During the past 15 years or so since the Soviet Union's collapse, the United States was able to postpone the need to grapple with the painful issues Kennedy raised in 1987. However, the chickens are coming home to roost, and those questions soon will have to be faced. At some point, the relative decline of U.S. economic power that is in the offing will bring American primacy to an end. In the shorter term, however, the United States can prolong its primacy if Americans are willing to pay the price in terms of higher taxes, reduced consumption, and curtailment of domestic programs. But, of course, there is a treadmill-like aspect to preserving American hegemony because perpetuating it will hasten the weakening of the economic base upon which it rests.

The United States is a very powerful state, and will remain so even if it no longer is a hegemon. Hegemony is not only a costly grand strategy, but also one that ultimately is unsustainable. America's real realists--George F. Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Walter Lippmann and Kenneth Waltz--always warned of the dangers that a hegemonic United States would over-reach itself and, by asserting its power heavy-handedly, provoke opposition to it. They understood that the world is not malleable and will not respond to American-imposed social engineering. They not only recognized that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means, but also that it must differentiate between desirable objectives and attainable ones. Most of all, the real realists have understood the true paradox of American power: Precisely because of its power and geography, there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure; yet the very fact of its overwhelming capabilities has been a constant temptation for American policymakers to intervene abroad unwisely in the pursuit of unattainable goals (nation building or democracy promotion). Real realists like Lippmann, Kennan, Morgenthau and Waltz have highlighted the dangers that await if the United States gives in to the temptations of hegemonic power and have counseled instead that the United States pursue a grand strategy based on prudence and self-restraint. Americans would do well to pay heed to these admonitions as they debate how the United States should alter its grand strategy as the unipolar era inexorably draws to a close.

 

1 Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 185.

2 David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail", International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 50-51.

3Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project (Washington, dc: Government Printing Office, December 2004), pp. 47.

4 The Strategic Assessment Group's analysis of current and projected world power shares was based on the International Futures Model developed by Barry Hughes. For a discussion of methodology and summary of the Strategic Assessment Group's findings, see Gregory F. Treverton and Seth G. Jones, Measuring National Power (Santa Monica: rand Corporation, 2005), pp. iii, ix-x.

5 See Niall Ferguson and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, "Going Critical: American Power and the Consequences of Fiscal Overstretch", The National Interest, No. 73 (Fall 2003).

6 See Martin Wolff, "America Failed to Calculate the Enormous Costs of War", Financial Times, January 11, 2006, pp. 15

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