Terrorism

Al-Qaeda Grows in Sinai

Bruce Riedel — Fri, 10 Feb 2012 10:00:00 +0000

In the year since Hosni Mubarak was toppled, most of our attention has rightly been focused on Cairo and the Nile heartland of Egypt. The future of the Arab world’s most populous country is being determined in the struggle between the army and the revolutionaries, as well as in elections for parliament and the presidency.

But there have also been important developments in Egypt’s eastern frontier, the Sinai Peninsula bordering Israel. The Sinai has long been at odds with Cairo. The Bedouin population that lives in the arid and forbidding desert has long felt neglected by the government in Cairo and ignored by the Egyptian mainstream. Smuggling and crime are rampant among the tribes. Several acts of terror against Western and Israeli tourists along the Gulf of Aqaba in the last decade were blamed on the Bedouin, although the perpetrators of the violence were never really identified by the Mubarak regime.

The Wild East

During the revolution last February, police stations in the Sinai were abandoned or attacked and looted by disaffected Bedouins. A shadowy new organization emerged that went by several different titles, including al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula and Ansar al-Jihad. It took credit for attacks on the Egypt-Israel natural-gas pipeline that crosses the Sinai.

Deeper into Terrorism

Paul R. Pillar — Fri, 10 Feb 2012 03:30:34 +0000

Paul R. Pillar

LM/The National InterestAlthough the assassinations of Iranian scientists have until now been followed by no indication of responsibility other than smug comments of satisfaction from officials of the most likely foreign state perpetrator, now NBC offers something more specific. According to a report by Richard Engel and Robert Windrem, the assassinations have been the joint work of Israel and the Iranian cult-cum-terrorist group Mujahedin-e Khalq. According to the report, the partnership has involved Israel providing financing, training and arms to the MEK to accomplish the hits, as well as to commit other acts of violent sabotage inside Iran. The story tracks with accusations from officials of the Iranian government, who say they base most of what they know on interrogations and captured materials from a failed assassination attempt in 2010. Such accusations by themselves would be easy to dismiss, of course, as more of the regime’s propaganda. But the NBC story cites two senior U.S. officials, speaking anonymously, as confirming the story. A third official said “it hasn’t been clearly confirmed yet,” although like the others he denied any U.S. involvement. The Israeli foreign ministry declined comment; the MEK denied the story.

Regime Change, Humanitarianism and Syria

Paul R. Pillar — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 03:45:10 +0000

Paul R. Pillar

The West and especially the United States are still paying a price for the messy habit of conflating regime change with other objectives, even the laudable objective of saving lives. Last October, Russia and China vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria. The Russians in particular made it clear they were determined not to fall again for what they regarded as a bait and switch on Libya, in which a NATO military intervention that received multilateral support on humanitarian grounds quickly morphed into support for toppling the Libyan regime. Last Saturday saw a replay at the Security Council: another resolution on Syria, and another double veto by Russia and China. It's not as if the Russians and Chinese are throwing vetoes around with abandon these days. The vetoes on the Syria resolutions are four of only five vetoes that have been cast at the council in the last couple of years (the United States used the other one a year ago against a resolution criticizing continued Israeli construction of settlements in occupied territories). Despite efforts to word the most recent resolution on Syria in a way that would assuage Russian and Chinese concerns, all the talk about seeing the backside of Bashar al-Assad, in addition to the experience with Libya, makes it easy to see why Moscow and Beijing were still not buying.

Unanswered Questions on Afghanistan

Christopher A. Preble — Thu, 02 Feb 2012 18:26:08 +0000

Christopher A. Preble

Secretary Panetta’s announcement that the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan will end as early as mid-2013 is a positive development. But it is long overdue and still leaves too many questions unanswered. After more than ten years of war in Afghanistan, the administration should follow through on its commitment to end combat operations and withdraw all troops by 2014. Continuing to narrow our objectives will make this war winnable.

Politically, this makes perfect sense for the Obama administration. It is a shot across the bow of his political opponents and those wishing for an indefinite combat mission in Afghanistan. Secretary Panetta’s announcement allows the administration to get on the side of voters who want to draw down in Afghanistan. By opposing any drawdown, his critics side with the much smaller segment of the American people who still support the nation-building mission.

President Obama is in a position similar to the debate over Iraq in his 2008 presidential campaign. He argued in 2008 that he would end a grinding war he inherited. The president can claim victory (and vindication) in Iraq and argue that if you liked the first act, you’ll love the second. He will end another grinding war he inherited—and conveniently gloss over the fact that he sent more troops to Afghanistan than President Bush ever did.

Embracing Threatlessness

John Mueller — Tue, 31 Jan 2012 21:17:03 +0000

John Mueller

It is often said, even by many of his admirers, that at any one time Newt Gingrich will have one hundred ideas, of which five are pretty good. Falling into the latter category was his remark last week that defense budgets “should be directly related to the amount of threat we have.”

Although Gingrich, on his 95 percent side, imagines many dire dangers, it seems to me that the United States lives in an environment that is substantially free from threats that require a great deal of military preparedness. (A more extended discussion is here.)

Saleh Should Stay in New York

J. Dana Stuster — Tue, 31 Jan 2012 10:00:00 +0000

J. Dana Stuster

Ali Abdullah Saleh, the nominal president of Yemen, arrived in New York City last week. The visit is uncomfortable, to say the least.

For the past year, Saleh and his government resisted a peaceful protest movement’s calls for his resignation; months of stalemated sit-ins and marches that filled the thoroughfares of Sanaa, Ibb, Ta’iz and Aden were punctuated by massacres of civilians and street battles between the military and tribal militias. In November, after seven months of stalling, Saleh finally signed a transition agreement negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and supported by the United States. Under the terms of the agreement, Saleh agreed to pass his powers (though not his title) to his vice president while a jiggered “unity government” is formed and harried elections are conducted to authorize a new executive. In exchange, Saleh received immunity from prosecution, which was recently formalized in Yemeni law.

But the crisis in Yemen is hardly over. Protests persist, calling for Saleh to be held accountable for the violence against protesters. The presidential election is still a month out, and the only candidate will be the vice president and acting executive, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

Hamas Out in the Cold?

Paul Scham — Mon, 30 Jan 2012 10:00:00 +0000

Paul Scham

One of the most enduring epithets for Hamas, right up there with “terrorist,” is “proxy.” If you Google “Hamas Iran proxy,” you get 1,750,000 hits. The idea that the relationship between Sunni Hamas, the Gaza affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Shia Iran was merely a marriage of convenience and not a true love match is rejected by those who forget that most enduring maxim of Middle East politics: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” And implicit in that maxim are two more words: “for now.”

This conventional wisdom is due for a makeover. On January 17, a Ha’aretz headline announced “Hamas brutally assaults Shi'a worshippers in Gaza.” The article reported that Hamas fears “growing Iranian influence in Gaza.” But for years, we have been told that it is Hamas itself that represents Iranian influence in Gaza. What gives?

Further down in the article, the picture begins to make sense when we read that Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members in Gaza are “converting” to Shiism. For Hamas, the “Arab spring” does not lead to a “summer of roses and wine” (with apologies to Gilbert and Sullivan). A day later Khaled Meshal, the head of the organization, still based in Damascus, unexpectedly announced his resignation. The regional picture is changing, and Hamas is trying to catch up.

Terror Tipsters

John Mueller — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 20:18:59 +0000

John Mueller

At the National Sheriffs’ Association Conference in Washington last week, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano noted that riders on the D.C. Metro system can hear her voice repeatedly promoting her department’s “If You See Something, Say Something” terrorism-hotline campaign. “That’s a scary thought,” she suggested.

Even scarier to me is the campaign itself.

It began in New York City, where it generated 8,999 calls in 2006 and more than 13,473 in 2007. Although the usual approach of the media is to report about such measures uncritically, one New York Times reporter at the time did have the temerity to ask how many of these tips had actually led to a terrorism arrest. The answer, it turned out, was zero.

That continues to be the case, it appears: none of the much-publicized terrorism arrests in New York since that time has been impelled by a “If You See Something, Say Something” tip.

This experience could be taken to suggest that the tipster campaign has been something of a failure. Or perhaps it suggests there isn’t all that much out there to be found. Undeterred by such dark possibilities, however, the campaign continues, and the number of calls in New York skyrocketed to 27,127 in 2008 before settling down a bit to a mere 16,191 in 2009.

Homegrown Jihad Sweeps America

John R. Schindler — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 10:00:00 +0000

John R. Schindler

This month has seen two cases of domestic terrorism break along storylines that have become depressingly familiar. The first, a Muslim immigrant, crafted a very self-styled jihad that aimed at killing his “sinful” neighbors. The second, a U.S. soldier who had suddenly converted to Islam, sought to join the jihad in Africa. While both young men were caught before carrying out their murderous objectives, the cases are cause for concern, despite the death of Osama bin Laden and the apparent decline of al-Qaeda as a fighting force.

Sami Osmakac, arrested on January 7, is an Albanian from Kosovo and a naturalized citizen who lives in the Tampa, Florida area. His trajectory of self-radicalization looks familiar to any who have examined similar cases of this idiosyncratic and alarming phenomenon. Osmakac, twenty-five years old, entered a world of self-styled jihadism, a violent fantasy life which exists more on the Internet than anywhere else. He seems to have developed a murderous loathing for “infidels” as well as for fellow Muslims whom he regarded as insufficiently pious—most Muslims, in other words.

New Terror Threats in 2012

Rohan Gunaratna — Fri, 20 Jan 2012 10:00:00 +0000

Rohan Gunaratna

The global terrorist threat is diversifying. Ten years after its iconic attacks on U.S. landmarks, al-Qaeda no longer occupies the center stage in global security. Relentless U.S. targeting led to the massive degradation of al-Qaeda, the core of the global terrorist movement. This included the killing of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda’s founder and leader, in Abbotabad, Pakistan on May 2, 2011. The epicenter of the network suffered another blow when Attiyah Abd-al-Rahman (alias Attiyah Allah), the deputy to Bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al Zawahiri, was killed in a CIA drone strike in North Waziristan, Pakistan on August 22, 2011. Nonetheless, al-Qaeda’s ideology and its clones in Asia, the Caucuses, Africa and the Middle East still present a real threat to societies and governments worldwide.

Playing to Our Strengths—and Why COIN Doesn’t

Christopher A. Preble — Thu, 19 Jan 2012 18:06:15 +0000

Christopher A. Preble

A recent editorial in the Boston Globe noted with some glee that the Obama administration strategy document released last week included the “acknowledgement that America's brief and unhappy foray into counterinsurgency operations has come to an end.” The Globe editorialists conclude “Given the checkered history of counterinsurgency, and its cost in lives and money, its demise is hardly unwelcome. Even better to read of it in the very document that hopes to guide how the United States conducts wars the next time around.”

As a COIN skeptic from well before the publication of FM 3-24 (when COIN was called nation building), I am inclined to claim some vindication. Often with Justin Logan in the lead, I have probably written more about this subject than any other (including here and here). More broadly, Cato has been a hospitable venue for skeptical views of nation building as a cure for terrorism, including these two fine papers that explained why we didn’t need to repair/reconstruct weak or failing states in order to defeat al-Qaeda, and this paper by Jeffrey Record on why COIN/nation building was inconsistent with America’s strategic culture and therefore likely to fail.

Assassination in Iran

Paul R. Pillar — Wed, 11 Jan 2012 23:06:08 +0000

Paul R. Pillar

The killing of an individual foreigner overseas, if carried out for a political or policy purpose by either a nonstate actor or clandestine agents of a state, is an act of international terrorism. At least that is how U.S. law defines it, for purposes such as the State Department's annual reports on terrorism. This form of terrorism is part of what put Iran on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, the Iranian regime perpetrated numerous assassinations of exiled Iranian political dissidents, in Europe as well as in other countries of southwest Asia. The Iranians effectively ended this assassination campaign about a decade and a half ago, largely to improve relations with the European countries on whose soil many of the assassinations occurred and perhaps also because by then Iran had bumped off nearly all of the people on its hit list. We should assume, however, that Iran retains the capability to assassinate far-flung targets again, and that it would consider doing so if searching for ways to strike back at adversaries that are striking it.

Why Not to Attack Iran

Elbridge Colby, Austin Long — Wed, 11 Jan 2012 10:00:00 +0000

Elbridge Colby

Austin Long

The pressure for an attack on Iran is building. Media reports suggest that the Obama administration is under pressure to take action and may even be considering action itself, and Foreign Affairs published an article in its opening 2012 issue by nuclear expert Matthew Kroenig forthrightly stating that it is “time to attack Iran.” Many argue that strikes against Iran’s nuclear program are the only responsible course.

The American-Pakistani Cold War?

Christine Fair — Tue, 10 Jan 2012 10:00:00 +0000

Christine Fair

On September 10, 2001, Pakistan was, for all intents and purposes, a rogue state. It was encumbered by numerous layers of sanctions pertaining to nuclear and missile proliferation, the 1998 nuclear tests, as well as sanctions that resulted from General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 coup. When then president Bill Clinton visited the subcontinent in 2000, he spent five days in India and a mere few hours in Pakistan. During his Pakistan visit, Clinton refused to shake Musharraf’s hand and hectored the dictator on the necessity of democracy. Pakistan was one of the three countries that recognized the odious Taliban regime, and it had by the fall of 2001 secured a long track record of supporting terrorism. Back in 1993, Pakistan teetered upon a U.S. government designation as a state that supported terrorism.

The gruesome crimes of 9/11 changed Pakistan’s fortunes and those of its military dictator, Musharraf. By joining with the United States in its so-called war on terror, Musharraf was transformed from U.S. pariah to U.S. ally. Pakistan was relieved of its sanctions, reaped billions in loan forgiveness and loan rescheduling, benefited from more than $20 billion in military and economic assistance as well as lucrative reimbursements for military operations on its purportedly sovereign soil. Most importantly, the tragedy of 9/11 afforded Pakistan the opportunity to rehabilitate itself among nations and stave off what Musharraf believed would be an Indian effort to take advantage of Pakistan’s precarious position.

An Elusive Enemy

John R. Schmidt — Fri, 06 Jan 2012 10:00:00 +0000

John R. Schmidt

The Pentagon has just announced plans to give the Afghan army primary responsibility for conducting combat operations against the Taliban insurgency. This will begin as early as mid-2013, at least a year earlier than originally envisioned, and suggests increasing U.S. confidence that the Afghan army will be up to the task. The announcement came less than a month after the U.S. intelligence community issued a classified report that seemed to imply exactly the opposite: while Taliban forces had been driven out of parts of southern Afghanistan as a result of the recent U.S. surge, the overall situation remained one of stalemate. The report apparently also expressed concerns about the chronic weakness and corruption of the Karzai government and questioned its ultimate survivability.

The Tablian’s Calling Card

While it is true that the Taliban’s presence has been significantly reduced in parts of southern Afghanistan, it is much less clear that the Taliban forces that were based there have been destroyed. Although there have been exceptions, the Taliban modus operandi when confronted by superior force is not to stand and fight but rather to slip away to fight again another day.