Building on Sand?
Mini Teaser: Books on "the new Iraq " are already flying off the printer, but are they any good?
In the months to come, hundreds of books on the "new Iraq" by experts and non-experts alike will be rushed to press. A notable addition to this growing list is one by Joseph Braude entitled, of course, The New Iraq. Braude is ambitious, attempting to tell the story of the old Iraq while also making a series of recommendations about how to proceed in the new, post-Saddam Iraq. This is certainly a tall order, and Braude mostly rises to the challenge: providing many good insights and some sound ideas.
The book's main deficiency, however, is its largely anecdotal and insufficiently systematic approach. This downside stems, in part, from the fact that the author did not consult crucial secondary source material easily available in every large public library. This lack of a systematic approach leads to a number of mistakes and misperceptions that could have been avoided easily. As a result, his policy recommendations, while well meaning and mostly sensible, are all too general and occasionally erroneous. Most troubling, Braude does not address major aspects of the damage done by Saddam's socio-political policies and their likely continuing influence over Iraq's future. These policies include the modern-day return to tribal ways and the old-new autonomy that it implies, as well as Saddam's problematic attempts at forging a strong Iraqi national identity.
Despite the perplexing opening sentence--"this book is not about Saddam Husayn [sic]"--the book is very much about Saddam Hussein, even though not exclusively so since it also endeavors to discuss aspects of Iraqi society and history that preceded the fallen dictator. Braude does describe Saddam's crimes, often in great detail, but he also understands that any serious policy recommendations for the new Iraq must rest on an understanding of what 35 years of Ba'athi rule did to Iraq.
Questions of National Identity
In Iraq today, nationalism is the only political force that can possibly strengthen the ties between Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Sunni Kurds and Christians; strengthen ties between traditionalists and secularists; and reaffirm the invisible barrier between Iraqi and Syrian Sunni Arabs or Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a. This is the only way to make Iraq less vulnerable to political intervention by expansionist neighbors.
Iraqi nationalism is a positive leftover of the decades of Ba'athi tyranny. The trouble here is that its Ba'athi taint may very well have corrupted the most important component that could provide an Iraqi identity with any depth: the rich historical and cultural traditions deriving from thousands of years of civilization in Mesopotamia.
Saddam's hijacking of ancient Mesopotamia, and his politicization of the past more generally, was forced upon educators of all levels, party apparatchiks, journalists and writers. They, in their own turn, imposed it on their captive audiences. The most damaging aspect of this brainwashing campaign was the fact that it became inseparable from Saddam's personality cult. He was presented as the latter day incarnation of all the great Mesopotamian kings: the lawmakers, builders and warriors--even of the Sumero-Akkadian god of fertility and re-birth, Tammuz. While Ba'athi apparatchiks dutifully parroted their leader, it is not at all clear how the Mesopotamian-Iraqi identity has been perceived by the people. It may very well be that Saddam destroyed its potential as a unifying force by linking it to himself.
Likewise, claiming that Iraq was the cradle of human civilization, Saddam linked Mesopotamia's legacy to a myth of the Iraqi people as supreme leaders of the pan-Arab movement. As his Revolutionary Command Council phrased it on the day Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Iraqis are "the pearl of the Arab crown." This aspect of Saddam's legacy is troubling, not only because of its potential for arrogance, but also because it ties the Iraqi people to the Arab nation in a way that makes both Kurds and Shi'a uneasy and exposes Iraqi politics to massive Arab intervention. Most Iraqis are, indeed, Arabs, and cultural ties with the Arab world are essential, but political Arabism (like political Islam) poses a serious threat to a democratic union of all Iraqis.
The nexus of Iraqi national identity and the efforts of intellectuals and politicians since 1921--and especially since 1968--to forge it is a pivotal theme of the story of Iraq. But it is missing from Braude's book. The author does discuss the disastrous effect of pan-Arabism in Iraq and other places, but he fails to deal with the complexities of Iraqi identity and its clashes or, occasionally, compatibilities with pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. Indeed, one of the most pressing questions confronting the new Iraq is that of the content of Iraqi national identity. The legacy of Mesopotamia could serve to differentiate Iraq politically from the rest of the Arabs, as well as from Iran, thus establishing the necessary breathing space for the peoples of Iraq--something sorely needed to rebuild the country on a firm and non-threatening foundation.
Forging a New Iraqi Civil Society
Any vision for a "New Iraq" will face enormous implementation difficulties. Since 1968, the Ba'ath party sought to stifle every social cell and institution it could not fully control. No such endeavor had ever been attempted in Iraq. The Ba'ath were largely successful, failing only to penetrate the family unit. They even managed to set the ideological tone in the madrassas and the Friday sermons.
Only in the Shi'a areas did an effective subversive culture develop. At home, with parents and relatives, a child could absorb a Shi'a identity separate from that offered by the regime. Even secular Shi'a would tell their children about the travails of the imams and their suffering at the hands of the Sunni rulers. Precisely because religious observance was regulated by a Sunni-dominated yet secular regime, they developed strong resistance both to secularism and to Sunni-dominated politics (expressed by the people as anti-Sunni bigotry). This anti-Sunni resentment explains in part why anti-American attacks have often occurred in Sunni rather than Shi'a areas. Most Shi'a are more worried about the return of a Sunni-dominated regime than they are about a foreign, "Christian" occupation. So far, practically all armed confrontations between Shi'a forces and Coalition troops have been the result of cultural misunderstandings or baseless rumors that the occupation forces were insulting Shi'i religious symbols.
Braude tends to gloss over these important developments. He observes that Sunni-Shi'i ecumenism is important for a more benign and tolerant society, but fails to take on the serious difficulties of such an attempt. History is not on the side of tolerance and ecumenism. Two Ba'ath-era illustrations stand out: first, Saddam's speeches, in which he tried to persuade Iraq's Shi'a to support him. Another, tellingly, is to be found in the writings and speeches of his nemesis, the most radical fundamentalist cleric in modern Iraqi history, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was executed by Saddam in 1980. Sadr called for Sunni-Shi'a cooperation to replace the secular Ba'athi regime--not with a democracy, but with an Islamic republic similar to that of Iran. Both men failed. Saddam did because he did not offer the Shi'a real equality. Sadr failed because very few Sunnis were ready to give up their privileged positions in Iraqi politics and because they did not trust the Shi'a.
But history can be overcome. Take the example of the moderate Shi'a cleric Grand Ayatollah Allah Abu al-Qasim al-Kho'i (d. 1992), who was a "quietist" (one objecting to the clergy's close involvement in politics and thus opposed to theocracy). The Coalition forces must support such moderate Shi'a clerics indirectly through contributions and support for their social and educational institutions. In contradistinction, Sunni religious moderates are fewer and farther between. Very generally speaking, since the mid-1990s the gap between secular Ba'athi pan-Arabists and Sunni Arab Islamic fundamentalists has been closing. Today, many ex-Ba'athi are wearing beards and regularly attending mosques, not only to pray but also to plot against the Coalition forces. This fusing of Ba'ath types with groups like the Muslim Brothers or groups connected to Wahhabi Islam is most worrisome. The Islamicization of the Ba'ath party and the party's co-optation of Sunni Islamists must be ranked among Saddam's greatest successes, unfortunately for us. However that may be, it remains crucial in the time ahead to differentiate between radicals and moderates, and between their different types.
Over time, other elements of Iraqi civil society independent of the old regime will be restored. Already, more than a hundred privately-owned print and broadcast media have sprung up in Baghdad (which may be too much of a good thing). Still, as Braude points out, there is a good chance for a free and varied press in the new Iraq. Under the monarchy--and even under Generals Qasim and Arif--Iraq's press flourished, evincing a number of independent newspapers that these governments did not favor but did not close either. (When papers were shut down, they came out the next day under a new name.) It appears that 35 years of Ba'athi rule has not stifled this trend. The Iraqi press will still be challenged not only to denounce political rivals but also old prejudices and hatreds.
Braude competently discusses Iraq's education system under Saddam. While it was greatly expanded, the curriculum also became extremely manipulative and politicized. Much class time was devoted to indoctrination. After the Gulf War, education ceased to be regarded as an asset as unemployment increased in the ranks of the educated and the salaries of the professional classes decreased sharply. Unfortunately, Braude fails to mention the most serious pedagogic consequence of the embargo years: the sharp drop in school attendance. All these ills will have to be corrected for the new academic year: new textbooks will have to be printed rapidly, teachers will have to be retrained. Braude correctly recommends that senior Ba'athi educators will have to be pensioned off, schools will have to be refurbished, and educational materials will have to be supplied in large quantities. All of these are huge and very costly assignments.
As for the question of whether madrassas ought to be allowed, Braude's answer is not clear-cut. Banning religious schools in Iraq is both impossible and dangerous. On the other hand, government support should be predicated on the acceptance of state guidelines, in particular the need to teach the natural, applied and social sciences, the humanities and English as well as a full Islamic curriculum. Failure to comply should result in a denial of funding, but not closure. At the same time, it should be made clear at the outset that graduates from religious schools that do not include the full array of secular subjects in their curricula will be unable to find employment in the public sector, save as mosque functionaries. Hopefully this will limit the demand for such education.
The De-Ba'athification Question
Braude discusses the future of the U.S. presence in Iraq. He fears, justifiably, that the United States may not have "the focus and commitment to the long haul that Iraq's reconstruction requires." At the same time, he recognizes, again justifiably, that an "imposing Western presence" will be unpopular in the region.
Yet it seems that Braude does not recognize the paradoxical nature of this situation. Many Shi'a clerics and community leaders currently organizing demonstrations against the American presence are also deeply aware that an early American withdrawal would result in a counter-revolution by Saddam's men--and their vengeance would be unparalleled in Iraqi history. The old elite still has the organization, training, weapons and, crucially, the will. Should they fail, the country would certainly disintegrate, and the likely civil war would be horribly bloody. The Shi'a south could be cut off and, possibly, incorporated into Iran; the oil-rich Kurdish north could gain independence or possibly be annexed--de jure or de facto--by Turkey; the resourceless "Sunni triangle" would thus be left hanging in the middle of nowhere while Baghdad, a mixed city, would become the stage of inter-communal carnage. But if the Shi'a extremists realize all this, why do they persist in their demands for an immediate American withdrawal? The simple answer, which must inform all aspects of a serious consideration of Iraq, is that Iraqi political culture is characterized by an all-pervasive hypocrisy.
Unfortunately, Braude seems entirely unaware of this. In fact, since the 1920s most of the country's political leaders have made use of the most inflammatory and irresponsible nationalistic slogans in support of their careers. In response, the Iraqi people gave them their support. In no case did these men achieve even a tiny portion of what their jingoistic and inflated slogans promised, which resulted time and again in a backlash against the then-current group of demagogues. In turn, the people embraced another. The only expection to this rule was Saddam. While he could never keep to his wildly inflated nationalistic promises, he managed to prevent a backlash. When disorders did occur, Saddam put them down by using the most brutal sort of force on his own people--something his predecessors had been reluctant to do. It would seem that a number of Shi'a leaders, though clearly not most of them, are true disciples of Saddam in that respect.
Braude correctly points out that there is a real danger in a post-Saddam Iraq that pro-Ba'athi forces will continue to target political rivals in addition to American soldiers, but he offers no concrete advice on how to contain and defeat these forces. The solution is two-fold. For those already shooting, long prison sentences--or death by shootout--are the answer. For those not yet shooting and contemplating their future, one must be proactive. At a minimum, offer them a modest pension. After all, they did serve the state. In exchange they would provide information about their past career and present activities. The more information one has about them and their friends, the more likely one could pre-empt their turn to mischief. Obviously, those with provable blood on their hands (such as many former Republican Guardsmen) should be punished, but wholescale lustration is to no one's benefit. However, if they were mid-level or senior professional Ba'athi operatives they must not be allowed to re-occupy any official positions of authority save in rare cases when their purely technical expertise is indispensable.
The Ba'ath party was composed of four main levels. The bottom two were populated by survivors who joined out of necessity; the third is a mixed bag; the upper level, however, could only be attained by exceptionally active and dedicated party members. At minimum, this second group must be banned from public service. As for mid- and senior-level Ba'ath party apparatchiks, Braude suggests employing them in their previous positions if they prove effective. While this may be exceptionally necessary, it is not desirable. Vigilance is required, as a constant undermining of the new Iraq--even sabotage--could be seen as preferable to constructive participation in a regime considered illegitimate. Another reason to have a policy of exclusion as the default position is symbolic. Any other approach would send the wrong message to the Iraqi people--namely, that the old regime is back under a different guise.
The goal is elementary: co-opting the old guard's loyalties, or, put differently, tying them to the new regime. To succeed, the new Iraq must keep tabs on the old guard while making sure that its adherents have something to lose. If this is not done, total alienation, and the desperation and wrath that follows, is likely to result in attempts at sabotage--even in the creation of an underground armed movement--that could act both as political opposition and economic mafia. In the best case, those involved with this last sort of activity will transform themselves, over time, into the entrepreneurial class; but for now they need to be watched closely. This brings us to the question of what to do with those who served in the regular army.
The average Iraqi foot soldier feared and hated the Saddam regime and the military obligations that were par for the course. These ex-soldiers should be screened, and about 50,000 of those vetted should be offered the option to return to military service with a reasonable salary. A similar number of ex-army soldiers should be drafted into the new police force. They know how to use weapons, are used to discipline and could be trained in civilian policing skills and tactics. Teaching ignorant soldiers how to operate as sophisticated policemen in a democratic system, though, is not a simple job.
Braude's suggestion of a 150,000-man future army makes sense only in the long term. At present 50,000 should suffice--Braude does acknowledge this as an alternative, noting, rightly, that it would work only with an American security guarantee. As Braude suggests, the army can participate in and even lead the reconstruction effort. Braude further recommends joint exercises with Coalition forces, and the eventual integration of the various Kurdish militias into the army. While a separate militia may exist for a few years, Kurds who are joining the national army must be fully integrated into it, for it is not wise to keep separate Kurdish units within the army even as a stop-gap solution. When a national army is born, it must be just that: national, not fractured along communal lines.
Though it can indeed facilitate national (re-)integration, I doubt the army can educate toward entrepreneurship, as Braude hopes. No army has ever been able to do that, unless one considers the top echelon of officers--those who gain experience in management and large-scale organization. The army can, however, serve as a training ground for leadership, and it can provide skills that can later serve the retirees in civilian capacities. Though Braude thinks the Iraqi army should immediately become a volunteer-only force, it is necessary within a few years, in the interest of long-term national integration, for every able Iraqi man of age to serve as a conscript for one year.
An often underappreciated fact is that Iraq's regular army was less political than any other organization, which means that it is now much less tainted with the stain of the past. Restoring the army's ranks will keep tens of thousands of young men with military proficiency out from under the influence of radicals, provide them with respectable livelihoods and make them effective guardians of the new regime.
Another target for de-Ba'athification is the Iraqi legal system, which should be cleansed of corruption and modified in accordance with internationally accepted principles of jurisprudence. Thankfully, one does not have to begin from scratch. Some judges, for starters, are thought to be decent and fair. After a careful vetting process, they ought to be reintegrated into the justice system.
Moreover, the 1969 penal code largely can be relied upon except for a few additions from the 1980s and 1990s in which Saddam attempted to incorporate elements of sharia into a secular code. For example, the punishment for theft became the severing of the right hand, a man was given the right to beat his wife, and the practice of "honor killing" was sanctioned in certain cases. Contrary to many other regimes in the Arab world, early on, Saddam's regime sometimes took equal rights for women seriously. The 1963 Law of Personal Status, which granted certain fundamental legal rights to women, was never repealed, as Braude says, and additions and amendments dating back from 1978 and the early 1980s improved the status of women even further. Legally, women are still not fully equal to men in Iraq (two examples: inheritance laws and status of women soldiers), but boldly pushing for this issue now would be imprudent, for it would risk sparking deep resentment among Iraqi men.
The Economic Angle
The Ba'athi regime's fiscal arbitrariness was so extreme that business decisions could hardly be made and personal economic security for the vast majority was seldom within reach. Take, for example, Saddam's decision in 1995 to abolish all the Swiss-printed 25 dinar notes. People who had saved huge quantities of these notes because of lack of confidence in the banks were immediately ruined if they could not change them in four days.
Braude's overall description of the ills of the business community under the Ba'athi regime is convincing but flawed in places. For example, Saddam's policy of economic openness (infitah), announced in 1987, did not, as the author claims, successfully resuscitate Iraq's economy. The money-making government assets that were privatized were sold to the regime's favorite clients, and the losing businesses found no buyers. A case in point is Iraq Airlines: Braude notes that it was offered for sale but fails to mention that, because no one bought it, it remained the property of the state. Furthermore, as Braude correctly indicates, any businessman who did not have a senior Ba'athi protector had to keep out of sight. Otherwise he would be harassed and even destroyed by the various intelligence apparatchiks who demanded protection money. This reached such drastic proportions that Saddam himself even complained that his mukhabarat was unnecessarily breathing down the neck of the business community. There was no chance that this sort of infitah would succeed!
Many government assets belonged to Saddam's family. They even controlled the monetary printing presses, which they used to print billions of dinars for their private coffers from 1994-5. Senior Ba'athis went into all sorts of partnerships with private businessmen, creating instant fortunes for both sides. Bribery became the norm for acquiring business permits from the government, and smuggling became a thriving business. The only necessary precaution for engaging in such work was taking care not to compete with the business interests of Saddam's family. For this the punishments were swift and severe: Uday once hanged some forty merchants in Shorja Market in the mid-1990s because they dared compete with him.
Iraq's black market economy was, and still is, endemic. Although Braude provides a good description of the problem, his solution is less clear. Involving the international business community in investments and partnerships is of course desirable, as is the general hope to turn Iraq into a powerhouse of trade and banking, but how can this be accomplished? Iraq's business tradition is mostly still alive and certainly an important asset, but forty-odd years of socialistic backwardness has made Iraqis too dependent on the state for everything from jobs to food rations. Government subsidies were huge, and they will have to be continued for a few years. At present, it is unclear which inclination will win over: Iraq's traditional entrepreneurial spirit or the messy mixture of socialism, nepotism and corruption it experienced under Saddam.
What may aid Iraq's economic recovery, as Braude mentions, is the country's relatively educated and skilled labor force. A factor that may complicate this process, however, is that Iraq does not have the "developed industrial backbone" that Braude insists it does. Phosphate mining and the petro-chemical industry aside, Iraq's heavy industry--what is left of it anyway after two wars and 13 years of sanctions--is largely useless and liable to lose colossal amounts of money. Though Iraq's oversized weapons industry, which was developed purely for national security reasons, is probably one of the world's largest, it still cannot compete successfully in the world market. Putting these production lines to civilian uses would be both extremely difficult and expensive.
Iraq's oil production is essential for recovery, of course. But the best that can be realistically hoped for would be bringing the country's production level up to four million barrels a day within three or four years, which is going to cost around $10 billion. To reach six million barrels a day will cost $40 billion, more than is affordable under present conditions. Additionally, as Braude notes, Iraq will indeed have to reach an agreement with OPEC that allows the country to sell as much oil as it can produce. But OPEC is not known for its altruism, and Iraq may be compelled to leave the organization. Even if the country substantially increases its oil production, however, the new Iraq will not have sufficient funds for recovery without debt forgiveness and payment rescheduling. Here, the Arab Gulf states must show the way, and the Paris Club should soon follow suit. But it should certainly be noted that foreign investment in any sector of the Iraqi economy is unlikely without marked improvements in security and stability.
Braude correctly emphasizes the problem of the "cats of the embargo", those entrepreneurs close to the regime who manipulated the system to establish lucrative illegitimate businesses and smuggling networks. These same people also manipulated the United Nations Security Council-mandated "Oil for Food" program: serving as middlemen for reselling much of what Iraq received for their own enrichment. It is unclear from Braude's book how he thinks these people could be persuaded to pursue legitimate business activities. Co-opting them is crucial because they are most likely to team up with ex-Special Republican Guard officers to establish mafia organizations and smuggling networks. New police forces and border guards could certainly help the situation but would not solve the problem.
Though Braude remains silent as to a viable plan of attack, the only real solution lies in the successful cultivation of a rational economy. If an Iraqi farmer is paid a fair price for his products, there is no need to smuggle it abroad. Some "cats" are already involved in agriculture, and they need no government support. Those who desperately do need it, however, are Iraq's small and middle-sized farms. Farmers will have to be taught new agricultural techniques, and agricultural machines will have to be imported.
A rational customs policy can help, too. Now that imports into Iraq are fully legalized by the United Nations, customs costs should be reduced to make cross-border smuggling less profitable. A system of small government loans could perhaps be introduced to encourage Iraqi entrepreneurs to invest in small businesses. Braude is correct that breaking down the old cartels is crucial, but he does not offer practical advice as to how. This task will not be easy because enactment alone will be insufficient. Turning Iraq into the hub of commerce and storage of which Braude speaks so longingly depends on the substantial enlargement of the ports at Basra and Um Qasr. This, in turn, requires extensive bilateral understandings with Iran (for Basra) and Kuwait (for Um Qasr) before any of the costly and extensive work can be done to modernize these ports. Last but not least, if Iraq wishes to compete with the Gulf emirates as a commercial hub, it must achieve not only stability and safety, but also logistical flexibility and bureaucratic procedures. This all depends on how successfully Iraqis can overcome the socialist economic behavior to which they grew accustomed under Ba'athi rule.
Knowing this, the Coalition must resist the temptation to enact immediate, large-scale privatization of state-owned assets in an effort to stimulate economic growth and capitalist thinking. Such a policy could turn disastrous, as it did in Russia after the collapse of communism. Just as in that case, those individuals and companies who would buy up lucrative public assets would be the old elite: senior and mid-level Ba'athi officials who managed to hoard massive amounts of capital during Saddam's reign. The result would be an increase of influence among the old guard and tremendous bitterness among the general public. If Iraq is not to follow in the disastrous footsteps of other countries that attempted the transition from socialism to capitalism, the Coalition authority must proceed slowly with a carefully monitored process of economic privatization. Or has history taught us nothing?
In the final judgement, The New Iraq is a useful book, but not without flaws. On the one hand, Braude has good instincts on the direction the new Iraq should take. On the other hand, his lack of analytic thoroughness and historical perspective damages his book's seriousness and credibility. In practice, this means that Braude can present a hopeful and positive vision for a post-Saddam Iraq without having to bother very much with the huge obstacles standing in the way of such a hopeful future. While I, too, believe that there is hope for Iraq, The New Iraq simply does not do justice to the fact that, as Fouad Ajami recently put it in another foreign affairs magazine, Iraq was--and I think remains--a symbol of "the region's age-old prohibitions . . . , defects [and] phobias." Only a careful examination and analysis of the obstacles that stand in the way of a peaceful and democratic--or, at least, a much more representative--Iraq will produce a country that can have a fighting chance to succeed. The New Iraq makes a useful contribution towards the success of this ambitious project, but more is needed.
As for the new Iraq itself, failure will mean a premature Coalition withdrawal that will very likely lead to disintegration, anarchy, bloodletting and even more world terrorism. Success will mean shattering, for the first time, the chain of Arab authoritarian-dictatorial regimes that have bred corruption, xenophobia and international adventurism. The stakes are enormous--and failure is not an option.
Essay Types: Book Review