of becoming failed states. States that fail become breeding grounds for terror and easy transit areas for weapons smuggling. Yet in part because they do not qualify for the MCA, America's focus on and assistance to failing states has been insufficient. America must better conceptualize how to deal with failing states, and develop more effective and well-funded programs to meet the challenge.

Finally, America should lead on the new agenda: disease, organized crime, climate change, the drug trade and human trafficking. As with democracy promotion, Americans consider action on these issues a moral imperative. The Bush Administration's Global aids Initiative was sorely needed and has been appropriately well-funded. Yet Democrats can improve it. The initiative is too ideological (for example, its unrealistic emphasis on abstinence) and the president's plan fails to contribute sufficiently to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Donations to the Fund both leverage American dollars and increase Washington's ability to encourage other nations to contribute. And Democrats should develop initiatives for the other pillars of the new agenda.

Focus on issues of prevention promotes the strength of the unipolar order, America's core interests and values its citizens hold dear. Americans must see the link between organized crime and security threats: For example, nuclear smuggling poses a clear danger. So too with disease and drug flows--weak nations weaken the order. And assistance for development and health issues serves both Americans' security and insistence on morality in foreign policy.

Securing America & its Values

Americans want a muscular and moral foreign policy. Real Democratik fits the bill. The policy builds on a rock-solid foundation--the firmly entrenched unipolar structure of current international relations. It spells out how and why America should prolong this benevolent order. Real Democratik offers policy recommendations that will increase American security and promote American values. It envisions how to repair damage to the American era caused by the Bush Administration. Real Democratik is a winning foreign policy vision--it will both provide security for decades and appeal to Americans' sense of what is right for the world.

Clifford Kupchan is vice president of the Nixon Center.

Essay Types: Essay