For three and a half years, the United States has been engaged with the Afghan people in an ambitious program of state-building. Afghans have a strong sense of national identity, despite their ethnic diversity. The key task has been to establish a legitimate political process and rebuild state institutions. As the president's special envoy and as ambassador to Afghanistan during the past 17 months, I have seen that a nation wracked by a quarter century of occupation and internal conflict can lay the foundation upon which a democratic society can be constructed.

This success was not expected. Many observers too readily accepted caricatures of Afghanistan as an ungovernable tribal society whose instability could only be managed, not resolved. They said that a society with high levels of illiteracy and ethnic and sectarian cleavages could not become democratic. Some went so far as to characterize Afghan society, wrongly, as given to extremism and hostile to modernity. In their view, if democracy was ever to come to Afghanistan, it could only be at a much later time in its development.

Why have we seen this success? While the circumstances of every country are unique and Afghanistan cannot serve as a simplistic template for other countries, there are a number of factors that have contributed to success. First, the president's initiative to push forward the frontiers of freedom politically--and to support those in the Greater Middle East who seek to transform the region--is premised on the belief that the ideals of democracy, popular sovereignty, individual rights and the rule of law are universal. The experience of Afghanistan validates this view.

Second, Afghanistan is succeeding because the United States has pursued an enlightened, hands-on approach that responded to the deep aspirations of the Afghan people for normalcy, development and democracy. We recognized this yearning of the people and worked with it to make political progress. To do so, the United States conducted itself as a liberator, not an occupier. We maintained an appropriate military footprint; pursued an approach that balanced and integrated the use of our political, economic and military instruments of power; worked closely with local leaders with genuine roots in the society on a joint political-military-economic strategy; adopted a flexible multilateral approach supported by a robust U.S. program; and shaped the conduct of neighbors and did not accept the existence of sanctuaries for the armed opposition.

Even as we continue to help Afghanistan, it is useful to consider ten specific lessons that help explain what has worked so far.

1) Any effort to build the post-war order must be based on a fundamental understanding of the aspirations or political center of gravity of a newly liberated society and must be implemented by civilian and military leaders who know how to align the United States with those goals.

After the fall of the Taliban, the Afghan people had a profound wish to rejoin the world community and embrace democratization and modernity. They based this aspiration on aspects of their self-identity and recent history. Afghans' self-conception is of citizens of a nation that once gave rise to great empires based not just on the strength of their armies, but also on the quality of their culture, learning and arts. With respect to the modern period, many view the fifty years before the communist coup in April 1978 as a golden age, one in which they enjoyed peace, made slow but steady material progress, and saw their country take steps toward instituting a constitutional monarchy with real powers in Parliament. For Afghans, this is a narrative that they wish to resume.

The test for U.S. policy in Afghanistan, as in any other post-conflict setting, is how quickly and solidly we can help the people and their leaders build a political order that is legitimate by their terms and based on their traditions and history.

2) If U.S. military forces are used to effect regime change or are deployed to stabilize a country after a regime has been toppled by internal forces, it is vital for the United States to position itself as an ally, not a conqueror or occupier, and to ensure that indigenous leaders take ownership of the new order.

In Afghanistan, we won the war in coalition with Afghans. American power and Afghan forces were both essential to this victory. The fact that the Afghans played a key role in their own liberation gave them a sense of dignity and ownership of their destiny. Afghans in the north and the south were active participants in, not passive recipients of, the actions needed to free their country from an extremist and terrorist regime.

At the same time, the United States and the international community supported a political process to create an interim regime to be installed in Kabul immediately after the military victory. This was the first step in creating a legitimate government that would be accepted by the Afghan people. The process is well known. Even before the first air strikes took place, the United States was in talks with various Afghan groups about the shape of this process. It culminated in the Bonn Conference, where the major anti-Taliban political groups came together under UN auspices and agreed to an interim government that was sworn in just over two weeks later in Kabul. The Bonn Agreement also set in motion the process to hold the Emergency Loya Jirga to legitimize the interim government, the Constitutional Loya Jirga to adopt a new governing charter, and national elections to select a president and a parliament. This roadmap gave the Afghan people confidence that this staged process would lead to an ever more representative government.

Many observers have been critical of the U.S. insistence that elections be held on a fast timeline. They argued that conditions were not yet right and that warlords and commanders still had too much influence to ensure a free and fair process. I took a different view. I believed that warlords and potential spoilers should be exposed as soon as possible to the popular will. The people have been determined to take back their country from extremists and warlords. Furthermore, enough progress had been made in disarming warlord militias that the people concluded that the era of warlordism was coming to an end. Moreover, provided that basic measures such as secret ballots are taken, Afghans as a rule are difficult to coerce.

In this context, the loya jirgas and elections of the Bonn Process served a catalytic role. When confronted by the people at these key events, the potential spoilers almost visibly shrunk back, cognizant of their own political illegitimacy. Through each stage of the Bonn Process, the people have gained increasing confidence and the spoilers have steadily lost ground, creating a virtuous cycle that the international community can support without unduly interfering in Afghan politics. This approach is working. However, we must recognize that enabling the Afghans to make incremental progress by these means takes more time than taking a direct hand. The payoff will be more stable and enduring if the Afghans themselves work through this process.

As a result, Americans have been seen as a catalyst for liberation, and as a positive and helpful force, not a predatory foreign power intent on ruling Afghanistan.

3) Intensive political and diplomatic engagement with national leaders is needed to craft a national compact among competing groups and to form a partnership to execute a mutually agreed strategy for reconstruction.

To set a post-conflict country on the right trajectory requires a hands-on approach. The influence of the United States in such settings is immense, particularly in working with credible local leaders or in building up the credibility of such leaders. In Afghanistan, the United States has been careful not to use its power to impose American-made solutions. Instead, the United States has used its influence to help Afghan leaders agree on Afghan solutions to Afghan challenges.

This has meant that the United States has needed to have relationships with all Afghan factions who accepted the political process--including those we felt might be potential spoilers. From the beginning, it was essential that Americans be seen as honest brokers. This has allowed us to help move the process along. As I have often told my Afghan friends, "You have agreed among yourselves through the Bonn Process that you wish to create a moderate and democratic Afghanistan. The United States endorses your goal. In order to achieve that goal, you have agreed that certain steps have to be taken, including the building of a single national army, the demobilizing of private militias, and so forth. If you can get there on your own, this is great, and we applaud you. However, if you cannot get there on your own, failure is not an option--and we are here to help." From this posture, we have worked with the Afghans to come to an agreement on how to surmount their challenges.

For example, a key issue in 2003 was the need to reform the Afghan Ministry of Defense to reflect the country's ethnic and political diversity. One faction controlled the ministry, but all factions agreed as part of the Bonn Process that a single national army needed to be formed. The United States took on the role of serving as the lead nation in building the army. However, we insisted that the reform of the Ministry of Defense be a key part of the process. Afghans had difficulty agreeing on such reform themselves. As a result, the United States worked with President Hamid Karzai, the leadership of the ministry, and other key leaders to establish a process that led to the reappointment of all of the personnel in the ministry, starting with the most senior positions, based on the principles of ethnic and political balance and professional qualifications.

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