six-party talks

No one doubts that there is a significant “North Korea problem.” Few doubt that the answer is “China.” Unfortunately, the few are those who rule China.

The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is creating global unease with its nuclear weapons program. The North Koreans are thought to have enough nuclear materials for ten to twelve bombs, though their actual capabilities are unknown.

Moreover, the North has been escalating its attacks on the Republic of Korea. A DPRK submarine is thought to have sunk a South Korean warship in March. Two weeks ago Pyongyang responded to ROK military exercises by bombarding a South Korean island in the Yellow Sea.

Still, “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il’s regime offers a certain ugly stability. The man is known to enjoy his virgins in this life rather than the next, and therefore is unlikely to intentionally start the Second Korean War.

But he suffered a stroke two years ago and is advancing his youngest son, just twenty-eight or twenty-nine, as his heir apparent. The latter’s ascension is by no means certain. Other relatives could play a role in the coming transition. Moreover, a gaggle of Communist officials, military brass, security operatives and nameless bureaucrats have been waiting years for their chance to rule.

A power struggle could go violent as everyone looked to their favorite general. Perhaps the only thing worse than an opaque brutal dictatorship with nuclear weapons is an imploding opaque brutal dictatorship with nuclear weapons.

Ordinary observers have to ask: Are those North Koreans nuts? This year they have sunk a South Korean warship, made a pudgy, pouty youth into an instant four-star general and heir apparent, held a coming out party for their enriched-uranium nuclear program, and now shelled a nearby island held by South Korea. Who does these things?

China’s best friend does. Under the urban mythical Pottery Barn rule, if you break it, you own it. China took ownership of North Korea’s behavior when it stood between Pyongyang and punishment by the United Nations Security Council for its sinking of the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, last March, with the loss of forty-six lives.

China is the last lifeline to North Korea. It provides or facilitates virtually all the foreign goods needed to sustain the state and its elite. While Beijing probably did not provide the nuclear–related materials displayed by Pyongyang last week and appears to be strictly adhering to the letter of existing UN sanctions, there is nonetheless a brisk commerce between the two communist neighbors. Without it, the North’s regime could barely sustain itself.

China has claimed repeatedly that it supports denuclearization of North Korea and stability in the region. But Beijing has lamely reacted to the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and the loss of life there by calling for the parties to meet and talk, under the framework of the six-party talks that China hosts. What is more, the Chinese government refuses to use its unique and major influence to leverage a better outcome from the North Koreans. This posture assures more of the same from Pyongyang.

North Korea is a nuclear power. The United States should get used to it.

Nonproliferation is a sensible objective. But Washington’s drive to prevent the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons is dead. The North will remain a nuclear power irrespective of who ends up on top in the ongoing transition of power in Pyongyang.

Not that the Obama administration wants to acknowledge reality. Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, recently opined: “We need to see a very clear signal that this new leadership—or some structure in North Korea—accepts the very clear commitments that North Korea made in 2005 to denuclearization.”

There’s little reason to believe those commitments were ever sincere. Nuclear weapons offer the Kim regime obvious advantages: deterrence against a much stronger South Korea backed by Washington, status for an impoverished and otherwise unimportant country, and opportunities for extortion from its neighbors and the United States. There’s likely a domestic reason as well. How better to run a “military first” policy than to give the armed services the ultimate weapon?

Whether Kim was ever willing to trade away his nuclear program may never be known. But it’s doubtful that he now envisions a nuclear-free future. Maybe he’s prepared to yield up future production. But he has given no indication that he is willing to turn over his existing arsenal.

Indeed, North Korean officials have ostentatiously claimed the status of a nuclear power. The regime equally ostentatiously left the so-called six-party talks, supposedly permanently.

This week North Korea watchers were treated to a rare display of succession propaganda when it was announced at a Congress of the Korean Workers Party in Pyongyang that Kim Jong Il’s twenty-seven-year-old third son was promoted to Vice Chair of the National Defense Commission and to the rank of General in the Korean Peoples Army. With Kim Jong Il unanimously re-elected as Chairman of the Party and his sister and brother-in-law ensconced as a General and as the other Vice Chair of the National Defense Commission, respectively, the long-rumored lineup for dynastic succession is now officially in place. Suffering from a stroke but still lucid and ambulatory, Kim Jong Il can return to smoking cigarettes and drinking Hennessy Cognac confident in the knowledge that his relatives will serve as regents for the young general with the backing of the Army. The Chinese are breathing a sigh of relief and telling American and South Korean counterparts to stop fretting so much about regime change and instability. The system is stable, according to Beijing, and now the North is in a good position for peaceful accommodation with China’s own model of economic reform and opening and a return to the diplomacy of the six-party talks. Other hopeful observers of North Korea, like former President Jimmy Carter, are also echoing this optimistic prediction. Undiscouraged by his shabby treatment in Pyongyang earlier this month (the former leader of the free world was met only by the equivalent of an undersecretary of state), Carter has announced in the pages of the New York Times that the North really does want to improve relations with the United States.

 The Hermit Kingdom of North Korea remains an enigmatic curiosity. A major Communist party conference planned for early September has yet to occur and no one knows why. Earlier Pyongyang suggested its willingness to return to the ever-futile six-party talks, yet the prospect of concessions from the North seems even less likely than before. What to do?

For all of its 62 years of existence—except during the 1950-53 Korean War—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been a paragon of stability. Only two men have ruled, “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung and his son, “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il. After the elder Kim dispatched his rivals during the 1950s control from the top has been essentially absolute. The DPRK became a totalitarian communist monarchy.

For most of that time the North was only a conventional, though potent, military power. The North Korean threat declined significantly as Seoul raced past Pyongyang in economic strength and diplomatic reach. Today the DPRK is a mere shadow of its neighbor in most measures of international power.

However, for nearly two decades North Korea has been ostentatiously developing nuclear weapons. While the numbers and capabilities of its arsenal remain limited, Pyongyang must be counted as a nuclear state. Neither negotiations nor sanctions have had any discernible impact on the North’s course. Obvious regional discomfort at the prospect of North possessing nuclear weapons was eased slightly by the recognition that the regime matched malevolence with stability. Kim Jong Il obviously enjoyed his Swedish blondes—if not virgins—in this world and appeared to have no desire to trigger a war which he would lose.

Once again, there is optimism in the air about the future of the six-party talks to end North Korea’s nuclear program. Following his surprise visit to China, Kim Jong-il announced that his government was ready to return to the negotiations after an absence of nearly two years. China praised his responsible statesmanship, and Russia, South Korea, and the United States all seem willing to participate in a new round of talks. Japan is the only party that is balking, arguing that it is still “too soon” to expect productive negotiations.

Tokyo is right—but for the wrong reason. It’s not merely the timing that makes it unlikely that anything worthwhile will come out of another round of negotiations with North Korea. The real reason is Pyongyang’s lack of seriousness about giving up its nuclear program. North Korea’s record over the past two decades provides strong evidence that the goal has always been to become a member of the global nuclear-weapons club. The rest is just atmospherics, diplomatic theater, and misdirection to stall for time until the program is complete and Pyongyang can present the world with the fait accompli of an operational deterrent.

Suspicions continue to mount that North Korea torpedoed the Cheonan, a South Korean corvette which sank more than a month ago in the Yellow Sea to the west of the Korean peninsula. Policy makers in both Seoul and Washington are pondering how to respond. The potential, even if small, of renewed conflict on the peninsula demonstrates that today’s status quo is unsatisfactory for all of the North’s neighbors.

The Korean War ended in an armistice nearly six decades ago. No peace treaty was ever signed; over the years the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea committed numerous acts of war, most dramatically attempting to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during a visit to Burma and seizing the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo. Conflict was avoided because the United States, long the senior partner to the Republic of Korea in their military alliance, refused to risk igniting a new conflict.

In recent years the DPRK’s conduct has remained predictably belligerent but constrained: fiery threats, diplomatic walk-outs, policy reversals, and unreasonable demands have mixed with occasional cooperative gestures as Washington and Seoul attempted to dissuade the North from developing nuclear weapons.

North Korean relations recently have been in a down cycle. Pyongyang has walked out of the long-running Six Party talks and failed in its attempt to engage Washington. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy,” which essentially entailed shipping money and tourists north irrespective of the DPRK’s conduct, causing North Korea to downgrade economic and diplomatic contacts and even recently confiscate South Korean investments. Japan’s relations with the North remain stalled over the lack of accounting over the kidnapping of Japanese citizens years ago.

In late March an explosion sunk a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea. After his government downplayed the likelihood of North Korean involvement, the South's defense minister now says a mine or torpedo might have been involved. A torpedo would mean a North Korean submarine actively targeted Seoul's aging corvette.

The Republic of Korea's president, Lee Myung-bak, has attempted to dampen speculation by announcing his intention to "look into the case in a calm manner." But the possibility that Pyongyang committed a flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremors through the ROK. Seoul could ill afford not to react strongly, both to protect its international reputation and prevent a domestic political upheaval.

All economic aid to and investment in the North would end. Diplomatic talks would be halted. Prospects for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear.

Moreover, Seoul might feel the need to respond with force. Even if justified, such action would risk a retaliatory spiral. Where it would end no one could say. No one wants to play out that scenario to its ugly conclusion.

The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK's "Sunshine Policy"-which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang's behavior.

Nevertheless, the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and the United States.

Now we are no longer sure.

North Korea appears to go through phases. Earlier this year the North engaged in several foot-stomping, screaming, angry tantrums-like the "unruly" child Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of. Now Pyongyang is exhibiting sweet reasonableness and asking to talk.

But the Obama administration has said no. At least no negotiations outside of the six-party talks. U.S. special representative Stephen Bosworth explained, "because of the nature of this issue and its regional implications and its global implications . . . this is a problem that requires a multilateral solution."

That's true as far as it goes, but it doesn't go very far.

The potential of a nuclear Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be primarily an issue for northeast Asia. However, Washington has made it America's problem. And the U.S. role is central in North Korean eyes. The administration should initiate bilateral talks with an eye to extricating America from this position.

Secretary Clinton should invite the DPRK to send an envoy to Washington. (Enough supplicants have gone to Pyongyang.) The agenda would be to develop the parameters for any bilateral talks. The administration should indicate that it is willing to discuss most any issue, but genuine negotiations could be conducted only in a multilateral context-if not the six-party talks per se, then in an ongoing, parallel framework.

The reason is simple: the North's nuclear program, accentuated by Pyongyang's predictable brinkmanship, is the principal barrier to improvement of the DPRK's relations with the United States, as well as North Korea's neighbors. In response, Washington should indicate that it is prepared to work with the other parties to develop a comprehensive program to promote stability, security and prosperity for the Korean peninsula. The solution must be both regional and consensual. Washington should indicate that it has no intention of imposing a solution on other nations.

(c) Corbis

(c) Corbis

(c) CorbisTHESE DAYS when North Korea conducts a nuclear or missile test, the preferred metaphor in Washington is to compare Kim Jong Il to a spoiled child. President George W. Bush used to say the North's "Dear Leader" was like a baby throwing food on the floor in the hope that the adults would pick it up. When asked about North Korea during a recent trip to the region, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that as a mother she was already familiar with small children acting out to gain attention. Meanwhile, foreign-policy experts have fought over diplomatic tactics for a decade: Should we engage Pyongyang bilaterally? Multilaterally? Not at all? Journalism's contribution has been a series of depressingly accurate but not terribly prescriptive accounts of how often the U.S. and Asian governments have been reduced to internal squabbling over North Korea policy.

Lost among all the ridiculing of Kim Jong Il and the fights over the shape of the negotiating table is one unmistakable fact: North Korea has deliberately made itself more dangerous over the past fifteen years. It has increased its missile arsenal, the capabilities of its weapons, and its chemical, biological and nuclear programs. And now the rapid physical demise of Kim Jong Il adds a new element of uncertainty.