The other sheikhdoms, too, would not take much to topple. They are largely unpopular regimes and militarily weak. The Shah's Iran already seized three islands from the United Arab Emirates in the 1970s. A taste of what's to come? If Iran and the United States come to blows, it is almost certain that Tehran would consider a putsch to take over Dubai, not unlike the Bahrain scenario. In fact, there are already signs of Iran's arm-twisting. In February 2008, the ruler of Dubai, Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, effectively pledged his loyalty to Iran, stating that Dubai would never join a U.S.-led alliance in an attack on Iran. Because Iran continues to occupy three islands belonging to the UAE, many Arabs look at a statement like this as tantamount to capitulation.

As for the rest of the Gulf Arabs, the sword of Damocles is their oil wells. It would only be a matter of sinking a few tankers to stop traffic through the Strait of Hormuz connecting the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman (as Tehran already often threatens to do), to take 17 million barrels of oil a day off world markets, driving up the price of gasoline in the United States to $10-12 a gallon. The UAE is so worried about this scenario that a senior official in Dubai recently proposed building a canal to bypass Hormuz.

 

THE BEST thing about disaster scenarios is that they rarely come about. But as Iran moves through the Middle East with its tried-and-successful strategy of imperialism via proxy, of bridging sectarian differences, of blackmailing oil exports, of adapting advanced weapons to classic guerilla tactics and of thwarting modern armies, we must consider that Tehran could very well succeed in establishing the virtual empire it seeks.

It would be convenient and a good deal less costly if diplomacy and international sanctions would contain Iran, force it to stop building a bomb and make it back off in Lebanon and Iraq. But there is no evidence these approaches will work. Iran called the Bush administration's bluff on nuclear weapons, not slowing down in the least its nuclear program. With the price of oil near a $100 a barrel, with Tehran threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz and with the American people turning against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Iranians see little U.S. appetite for a war with Iran. American posturing can safely be ignored. As long as the price of oil is high, there is little chance Iran will suffer serious economic hardship that would force it to alter its policy.

With rising anti-Americanism and the absence of a Palestinian peace deal, Sunni and Shia will be goaded into overcoming sectarian differences and uniting with Iran against the West. As long as the United States and Israel postpone a Palestinian settlement, Iran will fill the void, inserting itself as the one leader of the discontented, poor, oppressed and downtrodden across the Middle East. Its most important concern now is that Iraq remains calm so a wedge is not driven between Sunni and Shia.

The United States needs to go to Tehran to see what kind of bargain can be struck. To be sure, if indeed the balance of power has shifted to the degree it seems it has, a deal won't be cheap. Iran would demand an important and open role in the security and rebuilding of Iraq. It would demand an open role in policing the Gulf, not unlike the role the Shah's regime played in the 1970s when Iran was the Gulf's "policeman." Tehran would demand the lifting of all sanctions. But we won't know any of this with certainty until we sit down and listen to the Iranians.

The other choice is to let the logic of war play itself out and hope, against the evidence, that we are wrong about Iran's rise.

 

Robert Baer is a former CIA field officer who served in the Middle East for nearly twenty-one years. He is the author of the book The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (Crown, September 2008).

Essay Types: Essay