And there is another, often unspoken assumption guiding the relationship: the unmentioned strategic glue holding it in place. Hovering like Banquo's ghost at the banquet for both the United States and India is the rise of Chinese power. The Bush Administration does not mention this as a rationale, not wishing to provoke a negative reaction in Beijing. New Delhi would likewise deny that this figures into India's calculations. But the truth is that no one knows what sort of China will emerge in the decades ahead. Robert Zoellick noted our hope that China will become a responsible stakeholder in the international system, but that standard is nowhere near being met by Beijing at present.

In private, both Indian and American strategic planners worry what would happen if China became more aggressive and engaged in worrisome external behavior. A strong U.S.-India partnership is a strategic hedge for both countries against problematic Chinese behavior in Asia and on the global stage.

There needs to be a certain degree of patience among Americans. Strategically, no other country is in the same league as the United States in what it can offer India, but this does not mean that India is going to sacrifice or abandon other bilateral relationships that serve its interests. For example, as India looks to purchase advanced weapons systems, we should not expect that because of the U.S.-India strategic partnership, New Delhi is not going to entertain purchasing arms from competitors such as France, Russia or even Israel, as opposed to U.S. firms. There will be times when India will find a particular policy of a particular country more congenial to its interests than aligning with the United States on that particular issue. With this reality in mind, the United States, particularly Congress, needs to avoid applying a series of short-term litmus tests to Indian international behavior-a piece of policy advice easier said than done.

It is important for Americans to remember that India's colonial experience-for 300 years the destinies of the subcontinent were decided thousands of miles away in London-is never far from the surface. Indian politicians are sensitive to a public mood that prizes independence of decision-making. Despite the major gains India is poised to receive from the civil nuclear deal, there was nonetheless criticism in both the Lok Sabha (the parliament) and among pundits that by signing the agreement India would become beholden to the United States; that Washington would present New Delhi with a continuing bill (say, on accommodating U.S. preferences on Iran or Pakistan) that would end up mortgaging India's vital national interests. This, of course, was not true at all: No such quid pro quo was ever part of the discussion. But this criticism points to a lingering sensitivity in India about not being lectured to or bullied by any nation, including the United States.

In the end, however, these are only occasional bumps in the road. Two years ago, I said in the pages of The National Interest, "As this decade progresses, India will be an ever more active partner with the United States." We are certainly on that course.

Robert D. Blackwill was President George W. Bush's deputy national security advisor for Strategic Planning and also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and U.S. ambassador to India. He is now president of Barbour Griffith & Rogers International, a Washington consulting and government-affairs firm.

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