Australia values a U.S. forward role that contributes to the regional balance but tolerates the rise of China by seeking to incorporate it into mainstream international economic and security systems. This view is founded in realism, buffered by a bit of justifiable optimism. It recognizes the lack of strategic stability in East Asia, China's role as an anti-status quo power, and the risk inherent in Asia's three unresolved flashpoints: the India-Pakistan dispute, the division of Korea and the Taiwan issue. A strong U.S. role is indispensable to a peaceful regional balance. It is hard to see any downgrading of ANZUS, however, that would not be part of a U.S. regional retreat--a retreat that would also concern Japan and South Korea in the north and, at a minimum, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia in the south.

Australia's main worry, however, is not the likelihood of a U.S. retreat but of an ideological overreaction to China's rising power. Australia opposes any American effort to define its Asian purpose as the "containment" of China. This applies either to the emergence of a hardline U.S. unilateralism or any effort to conscript America's Asian alliances into a plan of regional containment. If America's allies in the Asia-Pacific are typecast as part of a China containment strategy, the entire region could become hostage to a deteriorating U.S.-China rivalry--and, from the looks of China's de facto post-communist realities, a needless rivalry at that.

The nightmare scenario for Australia is one in which it would be forced in a crisis to choose between the United States and China. Since Australia would have to side with America, at least nominally, the costs arising from a breach with China would be substantial--particularly if responsibility for any crisis was seen to rest mainly with Washington rather than Beijing. In this situation some Australians would argue that the price of the alliance was no longer worth paying--a fact that underlines the need for each alliance partner to be realistic about what it expects from the other. This is particularly important in relation to China because Australian and American attitudes are considerably more divergent than is generally realized in the United States.

In Australia, unlike in the United States, China policy is more a source of unity than conflict. This is the result of thirty years' worth of bipartisanship on the growth of economic, political and security ties. The future power disparity is such that Australia does not regard China as a rival; rather, Australian governments have sought a relationship with China that transcends the limits imposed by the Beijing-Washington rivalry.

As things stand today, the majority view within Australia is that such transcendence will work for the time being because China, being far weaker than the United States, will defer any crisis. Any near-term testing of this view is likely to center on Taiwan. This is where management of alliance expectations is crucial. There is no disposition in Australia for military commitments in Northeast Asia. Australia's armed forces are not structured for such a role and, except possibly in the unlikely event of crude aggression on the part of China, public opinion would not expect or support it. The political reality that underpins the U.S.-Australian alliance needs to be explicit; America needs to know that Australia will do less than it may expect in Northeast Asia, and Australia needs to accept that it must do more in Southeast Asia. In this sense East Timor and Taiwan offer useful keys to the partners' interpretation of their alliance to each other.

The successful 1999 collaboration over East Timor began with a sharp misunderstanding. Prime Minister Howard was surprised by President Clinton's refusal to contribute U.S. ground troops to the UN force and, for a few days, there was a breakdown between Howard and Clinton. It rapidly evolved into a model of alliance cooperation: Australia as the regional power led the UN force, backed by indispensable U.S. logistical and political support. The overall message is that Australia must assume greater responsibility commensurate with its role as the metropolitan power in the South Pacific and the main economic power in Southeast Asia.

By the same token, the United States should be aware that in any conflict over Taiwan, the Australian contribution would at best be extremely modest and quite probably merely declaratory. Australia has no legal obligations to Taiwan. The "one China'' policy is rarely contested in Australia. There would be little support for a democratic Taiwan moving toward independence. Australia's view is that Taiwan enjoys autonomy and de facto independence as it is and that there is no reason why any Australian should die to convert that into de jure independence. It is difficult to imagine the circumstances, outside of overt Chinese aggression, where any conflict over Taiwan would generate even modest support for Australian involvement. The potential damage to Australia's interests in terms of its China relationship could represent the most serious cost for Australia in the alliance's history. In terms of the current debate, Australia has no vital national interest at stake with Iraq--except as it may ultimately affect WMD proliferation trends. But Australia certainly does have vital interests at stake with China, right here and right now.

Australia's view is that China should meet the region's expectation of a non-military solution, and that the United States and Taiwan should avoid provocation in the short term to win a managed solution in the long term. In the event of a more militant and unqualified pro-Taiwan line emerging in the United States, the chance of a breach between Australia and the United States could not be ruled out.

That the war on terrorism may improve long-term U.S.-China relations, or at least reduce the likelihood that a rivalry will intensify anytime soon, is good news. But the enduring message for the alliance is the need to manage expectations over China to avoid sudden shocks and political disappointments between Washington and Canberra. Now--when the emotional focus in both countries is being directed elsewhere--is an excellent time to talk this out.

The Global War on Terror

It is far from obvious that the war against terrorism unites American and Australian interests to the same extent as have previous wars. The fear among America's allies, that the United States will deliberately privilege pre-emptive military and unilateral means, varies from ally to ally and is often exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is true that American perceptions of the threat it faces are different from those of its allies. To the extent that America tends toward military pre-emption and unilateralism over multilateralism, it creates new problems for old allies.

These differences between unilateral and multilateral approaches, while nothing like the caricatures created in some quarters (and stimulated by some over-dramatic rhetoric by the U.S. Secretary of Defense), do matter. While not disparaging multilateral undertakings in all but the most vital of U.S. interests, Charles Krauthammer favors, as he put it in the Winter 2002/03 issue of The National Interest, "the aggressive and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism.'' Fareed Zakaria understands as well as anyone the fragility of the United Nations and the need for U.S. security policy leadership, but he warned in the October 21 issue of The New Yorker that U.S. hegemony needs the legitimacy derived from operating within an international consensus. "Without this cloak of respectability America will face a growing hostility around the world'', he wrote, adding that without such respectability anti-Americanism will become "the global language of political protest--the default ideology of all opposition--unifying the world's discontents and malcontents.''

On balance, most Australians incline to Zakaria's sensibilities rather than to Krauthammer's. Australia's support for the Bush Administration's military actions should not be misread to underestimate Australia's serious interest in the legitimization of such actions. There has been a strong bipartisan view in Australia that any Iraq campaign should be sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Australia's preference in the post-September 11 climate for military action sanctioned by a broad coalition of nations mirrors its concern that the new U.S. emphasis on pre-emption could risk greater global disorder, and that deterrence should not be lightly abandoned.

Australia has strong national interest reasons for such concerns. As a middle power, Australia is interested in seeing that U.S. hegemony is deployed not just on behalf of America itself but for a better global order. This is how any sensible middle power thinks. Australia wants the United States to operate as a constructive global leader that supports Australia's post-World War II diplomatic synthesis between realism and multilateralism. In its realist phase, Australia has prized the U.S. alliance with its military and security dimensions to bolster its own security and political leverage. In its multilateral commitment Australia's interests have consisted in the development of law, treaties, economic agreements and peacekeeping to advance the development of a rules-based international system. This logic derives from Australia's situation as a stable country in an unstable region.

Australia therefore does not want an America so imprisoned by the search for consensus that it is paralyzed from taking military action. But neither does it want an America that is walking away from global institutions rather than laboring to work within them. Indeed, nothing would cause more dismay in Australia than seeing the European Union prevail within such institutions at the cost of those institutions' ultimate viability. If America should ever decide that the global institutions and rules of the post-World War II period have little value for its needs as a hegemon, it would be disastrous for middle powers such as Australia.

Essay Types: Essay