A PROMINENT British government minister, Baroness Warsi, herself a Muslim, claimed just recently that Islamophobia has “passed the dinner-table test” in Britain and is seen by many as normal and uncontroversial. She warned of growing intolerance, prejudice and bigotry toward the Muslim faith and its adherents. In reply, some religious and social commentators have suggested that growing numbers of Muslims in Britain give rise to legitimate concerns. They have asked whether strict adherence to the Islamic faith is compatible with the values of Western democracies. Even to pose such a question, people object, is to engage in a covert form of racism. However, the claims continue. It is further asserted that the advocacy of sharia law, disregard for women’s rights and opposition to all forms of assimilation into Western society by some Islamists justify doubts about compatibility. The controversy over the place of Islam in British society is inextricably linked with the additional concern about homespun Islamic terrorism in light of the evidence that the 2005 al-Qaeda bombings in London were perpetrated by young Muslims who had grown up in the UK, and whose deadly actions were apparently and worryingly supported by a minority among the Muslim population.
Though the comments of the minister related solely to Britain, there is little doubt that they could be replicated in many other European countries. If we add to the mix the anti-immigrant feeling that is widespread in many parts of the Continent, then racism, it has to be admitted, is far from eradicated. How dangerous is it, given these countries’ baleful histories of racism and fascism in the not-too-distant past? Not surprisingly, some have asked whether Europe is moving toward political extremes. Do the signs point that way? Is Europe indeed on the road to new racial intolerance that could give succor to the extremist Right and even offer it new, promising prospects?
Certainly, the bright lights of optimism that burned in Europe when the Iron Curtain came down twenty years ago were all too quickly extinguished. Hopes that the collapse of Soviet repression in the Eastern bloc and the removal of the threat of nuclear confrontation would usher in a new era of peace, unity and prosperity rapidly evaporated. In the 1990s, aggressive nationalism in the territories of the imploding post-Communist state of Yugoslavia brought the return of war and ethnic cleansing on European soil. The demise of the Soviet Union, some had declared, meant “the end of ideology” or even “the end of history.” Such assertions also soon rang hollow. By early in the new millennium, Europe was having to attune to the sounds of Islamic jihadism. The seismic waves from the 9/11 attacks on the United States left no European country untouched. Europe immediately became part of the proclaimed “war against terror,” leading to involvement in costly, extended and highly divisive military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Terrorist outrages in London and Madrid showed that no European capital was safe from suicide bombers. In public consciousness, the threat from Islamic terrorism replaced the old bogeyman of the “Red Scare.” Greatly intensified security at airports was only the most visible sign of an enhanced surveillance society, as safety from extremist violence was weighed in the balance against personal liberties, which were often seemingly viewed by governments as less important.
Meanwhile, the rapid widening of the global economy and the integration of new member states from Eastern Europe into the EU liberalized and extended labor markets. With that came the inexorable movement of poorer migrants seeking work in the wealthier economies of Western Europe. This soon produced social and political strains, with much animus directed at the newcomers. Though the immigrants were actually important to the continued economic growth of the wealthier nations, their settlement—largely in poorer parts of towns and cities—was often greatly unwelcome. Many people, themselves underprivileged and living close to the poverty line, objected strongly to “interlopers” who, they thought (usually incorrectly), were being given unfair advantages in employment opportunities, housing allocation and the granting of social benefits. The basis for a potential revival of fascist tendencies was thus laid.
THEN, IN 2008, came the economic crash in the wake of the banking crisis in the United States, leading to the most serious recession since the 1930s. This inevitably prompted thoughts of the conditions that promoted fascism throughout Europe and brought Hitler and his Nazi regime to power in Germany. The major European states were forced to spend scarcely imaginable sums of money to rescue overextended, faltering financial institutions in order to prevent complete economic meltdown. In so doing, they built up hugely increased sovereign debt which is now being tackled by inflicting large cuts in public expenditures on populations that are starting to see their standard of living significantly affected—for the worse. It has been estimated, for instance, that real wages (that is, taking inflation into account) have fallen more sharply in the United Kingdom over the past few years than at any time since the 1920s. Unemployment is set to grow sharply as public services are reduced. Young people are especially badly hit, with youth unemployment in the UK reaching 20 percent. In Greece, massive reductions in state spending, imposed by the European Union as a condition of a rescue package for the failed economy, have afflicted the population far more drastically still and, last spring, led to serious riots on the streets of Athens. In Ireland, too, the collapse of the economy has caused widespread social misery and political upheaval, with the ruling Fianna Fáil party likely to be decimated in forthcoming elections.
The Euro itself, the very symbol of European integration when introduced in 1999, is potentially endangered, showing (in the eyes of some economists) the inherent risk in extending the single currency to widely diverse economies, some of them with serious underlying weaknesses. Reserve funds have already been used for the Greek and Irish bailouts. Portugal may well follow, possibly Belgium also. There are even concerns about Spain. Were that country to need rescuing, the end of the Euro would probably follow. And this would be a disaster for the European Union.
Germany, its strong manufacturing sector benefiting from increased exports to the Far East and other areas with firm growth, is at least one European nation emerging strongly from the recession. However, anger in the German population is palpable. As they see it, the other “feckless” countries of Europe need aid to save their badly run economies which inevitably comes from funds accrued through German hard work. When it comes to German popular opinion, the great European project of unity and harmony is giving way to a less idealistic—though elsewhere in Europe quite normal—emphasis on national interest.
Perhaps surprisingly (and thankfully), in an economic crisis of such major proportions, largely caused by the greed and incompetence of big investment banks in an unregulated banking sector, there has been no political earthquake. Rather, at least on the surface, the existing political order has been consolidated. In contrast to the impact of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the governing institutions in Europe, despite their buffeting, have remained intact. There has been no collapse of state systems, as was the case in the interwar period. There has been no indication that fascism or other political extremes are close to power. The political establishment throughout Europe has weathered the storm—at least so far.
BENEATH THE surface, the situation is admittedly far from rosy. The gulf between the ruling establishment and the ruled is wide. Most voters, even in countries less Euroskeptic than the United Kingdom, see the EU government in Brussels, and the European Parliament in Strasbourg, as distant and detached from their everyday lives. The Brussels oligarchy is often seen as a rich man’s club, frequently interfering unnecessarily in national affairs but otherwise largely irrelevant to ordinary people’s lives. Probably few could name their member of the European Parliament. Recent constitutional changes in the EU (such as granting the union a legal personality) were initially rejected in plebiscites held in some countries and were only finally adopted when heavy pressure was applied to those states to think again.
Antipathy toward the political establishment is far from confined to views on the EU. At the national level, mainstream political parties struggle to retain their traditional bases of support. There is a good deal of alienation among the people and much indifference about politics in general. Conservatives may lead in many countries but can seldom muster majority backing on their own, often commanding support from no more than around a third of the population. But Social Democrats have also seen traditional bases of support drain away. The collapse of old industries (where the party had its core following), the decline of trade unions, social and demographic shifts that erode conventional class-party allegiance, and the loss of anything resembling a clear alternative vision for a better society—that once proved appealing to idealists anxious for fundamental political and social change—have all undermined the potential of the Left. Social Democratic parties, once seen as the heralds of a brighter future for the underprivileged, have themselves become part of the political establishment, little more than alternative managers of the status quo. Liberal parties of various kinds, though often coalition partners in government, in their own right invariably enjoy only minority support. Young people, especially and unsurprisingly, frequently turn their backs on conventional party politics. A sense that politicians of all colors have private advantage rather than public interest at heart is widespread. In Britain, a recent scandal in which politicians from all the major parties misused their allowances, sometimes falsely claiming large sums in expenses, greatly enhanced the feeling of alienation. Detestation of politicians is deep and extensive.Image: Pullquote: Islamophobia has “passed the dinner-table test” in Britain and is seen by many as normal and uncontroversial.Essay Types: Essay