It is clear that ASEAN serves as protection against what many states see as the United States' Western democratization agenda. This explains the reluctance by member states to allow Western countries (especially America and Australia) to dominate forums, and it provides further explanation of why these states are keen to emphasize ASEAN as the lead player in any security regime.

China's Learning Curve

ASEAN'S COMPREHENSIVE security" concept is a natural fit for the Chinese, who themselves have had to defend a spotty human-rights record. Moreover, where Chinese diplomacy was once seen as ham-fisted and clumsy, it is now recognized as urbane and creative. The overall sophistication and energy of Chinese strategy has caught the United States by surprise.

China has tried hard, with some success, to remodel its diplomatic image from "rogue dragon" to "satisfied with the status quo"-a country willing to work within existing structures, an economy seeking win-win relationships. China's recent charm offensive is both a defensive and a proactive strategy. It is defensive since China, aware that the United States is uneasily watching, is in no position to challenge America and is not keen to offer a strong reason to contain its rise. Moreover, as mentioned, China has no desire to drive ASEAN states further toward the Americans.

However, this charm offensive is also proactive, since China is actively wooing the region towards itself and away from the United States. This is China's strategy of indirect competition. Signing the 2002 Declaration and acceding to the TAC were parts of a concerted public-relations campaign; holding out the prospect of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement was an act of economic seduction. Trying to sell the New Security Concept (NSC) at the 1997 ASEAN meeting, which set out a vision emphasizing cooperative security, multilateral dialogue, confidence-building measures and peaceful dispute resolution, was a more far-reaching initiative. The NSC mirrors ASEAN principles and implies the move away from alliances (namely those with the United States) toward a regional, multilateral security community or structure.

In more recent times, China used ASEAN-led forums to exclude the United States and propose greater regional security cooperation in the absence of America (e.g., the ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + China forums). The offer to host the second EAS, though politely declined, was an obvious show of enthusiasm to lead America-excluding forums.

More generally, these efforts aim to arouse enthusiasm for Chinese regional leadership. China has launched almost thirty ASEAN-China mechanisms in recent years. Almost thirty years since the first U.S.-ASEAN dialogue, there are only seven U.S.-ASEAN bodies, and they meet infrequently. Multilateral strategic logic is China's best hope for achieving regional influence beyond its current military capacities. Asian diplomacy and hospitality is presented as a peaceful and more sociable counterpoint to American and Western unilateralism and insensitivity.

America: Business as Usual?

SINCE WORLD WAR II, the United States' "strategic culture" has been to lead military alliances against perceived competitors and enemies. NATO was successful: Members shared common ground in terms of strategic and social culture as well as political objectives. But in Southeast Asia the record is modest. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was formed as part of the worldwide U.S.-led anti-Communist alliance but never really wielded significant force.

The post-Cold War administrations have been committed to continuing the bilateral model, despite periodic expressions of support for multilateral security forums. The Asian experience suggests that bilateral defense relations have been the only relations that count in terms of containing strategic competitors. America seeks to ensure that no other power can dictate the terms of regional or global security. For confronting a rising China, U.S. strategy is really one of business as usual; the belief is that the structure is in place to limit Chinese regional influence and further entrench U.S. dominance.

At first glance, the American "hub and spokes" model is working. Though all alliances and agreements exist ostensibly to guarantee sovereignty and territorial integrity, this assumes America's forward defense positions and, hence, U.S. regional dominance. Alliances with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Singapore remain firm, not to mention the de facto alliance with Taiwan. Defense cooperation with Malaysia, Indonesia and New Zealand is significant. Importantly, India is becoming a strategic partner of sorts. It is no wonder that China feels "encircled" in east and Southeast Asia.

Australia, among America's staunchest War on Terror allies, is perhaps the greatest success. The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy even called the alliance a "model." But this type of thinking is where the problems start-the Chinese great-power challenge presents a different logic than the struggle against global Islamists does. Whereas anti-terrorism (if not every U.S. anti-terrorism tactic) has broad support, the rise of China engenders ambivalence. It is accepted as legitimate and inevitable, and the country exerts a political and economic pull on other states in the region. The United States is attempting to circumscribe China's strategic choices, but there is ample evidence that bilateral alliances have serious limitations for controlling an ambitious and rising China.

First, defense alliances and partnerships are rarely fungible, in that America cannot simply expect partners to accept changes. For example, countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia encourage an American military presence largely to ensure a stable environment and keep each other in check. Without overt Chinese aggression, these states would be extremely reluctant to allow the United States to reinterpret the rationale as one of overt containment. Even Australia (America's strongest ally in Southeast Asia) and the Philippines (arguably the Southeast Asian country most concerned about China's rise) would hesitate to join any explicitly "anti-Chinese" alliance.

This is particularly the case given China's economic clout. Although the country's importance to ASEAN economies is sometimes exaggerated, China is seen as the region's primary economic-growth driver. Talk of a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, while just talk, reflects this momentum. Moreover, the tendency for China to offer economic incentives for smaller states to fall in line with Chinese strategic thinking (and economically punish those that do not) further strengthens this growing influence.

Second, enthusiasm for America's re-engagement with Southeast Asia should not be mistaken for enthusiasm towards America's strategic agenda in the region. In this sense, there is a worrying disconnect between American and Southeast Asian strategic thinking and priorities.

The War on Terror may have prompted a re-engagement with Southeast Asia, and the renewed interest may have been generally welcome, but these states do not see the war as their highest strategic priority. Indonesia and Malaysia are Muslim states, and Thailand has a considerable Muslim population. This, along with events in post-invasion Iraq, makes it difficult for governments to openly embrace the War on Terror. Read any newspaper or current affairs magazine in the region: Fighting terrorism is a functional and cooperative activity between the domestic law-enforcement and intelligence agencies of respective states.

Understandably, terrorism-focused American engagement is beginning to irritate many states. Many suspect that the United States sees its allies as far-flung lieutenants to be discarded when the job is done. Secretary of State Rice helped along this suspicion by failing to attend the ARF in Laos in July 2005-a decision that played badly in the region. Neither was President Bush's unimaginative and stale-sounding agenda, presented during a visit in late 2006, helpful in terms of conveying an interest in the region that extends beyond terrorism.

The upshot is that while America remains the lead partner in terms of defense relations, its political leadership is slipping. The Chinese have grasped the opportunity to extend their influence with tireless and immaculately executed diplomacy.

China is branding itself an Asian partner sensitive to the priorities and problems of Asian nation-states and employs a language that sells in the region. Where the United States sounds high-handed, the Chinese sound practical. Where President Bush speaks about global terrorist networks, Chinese President Hu Jintao speaks about promoting domestic stability and confronting local problems. Moreover, where American presidential visits can come off like Caesar greeting distant subjects, Beijing has become skilled at flattery, localizing messages and promoting regional rather than global agendas. A combination of U.S. neglect and Chinese imagination is nudging states in the region toward China.

Will America Respond?

HOWEVER, THERE is good news for the United States. Albeit warily, all ASEAN states (with the exception of Myanmar) want a predominant America keeping the region in balance, underpinning the stability needed for economic development.

Revealingly, despite China's growing economic pull and rigorous diplomacy, states have resisted persistent Chinese calls for greater regional security cooperation. Chinese initiatives such as the New Security Concept fail, while groupings that include China and exclude the United States achieve tangible agreements only in non-traditional security areas. Contrast this with the ARF attended by the United States, upheld as the primary security forum. Meanwhile, security pacts with the United States (e.g., those of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) have been kept while other states, including Indonesia, nurture military links with America.

It is also significant that China's proposal at the 2006 ASEAN-China forum for cooperation in maritime security stoked Malaysian concerns and was greeted with considerable skepticism by ASEAN members. Moreover, while it surprised some that ASEAN rejected China's offer to join the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (which the United States rejects), the rejection occurred on the grounds that ASEAN preferred all nuclear powers to join at the same time. This shows a clear reluctance to let China out-maneuver other powers on hard security matters. It is noteworthy that Malaysia supported a greater political role for Japan in the face of Chinese opposition.

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