How has this political cultural shift happened? It would be easy to blame the policies of the Bush Administration, in the manner of many on the American and European Left. It would also be wrong. The Pew Center study showed that, of those South Koreans who had an unfavorable view of the United States, when given a choice between blaming the Bush Administration or America generally, or both, 72 percent felt that the United States generally was the problem, and only 20 percent blamed the Bush Administration in particular for their attitudes. (These figures contrast starkly with anti-American sentiment in Europe. There, of that part of the population holding an unfavorable view of the United States, 74 percent in France, 74 percent in Germany, 67 percent in Italy and 50 percent in Spain believe that the Bush Administration is the problem, while only a small minority blamed America generally.)

Given that these attitudes are generationally different, the explanation of anti-American political attitudes in South Korea is rooted in generational issues. Older South Koreans recall directly the Korean War and the atrocities of the North. They were the ones most affected by the separation of families that took place as a result of the communist regime. The older generation still sees the United States as a factor of salvation and looks to the totalitarian North with dread, noting America's role as protector during the South's rise from poverty to wealth.

On the other hand, the younger generation, born into relative prosperity, recalls most vividly the struggle against the dictatorships of the South from the 1960s on. For them, the Kwangju massacre of students by the military government in 1980 is the focal point of collective memory. They recall that Pyongyang supported the students, while Washington supported the military dictatorship. They became even more susceptible to Marxist interpretations of Korean history. By the late-1980s, those students had become the South's university professors and high school teachers, in an Asian version of what the German intellectual agitator Herbert Marcuse called the "Long March through the institutions." The myth that America was responsible for the division of the nation, and that it caused the outbreak of the Korean War, permeates the younger generation's thinking, with the writings of University of Chicago historian Bruce Cumings serving as their basic texts. The recent discrediting of his theses by revelations from Soviet archives has made no impact upon these deeply held prejudices.

One political result was to encourage Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy": an attempt, through what Western policymakers like to refer to as "constructive engagement", to transform North Korea peacefully into a more open society, one that would trade and allow cultural interaction with the South. The ultimate hope is to eventually discover a basis for peaceful reunification of the divided Korean peninsula. Even if the policy had been partially successful in facilitating more economic and cultural openness in North Korea, there was still the unanswered question of how a people divided by two completely antithetical political systems would ever be able to unite. Only two 20th-century examples provide models. The reunification of North and South Vietnam came about as a result of military conquest and the overthrow of a non-communist government by a communist one, backed to some extent by both China and the Soviet Union. The reunification of Germany came about only as a result of the peaceful collapse of the communist system, when the Soviet-trained and protected German communist elites lost the support of their "elder brother" and, lacking the ruthlessness of tyrants, lost confidence in their own ability to rule. Proponents of the "sunshine policy" do not propose that either of these examples provide a model for Korea. How then will reunification happen?

Apart from its conceptual muddle, the "sunshine policy" was from the beginning a dismal failure in practice. To ensure a summit meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas, Southern officials and businessmen secretly paid Pyongyang hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes. The North has established a capitalist zone in the far north of the country, adjacent to China, where such economic activity can be isolated from the rest of the country. And the cultural opening--a promise of travel between the two zones that would enable divided families to spend some time together--was a farce that has only occurred once, and then only of a scanty 200 elderly people out of a pool of millions of eligible divided family members. The current North Korean leadership retains control of most economic life and has displayed no substantial interest in transforming the North into a politically authoritarian market economy and society like that of China.

Even if the December 2002 election results in South Korea had brought to power a hard-liner, thus keeping Seoul and Washington closer together on the Pyongyang question, the fact remains that, since September 11, South Korea and the United States face different threats from the advent of North Korean nuclear power. Washington is at the top of Al-Qaeda's hit list; Seoul is not. As such, American and South Korean security priorities have begun to diverge fundamentally.

The Specter of Regime Change

How can regime change in North Korea realistically occur? Two scenarios present themselves. The least bloody option calls for Beijing to make use of its near-total control over so much of North Korea's energy and food supply by essentially supporting one faction against another and foment a coup d'état in Pyongyang, the result of which would be to put Pyongyang on a firm road to a China-style reform-oriented communist regime. Why would Beijing want to do this? Some suggest that Beijing fears the regional proliferation that would result from Pyongyang's arrival to the nuclear club. Japan and South Korea would be bad enough, but Taiwan would be unacceptable. Additionally, Beijing might decide that the danger of ethnic Muslim separatists in western China acquiring a nuclear device from the North, via Al-Qaeda, might be sufficient to warrant a pre-emptive action against the North.

More significantly, it appears that the most compelling reason for China to act against the North is the reasonable fear that, if Beijing does not act against Pyongyang, Washington might. For, if the United States were to overthrow the regime in North Korea, it would likely expect a non-communist regime to emerge in the aftermath and would accelerate steps leading toward the unification of the two Koreas under a pro-American, democratic capitalist regime. Having such a regime on its border would adversely affect China's strategic environment, so China's motivation to act to change the regime in Pyongyang would be greatly affected by its perception that decisive American military action would result absent Chinese intervention.

Here is where the Iraq situation has complicated things greatly. On the one hand, before the Iraq War, Beijing was detached from the burgeoning crisis on the Korean peninsula. American officials complained about this fact often. Yet after the Iraq War, Beijing suddenly became open to Washington's suggestions that it should participate in and even host negotiations. No doubt the display of American resolve and military skill in the Middle East has convinced China to become involved in trying to solve the Korean crisis peacefully. On the other hand, the tying down of American troops in Iraq, in an unexpectedly complicated and probably drawn out counterinsurgency, and the stretching of American military deployments worldwide, means that American military options on the Korean peninsula are extremely limited.

The United States certainly has more than enough air power in the region. But it is doubtful that, at this moment, America has the ground forces required to conduct the kind of military operation that would enable it to overthrow the regime in the North by force. And this leaves aside the moral concerns that may constrain an American president from taking such a drastic step. At present, the only likely scenario of forcible regime change involves the direct involvement of the South Korean military. Given the political climate in South Korea, this will not happen unless the North directly attacks the South. Yet this essay has argued that the likelihood of an imminent North Korean assault on the South is slim. Or is it?

The United States has suggested on occasion that, if Pyongyang does not accede to a disarmament plan, it will propose the institution of sanctions and an economic blockade against North Korea. Sanctions, if enforced by the currently negotiating nations, especially China and Russia, may well cause the collapse of the regime. Pyongyang has publicly responded that it would regard such a policy as a declaration of war. Moreover, it promises under such an eventuality to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." That would be a direct assault on South Korea and certainly trigger an armed response from the South. With South Korean forces involved alongside the 37,000 U.S. forces already in country, plus those in Okinawa, and the full power of the United States Air Force in the region, Washington could bring enough military force to bear to topple the regime. It would not be a pleasant solution to the problem. But it would be decisive. And it may be the only solution, no matter how horrible the costs might be.

Essay Types: Essay