NATO: Going, going...

NATO: Going, going...

Mini Teaser: NATO has an insecure future. Afghanistan will determine if it has one.

by Author(s): Harlan Ullman

The Iraq Study Group (ISG) concluded that conditions in Iraq were "grave and deteriorating." They could easily have been referring to Afghanistan. Outgoing British General David Richards, who commanded ISAF in Afghanistan, believed that at year's end the alliance had three to six months to win hearts and minds.

Because concerns about Iraq have dominated the U.S. foreign policy debate, Afghanistan is a largely invisible war. In the run-up to the Riga summit, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked NATO's since-retired commander, General Jones, for a memo to the president on what was needed to prevail in Afghanistan. Whether the president even saw the memo is unclear. By one account, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley was given a copy. Regardless, the administration has taken no action.

The distinctions between Iraq and Afghanistan are at least two-fold. First, Afghanistan is repairable, for the moment. Second, a regional solution is not crucial in Afghanistan, though over time NATO must address the Pakistan situation.

Solutions for Afghanistan are inherently political and organizational. Yes, on the military side, a relatively modest investment of troops and equipment is needed. Yes, member states must loosen their so-called national caveats, or restrictions on their forces' employment in battle, so more troops can be engaged in the fighting. But if NATO does not address the larger political challenges-and time is running out, with new poppy crops planted and the Taliban regrouping-it will lose this opportunity.

First, a high commissioner must be appointed to ramrod and oversee the effectiveness of the civil reforms undertaken by outside states. This commissioner would have authority over the building of functioning legal, judiciary and police systems, and support President Karzai in creating an effective government. Second, the efforts of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) must be integrated, coordinated and supported with senior mentors and other capabilities necessary to complete the missions. Last, a comprehensive development and agricultural reform plan must be implemented.

None of these steps requires much additional personnel or money. Turning Napoleon on his head, sometimes God is on the side of the smallest battalions. Yet the solutions are political, not military.

Riga: Failure, Façade or Placeholder?

The Riga Summit began November 27, 2006. At its core was a working dinner on Wednesday, November 28, followed by a 9 a.m. to noon meeting the next day. Five-or-so hours was all the time heads of state spent on the world's most important alliance. For the United States, the congressional elections, the pending ISG report and Bush's meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki obscured the summit. Indeed, Iraq overshadowed every other issue.

Approval of the Comprehensive Political Guidance and Summit Declaration was pro forma. Nations agreed to the goal of preparing and equipping 40 percent of their ground forces for expeditionary operations and committed to deploying 8 percent of those forces to current operations at any given time. The alliance agreed to buy four C-17s for a logistics lift. And without completely abandoning national caveats, states conceded that forces could loosen rules of engagement when lives were at risk.

As with the Istanbul Summit, Riga ducked the major issues. The 40 percent goal was accepted in principle but not in fact. At the last minute after the United States assigned 2,500 American troops to plug the shortage, the NRF was finally certified operational. But the summit did not alter command structures and authorities that allowed the NRF to deploy on short notice. Finally, while the summit approved some force increases for Afghanistan, only about 85 percent of the required forces will be on station.

Seeing the summit as one inning in a baseball game, it would be scored as no runs, no hits and a few errors. Whether NATO gets another turn at bat will largely depend on Afghanistan. An emergency meeting of NATO foreign ministers on Afghanistan is planned for late January 2007.

Keeping NATO Vibrant

AFGHANISTAN WILL make or break the alliance. And only the United States possesses the dynamic leadership to convince NATO to make the crucial changes essential for stabilizing Afghanistan. Unless President Bush acts, chances are Afghanis will turn against NATO and the central government in 2007.

If a broader insurgency ensues, NATO casualties will grow. With more dead or wounded soldiers, domestic opinion within NATO will demand troop withdrawals. Should member states capitulate, it is unlikely the United States can pick up the slack. If a shattered or fundamentalist- or warlord-controlled Afghanistan followed, NATO will have failed. That failure might not end the alliance, but it will certainly erode its viability.

Second, nations must live up to promised force commitments for Afghanistan. Transformation must be seriously embraced. NATO forces must become more expeditionary.

Third, NATO needs to build more partnerships as well as work and coordinate more closely with international institutions and NGOs. Reaching out to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Russia, China and four of the "stans") and other groups is one possible step. Considering whether to approach states in Central and South America in PFP like arrangements is another, and no more farfetched than suggesting ten years ago that NATO would be in Afghanistan.

Fourth, a new understanding of transatlanticism-and its implications for the EU-is needed. Perhaps it is time to remove the "N" from NATO, and make it simply the Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Finally, NATO must streamline and update its organization and structure, particularly the supporting committees in Brussels. NATO's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is completing a major study on reorganization. But it must be implemented.

None of these steps is beyond what was implied or stated in the Riga Declaration or the Comprehensive Political Guidance. But pursuing each requires active and dynamic leadership. And only the United States can lead.

The next few years could surpass the last six in disruption and danger. NATO has enormous relevance to this emerging world. It has the means to promote stability and security on a selectively global basis. NATO's track record and flexibility suggest it can respond to these challenges. But will it? That is a central question of this decade.

Harlan Ullman is a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, at the Atlantic Council and a columnist for the Washington Times. His latest book is America's Promise Restored-Preventing Culture, Crusade and Partisanship from Wrecking Our Nation. For the past four years he has served on the Senior Advisory Group for Supreme Allied Commander Europe and European Command. In October 2006 he participated in a SACEUR visit to Afghanistan.

Essay Types: Essay