Thus, U.S. global interests, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, will not be well served by a weak Europe. It is not simply a matter of not having the material support of European allies in military contingencies (as in Afghanistan) or diplomatic backing in important negotiations. Rather, the risk is that some of our traditional European allies may actually work at cross-purposes with the United States, not sharing U.S. threat assessments because they will not have the tools to join in. As François Heisbourg observes, a “potential danger flows from the interactions between, on the one hand, a Europe in relative decline, and on the other the rising capabilities, dynamic policies and great-power aspirations of emerging states.”

WHAT CAN the United States do in light of this situation? Not even the worst-case scenario would resemble the immediate postwar years in Europe. There is no likelihood of Soviet armored divisions occupying half of the Continent, Communist insurgencies in European countries, or abysmal poverty, famine and material devastation. But the problem is that, unlike after World War II, the United States has a limited strategic quiver. This is due in part to America’s own fiscal problems. There is no deep reservoir of economic power that Washington can direct to shore up an economically stagnating Europe. There also is a limited power of persuasion in telling Europeans to fix their fiscal profligacy when Washington runs its own trillion-dollar deficits. Finally and most importantly, even assuming the United States could help the EU economically, that would not solve the Continent’s underlying political, social and cultural malaise.

It would also be counterproductive for Washington officials to align themselves completely with either of the views that fall under the rubrics of “EU at all costs” or “Euroskepticism.” The current administration of President Barack Obama appears to tilt toward the progressive vision of the EU. It consequently opposes attempts to renegotiate or resist the centralizing efforts of Brussels. Such a position is likely to damage U.S. authority. Europeans in general, and Britain in particular, are divided on the European Union. By aligning with the official Brussels line, which objects to national referenda on the EU such as the one proposed by British prime minister David Cameron, the United States may gain applause in the offices of EU bureaucrats. But such views are ignored or ridiculed elsewhere. This is a delicate internal debate, and Washington gains nothing by siding with the “EU: full steam ahead” view.

The United States has a comparative advantage in its power-projection capabilities, an important tool of influence. It can and should, therefore, maintain its varied methods of providing strategic assurance: its “visible assurance” with the presence of U.S. military forces and assets, rhetorical assurance with greater attention paid to Europe, continued commitment to NATO’s Article 5 (declaring that an attack on one member is an attack on all), defensive contingency plans, greater willingness to help Europeans in arming themselves and so on. But this will not suffice to strengthen Europe. The American provision of security is necessary but insufficient. After all, the United States has done this for the past several decades, and Europe nonetheless has descended into economic stagnation and political morass. In other words, the U.S. security umbrella may enable European decisions that could reverse the Continent’s current decline, but it cannot generate such decisions.

That’s because Europe’s problems are not caused merely by a mistaken policy or two. This is a deep crisis caused by, among other things, a missing sense of purpose and an abandonment of Europe’s distinct history and culture. The United States can try to persuade EU leaders to pursue different policies and even enable such changes of direction by guaranteeing Europe’s security from external threats. But that isn’t likely to make much of a difference.

Here lies the conundrum: On the one hand, as George Weigel has written, “A United States indifferent to the fate of Europe is a United States indifferent to its roots.” One could add that this also implies an indifference to America’s own security. On the other hand, the United States has only limited means of improving Europe’s geopolitical condition. In the end, Europe’s mess and decline pose a policy problem that requires civilizational solutions. The fiscal crisis can be measured; the political inefficiency can be described; the tax rates can be adjusted upward or downward; policies can be tinkered with. But Europe’s underlying sense of a raison d’être can be restored only by a slow regeneration of its foundations based on history, religion and culture. The etymology of the word “culture” (from Latin) refers to “the things to cultivate,” implying that there are certain things that transcend individuals, that are to be cherished for the future, that provide reasons to work and sacrifice—in essence, to live. Europe is missing these things now, and thus it is becoming little more than a civilizational cult, placing the individual above all else. The task at hand, therefore, is much larger and far more difficult than one can glimpse from reading the news. It may be too large and too difficult for Europe—or America—to handle.

Jakub Grygiel is the George H. W. Bush Associate Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Center for European Policy Analysis.

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