Opponents of federalism have been seeking to delay any vote for at least 18 months, hoping that the central government will be stronger by then. Some delay would be helpful. But after years of at least tacitly backing the insurgency, Sunnis must face the cost of continuing their support. Perhaps the prospect of a Shi‘a region will finally prompt Sunni communities to take bolder steps to stop the violence. But if not, that need not mean Iraq's dissolution. Having Iraqis put their faith in more local government authorities-rather than clerical sects for services and militias for protection as many currently do-would still be a vast improvement and a significant step toward secularism and democracy.

For its part, the United States can play the role of honest broker-calming tensions, encouraging compromise, and buttressing the legal and constitutional process. Although a stronger central government might in theory be preferable from the U.S. perspective, resolving this fundamental dispute peacefully is the highest priority.

Constitutional reform is the second milestone. At the same time that the Parliament began debating federalism, it formed a 27-member committee to consider amending the constitution. Just as the prospect of a federalism vote would please many Shi‘a lawmakers, so too Sunnis, Kurds and other minorities are heartened by the chance to "fix" a document that many believe enshrined Shi‘a dominance. And unlike during the original drafting process, where the United States adopted a hands-off posture, the United States should be very aggressive about encouraging trade-offs to help all sides reach compromises that might otherwise elude them. The United States should also advocate forcefully for greater protection of women and minorities and a secular judiciary with minimal clerical power to overturn laws.

A third issue is the disposition of the oil revenues. Apart from the future structure of the Iraqi government, one of the most significant sources of discord and uncertainty is the distribution of government revenues. In addition to outright oppression, Saddam Hussein deprived his enemies and non-Sunnis of basic needs and development. In recognition of this legacy, the constitution guarantees "an equitable share of the national revenues" to regions and governates. But there is nothing to ensure implementation of this principle.

A public formula for distributing revenues throughout the country, guaranteed for the next five years, would demonstrate the central government's commitment to fairness. While such budget rigidity will come at a cost, it would underscore the importance of the political process and give people a stake in protecting oil and gas facilities.

The fourth milestone would be the development of a regional forum. Not all of Iraq's political or security challenges are internal. Iraq is beset by regional interference-from Turkish intimidation to Saudi funding to Iranian arms. These outside actors are protecting their interests, pursuing their ambitions and striking out at their adversaries covertly. Far from dealing with the Iraqi government and each other directly in a structured format, they exert their power and influence through violent proxies.

One need not assume benevolence on the part of Iraq's neighbors in order to believe that an ongoing forum for these actors, the Iraqi government and representatives from the coalition forces will lead to some common ground. Even if cooperation and compromise prove elusive on many issues, such a forum would at least allow for clearer communications and a chance for mutual progress on some matters. Maliki's trip in September to Iran, and the prospect of more economic deals between the two countries, may encourage greater Iranian cooperation.

Finally, there is the fate of the militias. With a more revitalized political process tackling tough internal and external challenges alike, thereby shifting power from the streets to the Parliament, the Iraqi government can start to disarm militias.

Countries with political parties that control their own paramilitary forces are weak, unstable and violence-prone. As long as Iraqis can more immediately (and effectively) resolve disputes through violence or the threat of violence, the political process will be superfluous and garner little popular support.

Raiding militia strongholds and weapons caches, reclaiming territory and reestablishing government control will be difficult and could spark more violence-especially if some ethnic groups feel disproportionately targeted. Military disarmament will require strong support from U.S. military forces, although Iraqi forces should take the lead whenever possible.

But to be successful, there also must be a political process in place to reinforce the military effort with appropriate incentives and punishments. The Iraqi Parliament must pass legislation offering militia members broad amnesty and, in appropriate cases, a chance to be trained and join Iraqi military forces. Conversely, continued militia activity must bring not only criminal punishment, but also civil forfeiture of property in order to reduce the financial incentives of militia participation.

As for the political parties that support militias, disarmament will only occur if militias become a political liability instead of an asset. Given that numerous Iraqi political parties are more an extension of militias than the reverse, severing militias from their political wings may be as difficult as military disarmament. But unless and until militias cease being a political force and a security threat, Iraq will never enjoy peace, its government will never exercise exclusive power and the political process will never gain popular trust and respect. Here, too, criminal penalties and property forfeiture should apply to political parties and militia leaders in order to sever those ties.

Except for the disarmament of militias, which would include military action, these goals can be achieved politically-without the use of U.S. hard power and the expansion of violence.

These milestones may seem quite modest in contrast to the Bush Administration's utopian rhetoric about Iraqi democracy. But compared to the other possible outcomes-Iraq's sectarian violence descending into a full-fledged civil war and even escalating into a regional war; an Iraqi government unable to roll back the foothold Al-Qaeda has achieved; Iraq fragmenting into smaller statelets; Iran gaining a puppet state in the south and further influence over the entire Persian Gulf -they offer a reasonable chance of peace and stability.

If not, the result will not simply be "failure" or even a larger strategic blunder; it will be a human tragedy that haunts the United States for years to come.

Peter Charles Choharis is an attorney in Washington, DC, as well as a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and visiting scholar at The George Washington University Law School. He served as the executive director of the 2004 Democratic Platform.

 

How Bad Would a Partition Be?

John M. Owen IV
An American victory in Iraq would entail the establishment of a stable regime that does not develop Weapons of Mass Destruction, support terrorism, export radical Islamism, seek the destruction of Israel or tilt the balance of power toward now-ascendant Iran.

For the past three-and-a-half years, Washington has been acting as if the only way to achieve these ends is to establish a unified constitutional democracy in Iraq. But as dreary reports of sectarian violence continue to arrive daily and Americans lose the will to stay the course, such an Iraq appears more and more elusive.

A constitutional-democratic Iraq requires first having an Iraqi state-an entity with, in Max Weber's words, a "monopoly on the legitimate use of force." The United States destroyed the Iraqi state in 2003 and ever since has been trying to reassemble the rubble and implement constitutional democracy at the same time. America set itself a difficult task. Constitutional democracy is about reason and consensus; states are usually built by force. In a country such as Iraq-really a set of societies that are mutually mistrustful, penetrated by foreign entities, competing for valuable resources and bristling with arms-it may be that relentless, pitiless coercion is needed. The United States, a liberal democracy in an age of instant telecommunications, cannot be relentless or pitiless enough. By insisting on keeping troop levels low, the Bush Administration has shown that it is not willing to pay very much to rebuild the Iraqi state.

As Washington pursues a receding goal, support for disengagement grows. Quitting Iraq would likely worsen the ongoing Iraqi civil war. This intensified war could attract direct intervention from Iran, and perhaps Syria, no longer deterred by U.S. troops and keenly desiring a Shi‘a victory. That, in turn, would place pressure on other Iraqi neighbors-Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel-to counter-intervene. Averting or ending a regional war would require a return of U.S. troops. If an exhausted America refused-think the fall of Saigon in 1975-the end would likely be the triumph of the Iraqi Shi‘a, who make up approximately 60 percent of Iraq's population and have well-armed and well-motivated militias.

How bad would a Shi‘a-dominated Iraq be for U.S. interests? Such an Iraq would likely be authoritarian, inasmuch as Sunni Arabs and Kurds would not accept it without coercion. As a majority-Arab state with its own interests, this Iraq would not be a puppet of Persian Iran. Indeed, during the U.S.-led occupation many prominent Shi‘a politicians have walked a delicate line between Washington and Tehran. Yet a Shi'a Iraq would likely lean eastward, which in turn would solidify the nascent and much-discussed "Shi‘a Crescent" extending from the Gulf of Oman to the Mediterranean.

Essay Types: Essay