A Most Dangerous Game: Russian Gambles, American Distractions

March 26, 2003

A Most Dangerous Game: Russian Gambles, American Distractions

The U.

So Moscow is navigating between the Scylla and Charibdis a bit easier.  In this regard, Europe has become a key part of any "multipolar" world.  Ivanov stresses that multipolarity is not some of combination animated by a spirit of anti-Americanism, and in this regard is satisfied by the closer coordination with France, Germany and China in the UN Security Council, building "not on the principle of 'bloc discipline' but on the basis of complementary approaches to solving concrete problems."  

But this is the question, if we go down some sort of variant of this type of relationship with the United States--which players in such a multipolar world will be for Russia?  Does Russia possess the economic and other forms of leverage needed to buy their loyalty (as it does with its clients in the CIS)?  And do we think that when we buy them, their loyalty will be firm, and others will not outbid us?  Can Russia really support a new arms race, without running the risk that this will degenerate into another Cold War? 

The answer to all these questions is of course in the negative, decisively so.  Certainly, you find among some extremists, particularly in the ranks of the former generals, a whiff of even a stronger variant; to bang down on the table the nuclear card, retarget the missiles, turn back the clock, mobilize, hide away, resurrect (even if only virtually) superpower status.  

Yet, this frightens the Americans.  They are engaged in Iraq, but not prepared to take heavy losses.  The Moscow hawks maintain that it would be even more difficult, psychologically, for the Americans to cope with having Russia (and perhaps, acting in concert with China), as a strategic opponent, thus having to face the possibility of having to fight on two fronts.

This is why I do believe that Moscow has found a real source of leverage (and pressure) against Washington.  Moscow's confidence in its ability to influence the dialogue between Russia and the United States is grounded in the fact that, with the destabilization of the Middle East, Venezuela and, in the last few days, Nigeria (as well as Russia's geopolitical overtures to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), Russia's importance for America's energy strategy increases.  The Kremlin thus believes that it is in the strategic interest of the Bush Administration to secure a tighter partner ship with Russia, especially if the United States faces changes in the global balance of power due to a rising China.  And this leverage, this influence, will only become more powerful as the U.S. war machine becomes bogged down in Iraq, as the gulf widens between America and Europe, as hostility grows between the West and the Islamic world, and as the antiwar movement strengthens throughout the world. 

As I wrote two weeks ago: "For today Russia finds herself in distinguished company-- … with the leading continental powers of Europe--France and Germany.  And even though it is not as visible, we are also very close to our "strategic partner," China.  It also does not need to be said that other players are on the same side of the barricade with Russia --the majority of Arab and Islamic countries, as well as an influential antiwar front which is forming in the political and social circles within the majority of Western countries.  … So therefore the goal of Russian tactics is to … minimize the negative fallout of any American action while maximizing Russia's benefits."

Yet, there is a real risk that, if in pursuing this strategy, the Russian hawks gain ascendancy within the Kremlin, we could end up sliding into a new Cold War.

 

Yevgeny Verlin is the assistant international editor for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (http://www.ng.ru).