The Sunni minority, reviled by the Shiite majority for decades of oppression, correctly fear a strong central government dominated by Shiite politicians.  Some 20% of Iraq's population, the Sunni should be allowed to create a semi-autonomous province in their heartland, the notorious "Sunni triangle" north and west of Baghdad.

The Kurds, concentrated in the north, have shown themselves to be capable of effectively governing themselves for a decade and should be allowed to retain their status.  As important, they have solemnly undertaken not to press for independence from Iraq, anathema to neighboring Turkey and Iran, which have large and restive Kurdish communities bristling to achieve independence as a renewed Kurdistan republic.

The numerically dominant Shiite, though able to control their own development and destiny in the south and central areas,  must not also be the dominant force in the confederated national government based in Baghdad.  Such a concept must be made unmistakably clear to the Shiite leadership so that the recently insinuated rebellion by the Shiite against Coalition forces can be avoided.

What about the national government?  It can provide for Iraq's defense, issue currency and oversee development, management and equitable operation of the country's massive petroleum reserves.  Respecting Iraq's oil patch, oversight is what is called for. Actual ownership should be in the hands of every Iraqi citizen, adopting a modified Norwegian model, which has provided direct participation in the profits of its oil industry to those to whom the resources belong - the citizenry. 

There cannot be any meaningful argument favoring a nationalized, government-owned petroleum industry, just as there is none for a centralized Iraqi government.  Indeed, there could be no stronger proof-positive of Iraq's newly attained free market status than for its greatest natural resource not to be socialized. 

Among other advantages, a citizen-owned oil industry would send a resounding message to Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and every other oil producing state in the region that petroleum is a resource of the people, and should not be controlled and enjoyed by graft-ridden governments.

The above alternative to the Administration's centralized approach has major advantages:

·     Creation of Iraq as a genuine beacon of free market democracy in the Middle East;

·     Development of trusted leadership cadres in the country's three major population groups;

·     Reduction in potentially disastrous inter-communal rivalries;

·     In the process, reduced need to deal with the foul regime in Tehran, allowing for concomitant support for the already strong, legitimate Iranian opposition.

It must be hoped that reason and foresight will prevail over what seems to be a dangerously misinformed segment among George W. Bush's advisors. 

If the Bush Administration's grand strategy for creating long term stability in the world's most volatile region through establishing a democratic alternative is to happen, we see few workable options for the creation of an open non-Islamist government in the freshly liberated Iraq.  The strategy as currently presented is unrealizable, in the opinion of many long experienced in the Middle East.  If pursued, it can lead to failure of the democratic experiment, rather than a free market and political success.

 Dr. Hussain Hindawi recently returned to his native Iraq, after 32 years in exile.  John R. Thomson draws on three decades' living and working in Beirut, Cairo and Riyadh as a businessman, diplomat and journalist.