The Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait
Mini Teaser: The Bush Administration should take to heart the lesson learned by its predecessors: leave well enough alone in the Taiwan Strait.
The case can and has been made that the foreign policy of the Bush
Administration differs little from that of its predecessor. Only the
rhetoric has changed, it has been claimed, and even some of that is
falling back into old patterns--with regard to North Korea, the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and what to do about Ba'athi Iraq. Remaining
differences of rhetoric, it is said, mask essential continuity. The
Bush Administration carries a more unilateralist tone over a range of
issues--the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court,
proposals to verify the 1972 Biological Weapons Treaty and control
the flow of small arms--but it is not clear that the Clinton
Administration was really more eager to press ahead on such matters,
or that a Gore Administration would have been. Even on missile
defense and the ABM treaty, the differences between Clinton and Bush
may end up being quite minor when all is said and done.
One could argue the general case for the persistence of policy either
way, but in one specific area there is a clear difference, and not
just a rhetorical one. It concerns policy toward China.
When President Bush took office, he telephoned every major world
leader but Chinese President Jiang Zemin. The Bush Administration
then reportedly set about revising the SIOP (Strategic Integrated
Operating Plan) to target more U.S. nuclear missiles against China.
It has given serious consideration to prioritizing preparation for
conventional war in East Asia against China and has promoted enhanced
strategic cooperation with India and Japan. It has encouraged Japan
to loosen its restraints on a more active regional military presence
and it has proposed development with U.S. allies South Korea, Japan
and Australia of a "regional" dialogue. It has also stressed
cooperation with Russia on missile defense seemingly at the expense
of China. It has defined the "no foreign-made products" stricture for
the U.S. military to mean essentially no Chinese-made products and
curtailed Pentagon contacts with the Chinese military. It has
reversed a twenty-year U.S. policy by agreeing to sell submarines to
Taiwan. It has also allowed high-profile visits to the United States
by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and the Dalai Lama. Withal, the
administration has not appointed a specialist on China to any senior
position in the government.
Such a confrontational posture toward China cannot be explained as a
response to the downing of a U.S. ep-3 surveillance plane and the
detention of its crew for eleven days. The trend predates the
incident and, despite Secretary of State Colin Powell's constructive
visit to Beijing in July, has continued since. Rather, the
explanation seems to lie in the administration's sympathy for Taiwan,
its dour assessment of Chinese intentions and the prospect, in its
view, of heightened instability in the Taiwan Strait. There is more
than just talk going on: the administration is pursuing broad
coordination with Taiwan's military to enable cooperation in a
possible war with China, that coordination being an objective of many
Republican defense and foreign policy specialists and members of
Congress since 1996.
This is a well-intended but misguided effort. Such cooperation will
not make Taiwan more secure, the United States more effective
militarily or the deterrence of war more assured. Should the Bush
Administration nevertheless continue this policy, it will eventually
elicit mainland opposition because it threatens to reverse the
essence of the post-1979 U.S.-China strategic understanding on
Taiwan. It is worth emphasizing the core of that understanding from
the Chinese point of view, to which many American analysts have
somehow become oblivious.
From the days of the Korean War until 1979, Taiwan loomed in
Beijing's eyes as a kind of American "Cuba." In other words, Beijing
believed that the U.S. presence on Taiwan enabled the United States
to threaten China's borders directly, just as the United States
believed that the Soviet presence in Cuba threatened U.S. security
from the early 1960s to the end of the Cold War. Indeed, in 1954
Washington and Taipei signed the U.S.-Republic of China Mutual
Defense Treaty, which led to the U.S. deployment of advanced aircraft
and nuclear-capable missiles on the island. But in 1979, when
Washington normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing, it agreed to
terminate the 1954 treaty with Taiwan and to withdraw its military
presence from the island, thus satisfying China's demand that the
United States cease using Taiwan to threaten Chinese security.
If Chinese leaders believe, in their bedrock strategic realism, that
the United States is out to reverse the 1979 understanding, they have
a full menu of riposte at their disposal. They can engage in
nerve-wracking saber-rattling in the Taiwan Strait in order to
heighten regional tension and political and economic instability on
Taiwan. They can reduce cooperation on the Korean peninsula and renew
missile proliferation to Pakistan and the Middle East. They can also
impose costly sanctions against major U.S. export industries
dependent on the Chinese market, such as Boeing.
In the face of such potential trouble, the Bush Administration seems
to believe that if it firmly wields U.S. power, it can command
Chinese accommodation to U.S. policy initiatives. But this repeats
the old mistakes of several new entrants to the White House. The
Carter, Reagan and Clinton Administrations (but not the first Bush
Administration) each made the same error and encountered a level of
Chinese resistance that required them to move back to the policy of
their predecessors. Each discovered, too, that their predecessor's
policy was compatible with U.S. interests in both defending Taiwan
and cooperating with China.
The Bush Administration should maintain essential policy continuity
with its predecessors simply because there is no good reason for any
other course. There is, in effect, a firm triangle of military
deterrence and political dissuasion at work: China is deterred from
the use of force against Taiwan so long as American power and
interests are engaged there and Taiwan does not declare independence;
Taiwan is deterred from declaring independence due to credible
Chinese threats to use limited but politically significant force in
the face of any such declaration; and the United States is--or ought
to be--dissuaded from tampering with this situation because it
enables Washington to defend Taiwan, deal with China as necessary and
prudent on a range of issues, and minimize the possibility of war
through miscalculation. Moreover, the effective deterrence and mutual
interests in stability that are characteristic of this triangle are
conditions bound to last well into the 21st century.
Why China Wants Peace with Taiwan
China has three sets of interests in Taiwan--concerning security,
nationalism and domestic politics--each of which provides a powerful
incentive for Chinese leaders to exercise influence over the Taiwan
issue. Together, these interests ensure that the mainland would be
prepared to use force to reverse seriously unwelcome trends in
Taiwan's international role.
China's security interest in the Taiwan issue reflects the concern of
all states for secure borders. Located eighty miles from the Chinese
coast, Taiwan's enduring strategic importance to China is obvious.
Should any great power establish a strategic presence on Taiwan, it
could use the island to challenge Chinese coastal security. This is
not just a theoretical matter as far as the Chinese leadership is
concerned. Japan occupied Taiwan (then called Formosa in the
English-speaking world) from 1895 until 1945. The United States was
ensconced militarily on Taiwan from at least 1954 until the
U.S.-China agreement to normalize diplomatic relations in January
1979.
Since 1979 the United States has continued to sell advanced weaponry
to Taiwan, but this commercial relationship has not enabled the U.S.
military to use the island to challenge directly Chinese security.
China opposes these sales, but its key strategic interest--excluding
a great power strategic presence on Taiwan--is now satisfied by the
status quo, thus minimizing its strategic interest in war.
Chinese nationalism demands that both the international community and
Taiwan acknowledge that Taiwan is part of China, and therefore that
it not declare sovereign status in international politics. While this
demand is longstanding, it has taken on added energy in recent years
as the domestic political significance of Chinese nationalism has
grown. Now that the Chinese Communist Party leadership no longer
enjoys ideological legitimacy, is infamous for corruption, represses
dissent, and cannot ensure economic stability for much of its
population, it depends on its nationalist credentials for political
ballast. Taiwan's declaration of independence would challenge party
legitimacy, especially since it would be interpreted as U.S.
"imperialist" intervention in Chinese domestic affairs.
The combination of China's strategic, nationalist and political
imperatives creates the latent instability associated with the Taiwan
issue. Should Taiwan declare independence, the mainland would most
likely use force and possibly go to war to compel Taiwan to reverse
its position. This seemed increasingly likely during the 1990s, when
Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan's first democratically elected leader, moved
Taiwan toward a declaration of independence. His July 1999
announcement of Taiwan's "special state-to-state" relationship with
the mainland came close to crossing the line of a declaration of
sovereignty, but it did not. Since then, despite the election in
March 2000 of the pro-independence candidate Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan
has retreated from Lee's provocative stance. In his May 20, 2000
inauguration speech, Chen declared that Taiwan would not declare
independence, would not change Taiwan's constitution to incorporate
the "state-to-state" formulation, would not change the name of
Taiwan, and would not hold a popular referendum on Taiwan's
international status. He has not reversed this policy, so that
mainland interest in continued recognition by Taiwan that it is part
of China is met.
China will not forsake its demand for unification, but because its
foremost strategic and nationalistic objectives are met, this is no
more than a demand for face. Thus, in the absence of Taiwan's
declaration of independence China can be deterred from using force.
Taiwan's purchase of 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage 2000 jets and its
domestic production of the Chingkuo fighter nearly guarantee it air
superiority over the Taiwan Strait, denying the mainland the ability
to sustain offensive operations against it. The mainland still lacks
the amphibious capabilities required to occupy Taiwan against the
island's coastal defenses. Taiwan's assets alone could enable it to
frustrate a mainland effort to occupy the island. But deterrence of a
more limited but nonetheless punishing and coercive mainland use of
force depends on Taiwan's longstanding strategic relationship with
the United States.
The United States can inflict a rapid and punishing attack against
Chinese forces while emerging from war with minimal casualties.
Despite recent acquisitions of Russian military aircraft, destroyers
and submarines, China's air force and navy are dominated by 1960s
generation hardware. Although China has already received
approximately 75 Russian Su-27 fighter jets and has agreed to
purchase Su-30 ground attack aircraft, the PLA's difficulty in
operating and maintaining Russian jets diminishes their role in the
cross-strait balance of power. The Russian Sovremmny-class destroyer
is a highly capable vessel, especially when equipped with Russian
Sunburn missiles, but China cannot defend the Sovremmny, and its
limited stand-off range poses only a minimal threat to U.S. forces.
The Russian Kilo-class attack submarine is a very capable submarine,
but it is also very complex and difficult to operate.
China's military also lacks sophisticated information technologies.
It possesses minimal beyond-visual-range targeting. In December 1995
China did not discover that the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz was
transiting the Taiwan Strait, and in March 1996 it could not locate
the U.S. carrier Independence when it deployed 200 miles from China's
coast. China's theater missiles lack terminal guidance systems and
thus cannot hit moving targets beyond visual range, including U.S.
warships. Although China has been modernizing its information
technologies, in the eight years between the Gulf War and the war in
Kosovo the technology gap between China and the United States
widened, thus increasing China's vulnerability to U.S. forces.
Chinese officers are mindful of their military deficiencies. Their
studies of the Gulf War and the war in Yugoslavia underscore the U.S.
ability to use naval superiority and conventional high-technology,
precision-guided weapons to deter coastal adversaries and inflict
devastating damage from off-shore platforms. PLA researchers and the
high command understand that in decisive information technologies
China is woefully backward and that its inferiority will persist well
into the 21st century. There is no false optimism in the PLA that it
could survive a war with the United States.
Military defeat by the United States would not only weaken China
vis-Ã -vis the United States but would also dramatically reverse
China's position in the regional balance of power. China would lose
its current advantages with regard to Russia, with implications for
border security in Central Asia and Northeast Asia. Similarly,
Japanese and Indian power would pose greater challenges to Chinese
security in the aftermath of a U.S.-China conflict. A weakened China
might also face security challenges from foreign-supported
disaffected minorities on its borders and Tibetan independence
activists. Indeed, Chinese territorial integrity depends on its
avoiding war with the United States.
The strategic costs to China of a war with the United States are only
part of the deterrence equation. China also possesses vital economic
interests in stable relations with the United States. War would end
China's quest for modernization by severely constraining its access
to U.S. markets, capital and technology, and by requiring China to
place its economy on permanent war-time footing. The resultant
economic reversal would derail China's quest for "comprehensive
national power" and great power status. Serious economic instability
would also destabilize China's political system on account of the
resulting unemployment in key sectors of the economy and the
breakdown of social order. Both would probably impose insurmountable
challenges to party leadership. Moreover, defeat in a war with the
United States over Taiwan would impose devastating nationalist
humiliation on the Chinese Communist Party. In all, the survival of
the party depends on preventing a Sino-American war.
But sure knowledge of defeat in war will not deter Chinese leaders
from attacking Taiwan unless they are convinced that the United
States will in fact intervene. Is the United States credible? The
short answer is "yes." Chinese government analysts understand that
domestic politics contributes to the likelihood of U.S. intervention,
and domestic political opposition toward China and political support
for Taiwan in the United States have not been higher since the late
1960s. Moreover, the post-Cold War increases in U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan have strengthened the U.S. commitment to defend the island.
Chinese leaders also acknowledge that the March 1996 deployment of
two U.S. aircraft carriers near Taiwan strongly coupled the U.S.
commitment to Taiwan with its commitment to its allies in East Asia.
Since then, Chinese leaders have assumed that a war with Taiwan means
a war with the United States.
PLA assessments of U.S. military capabilities also contribute to the
credibility of U.S. deterrence. Some blustering Chinese PLA authors
take heart in the reputed U.S. inability to suffer casualties and
argue that China can risk the use of force against Taiwan because it
can abort U.S. intervention by sinking a destroyer, for example. Such
bluster sells many books in China, but it does not reflect mainstream
PLA analysis. Chinese military leaders have criticized these
ultra-nationalistic authors and their unrealistic analyses. Faced
with the prospect of war with a superior power, professional PLA
analysts do study asymmetric warfare. But their writings suggest that
the potential value of such strategies is in enhancing China's
ability to cope with war against a superior force once fighting
begins, not in giving China a deterrent capability against the United
States and thus the confidence to risk war with Taiwan.
Moreover, PLA analysts emphasize the critical importance of superior
warfighting capabilities in making deterrence threats credible.
Indeed, they do not discuss asymmetric warfare against an adversary
possessing vastly superior C4I technologies, wartime implementation
of asymmetric strategies, and the risk of eliciting overwhelming
retaliatory strikes and rapid defeat should deterrence fail. In order
to deter, it is necessary to be able to win, not merely to sink a
single ship. In this context, the PLA also understands that the
United States possesses overwhelming "escalation dominance", so that
China lacks the capability to deter U.S. escalation at any level of
conflict.
At the highest level, too, China's limited strategic nuclear
capability provides little comfort to Chinese planners. U.S.
escalation dominance puts the onus of initiating a nuclear war on
China, which would subject it to devastating U.S. nuclear
retaliation. But Chinese military leaders have little confidence that
China can even launch a nuclear first strike against the United
States. China's military literature dwells on the vulnerability of
the PLA's few long-range missiles, reflecting concern that the long
and overt preparation time prior to launch would elicit a preemptive
U.S. attack. China thus lacks confidence that it can use the threat
of a nuclear attack to deter U.S. intervention. Also, because U.S.
deterrence of China relies on conventional weapons rather than on
nuclear forces, the PLA's strategic analysts argue that it is far
more credible than U.S. Cold War deterrence of the Soviet Union.
There can never be total confidence that deterrence will work. Yet
U.S. deterrence of any actual Chinese use of force against
Taiwan--outside of a Taiwan declaration of independence--is highly
stable. Overwhelming U.S. superiority means that the strategic,
economic and political costs to China of U.S. military intervention
would be astronomical. U.S. conventional superiority and its strong
political commitment to Taiwan mean that the credibility of the U.S.
threat to intervene is very high. In an insecure world, the U.S.
deterrent posture in the Taiwan Strait is an unusually secure one.
Why Taiwan Will Not Declare Independence
While the United States deters China from using force so long as
Taiwan does not declare independence, China deters Taiwan from
declaring independence. Thus, following Lee Teng-hui's 1995 visit to
the United States and the simultaneous increased momentum of Taiwan's
independence movement, the mainland increased the deployment of
M-9/DF-15 surface-to-surface missiles in Fujian province. The M-9
lacks terminal guidance capabilities and, thus, precision targeting,
as well as significant destructive capability. Nonetheless, it can
create havoc in Taiwan's economic and political systems. Mainland
military writings emphasize the deterrent role of random missile
attacks against a shifting selection of targets on Taiwan. And there
is no defense against Chinese missiles, for an effective missile
defense capability is many years off. Moreover, even should such
technology be deployed, Chinese deployment of additional missiles
could saturate and overwhelm it.
China plans a similar deterrent role for its conventional military
forces. The mainland does not need to be able to carry out a
strategically effective air assault or a tight naval blockade against
Taiwan for the threat of such actions to deter Taiwanese political
ambition. Chinese leaders understand that such actions can have a
devastating psychological effect on Taiwan's economy and undermine
the island's relations with its major trading partners. The mere
threat to use them against a declaration of independence, bolstered
by large-scale military exercises and deployment, is therefore a
powerful deterrent, and low-level wartime implementation could coerce
Taiwan to accept early defeat.
Complementing China's missile deployments and its limited air and
naval capabilities is the credibility of its threats. Taiwan's
leadership knows that China's failure to respond to a declaration of
independence would challenge its international reputation, affecting
border security and independence movements around its periphery. In
March 1996, despite the risk of U.S. intervention, the PLA launched
M-9 missiles into coastal waters within the vicinity of Kaohsiung,
Taiwan's major port city, to underscore its will to oppose moves
toward independence. These actions were very risky, but they enhanced
China's credibility in using force to oppose Taiwan's independence.
Taiwan's interest in preserving the political status quo reflects
more than PRC military deterrence. Taiwan's economic prosperity
depends increasingly on cross-strait stability. As China's economy
has continued to grow and Taiwan's labor costs have increased,
Taiwan's economy has become more integrated into the Chinese economy.
Its high-technology industries have begun to move offshore to China,
so that its export-led economy and future economic growth are
increasingly dependent on a stable political relationship with the
mainland. Moreover, since late 2000 Taiwan has experienced a
significant economic downturn. Unemployment is higher than ever
before, the stock market has lost nearly 50 percent of its value, and
the New Taiwan dollar reached a 32-month low in early June. The
result of Chinese growth and Taiwan's relative decline is that
business confidence on Taiwan has reached a five-year low and
business elites increasingly recognize China as their long-term hope
for continued profits. Consequently, Taiwan's business elite
pressures political leaders to keep relations with China becalmed. As
these trends continue, especially after Taiwan and China enter the
World Trade Organization, Taiwan's ongoing incorporation into the
mainland economy and its economic dependence on it will discourage
provocations from Taipei.
Taiwan also has critical political stakes in cross-strait stability.
Its democracy is young and fragile and has yet to develop a tradition
of cooperation across party lines. Its society continues to suffer
from a deep fissure reflecting conflict between those born on the
mainland and arrived after 1945 and those born in Taiwan. This
fissure has contributed to intense partisan politics which, in turn,
have undermined Chen Shui-bian's ability to develop a coherent
economic recovery policy. They have also undermined voter confidence
in Taiwan's ability to contend with mainland pressure. It is far from
clear, therefore, that Taiwan's democracy could long survive
intensified mainland-Taiwan conflict.
Taiwan clearly retains an ambition for sovereignty and the associated
membership in the United Nations and other international
organizations. But, similar to Beijing's demand for unification, this
is a demand for face, not a vital interest. U.S. intervention could
defeat a Chinese offensive, but Taiwan would nonetheless lose all
that is worth defending--its very impressive strategic, economic and
political successes. Taiwan's satisfaction with a very favorable
status quo and the great risk in challenging Chinese interests
combine virtually to guarantee that there will be no declaration of
independence--and this is not to speak of U.S. opposition to such an
initiative. This reality is reflected in both Taiwan's public opinion
polls and in the outcome of the 2000 presidential campaign. Since
1997, support for independence has never exceeded ten percent in
government-sponsored opinion polls; the norm is less than six
percent. Thus, pro-independence candidates risk appearing reckless
should they call for a declaration of independence. Although Chen
Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential campaign, he was the beneficiary
of a three-way race in which the candidates opposed to independence
divided the anti-Chen vote. That he polled less than 40 percent of
the vote reflected in part voter apprehension over his prior support
for independence.
Beijing's interest in Taiwan's continued formal acceptance that it is
part of China is therefore not as much at risk today as seemed to be
the case two or three years ago. For the first time in many years, it
is confident that "time is on China's side." This is reflected in
reduced expectations that China will have to go to war to arrest a
trend toward Taiwan independence. Indeed, China has retreated from
the February 2000 Taiwan White Paper threat to use force if Taiwan
resists unification negotiations "indefinitely." Foreign ministry
officials no longer raise this condition; when pressed, they respond
that "indefinitely" is a "long time." Thus, while China is deterred
from initiating a major war, Taiwan is deterred from doing that which
would elicit China's use of force in the first place.
The U.S. Stake
The U.S. aim in cross-strait relations ought to be to re-inforce
these offsetting strictures and to make sure that its well-intended
efforts to prepare for war do not destabilize a constructive status
quo and unnecessarily set back U.S.-China relations. This should not
be too difficult.
One advantage in achieving this aim is the fact that the United
States does not possess inherently vital security or political
interests in Taiwan's strategic role in international politics. U.S.
security would not be affected by either China's unification or
Taiwan's independence. Thus, every U.S. administration since that of
Richard Nixon has declared that the United States does not favor any
particular outcome of the mainland-Taiwan conflict, only that it be
resolved peacefully. This interest enables the United States to be
content with a situation in which neither Taiwan nor China is fully
satisfied with the status quo but both prefer peace to war.
What, then, should the United States do, and what should it avoid
doing? First, the United States must continue its effort to maintain
the capability and the credibility to deter Chinese use of force
against Taiwan. In other words, the United States must hold up its
end of the triangle of deterrence and dissuasion. Useful in this
regard would be U.S. research and acquisitions strategies that
maintain Chinese doubts that asymmetric strategies are enough to
deter U.S. intervention. Such efforts should seek to protect the U.S.
regional presence through the enhancement of C4I capabilities. U.S.
defense planners should also consider how forward deployed arsenal
ships can complement the role of aircraft carriers in deterrence,
insofar as greater reliance on precision munitions and reduced
exposure of U.S. soldiers to attack will enhance the credibility of
the U.S. threat to intervene.
But the United States should not abandon its policy of ambiguity
regarding intervention in a mainland-Taiwan conflict. Abandoning the
present ambiguity would not enhance deterrence or stability, but it
would impose a cost on the United States. President Bush got it right
on April 25 when he said that Washington would do what it takes to
help Taiwan defend itself, but also that the United States opposes a
declaration of independence.
Ending ambiguity by clearly stating that the United States would not
defend Taiwan in the event of a declaration of independence may
clarify the U.S. posture, but it would not make deterrence of such a
declaration any more effective. Taiwan is deterred by the credibility
of PRC retaliatory threats, regardless of U.S. policy, because the
United States cannot defend Taiwan against Chinese missiles or from
the economic and political costs of even a limited war. Moreover,
clear opposition to Taiwan's independence would be politically
controversial in the United States, undermining the fragile domestic
consensus on Taiwan policy and making it even more difficult for the
White House to cooperate with China.
But neither should Washington abandon ambiguity by threatening
intervention against the mainland's use of force under all
circumstances. China cannot be deterred in the unlikely event of a
Taiwan declaration of independence and it is already deterred from
challenging the status quo by U.S. capabilities and commitments.
Additional clarity would not enhance deterrence or cross-strait
stability. But an unconditional U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan
would undermine the U.S. ability to cooperate with China. It would
affect mainland assessment of U.S. intentions, creating greater
suspicion of the United States and reduced interest in cooperation.
Above all, the United States should not exaggerate the fragility of
the cross-strait political or military balance. Stable deterrence
across the Taiwan strait means that Washington can refrain from
destabilizing initiatives intended to prepare for war and enhance
Taiwan's security. The U.S.-mainland balance enables the United
States to limit arms sales to Taiwan without undermining Taiwan's
security. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan contribute only marginally to
deterrence or to Taiwan's security. What really deters the mainland
is not Taiwan's military but the U.S. military. Thus, with the
important exception of ensuring Taiwan's air superiority, U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan are not a major factor in the security equation. This
is especially the case concerning the transfer of theater missile
defense technologies to Taiwan. Rather than seek a panacea in an
uncertain technology, the United States should have confidence in the
strength of its overall deterrent capability and, thus, avoid
unnecessary, provocative and destabilizing arms and technology
transfers.
Similarly, enhanced U.S.-Taiwan defense planning and coordination will neither aid deterrence nor affect the outcome of a war. Overwhelming U.S. superiority deters unprovoked Chinese use of force. It also enables the United States to incur minimal casualties, so that the Pentagon would prefer to fight a war over Taiwan alone. Washington would demand that Taiwan's forces stand down, sparing the United States the need to manage the complexity of cooperating with Taiwan's relatively ineffective military and risking casualties from friendly fire in a very tight theater. On the other hand, determined U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation will eventually elicit costly mainland opposition. Despite recent U.S. efforts to alleviate the stress in U.S.-China relations and China's evident interest in minimizing U.S.-China tensions, Chinese civilian and military leaders appear to be increasingly concerned over the direction U.S.-Taiwan defense ties.
AS STURDY as the status quo in cross-strait relations is, it can be disrupted by unwise diplomacy that threatens the status of the 1979 U.S.-China strategic understanding. The policy changes emerging in the new administration have the potential to harm the interests of both the United States and Taiwan. Such policies will increase suspicion of the United States in Beijing and strengthen the hands of politicians who oppose Chinese cooperation with the United States.
That would be unfortunate. U.S. interest in cooperation with China is not limited to managing the Taiwan issue and avoiding war. U.S.-China cooperation contributes to stability on the Korean peninsula by enhancing Chinese incentives to constrain North Korean ballistic missile proliferation and nuclear weapons development, and by encouraging Pyongyang to pursue dialogue and peaceful unification with Seoul. It also contributes to stability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf by encouraging China not to proliferate weapons and delivery systems to regional antagonists. It enables the United States to take advantage of China's market to enhance U.S. economic growth and the competitiveness of key U.S. industries. And it enables the United States to encourage political reform in China through economic, cultural and educational exchanges. Increased tension over Taiwan jeopardizes all of these interests without contributing to stability. Moreover, the greatest cost of conflict would be borne by Taiwan. Its security, prosperity and democracy would all be at risk should U.S.-China relations deteriorate seriously.
Rather than repeat the mistakes and subsequent retrenchments of past administrations, the Bush Administration should adopt the novel course of maintaining continuity with the China policy of its predecessors. It is still not too late.
Robert S. Ross is professor of political science at Boston College, an associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, and co-editor of Reexamining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).
Essay Types: Essay