In the wake of the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil, Americans cried out for catharsis. The 9/11 Commission delivered. What we are left with is an ill-conceived bureacracy in the guise of reform.
Tokyo has by turns been seen as a promising newcomer, an evil enemy, a dedicated junior partner, a serious economic and technological threat, and now a strategic disappointment. This attitude is detrimental to Washington and Tokyo alike.
With America mired in two wars and our economy in shambles, the chorus of declinists has returned. But the United States will endure because it is an elastic power.
Partisanship used to stop at the water’s edge. But times have changed; the U.S. electorate is now deeply divided—and not just on domestic-policy prescriptions. Facing a rift among the masses greater than that spawned by either the war in Korea or
Over the centuries, the causes and justifications for war have evolved. But we remain caught in a Westphalian mindset, even though the nature of today’s substate threats demands an altogether-different mentality and a new breed of soldier—or at le
Pundits across the political spectrum have been busy making pronouncements about the “real” financial and political costs of the war in Iraq. Most of them are just blowing smoke. In TNI’s Realist, Grover Norquist and Dov Zakheim separate fact from
The CIA’s estimate of WMD in Iraq is in the spotlight, but it was their assessments of post-Saddam Iraq that were dead-on and deserve attention. David Ignatius highlighted Paul Pillar’s story of how the agency
Somalia represents interventionst's perfect storm, but our difficulties there demonstrate the military's limits in the War on Terror.
Opportunistic policies advocated on both sides of the political aisle won’t address the real challenges that threaten the well-being of the United States.
A year after their assessment of Iranian nuclear ambitions, the authors look back. There are still no good options for dealing with Iran.