Alija Ali Izetbegovic, the controversial Bosnian Islamist leader of a largely secularized people, died on Sunday, October 19 th, 2003, in Sarajevo, at the age of seventy-eight. Izetbegovic helped lead an ill-defined entity inhabited by three ethnic groups down a tortured path of war and independence, poverty and conflict and hatred and instability. He brought jihad to Europe while also struggling to found a multiethnic state against the objection of a majority of its projected citizens. Izetbegovic will remain a controversial figure for two related reasons: his Islamic fundamentalism and his unwillingness to abide by an agreement that would have prevented war and secured independence for Bosnia. Each will be examined in turn.
To recall the name of Izetbegovic is to recall that, as Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson wrote in The National Interest 's Fall 1993 issue, the Bosnian civil war he precipitated "occasioned the first significant debate over foreign policy of the post-Cold war period." The authors quickly added that "although the war in Bosnia has aroused such strong emotions and passions, it has not evoked comparable appeals for the sacrifice of blood and treasure. With very few exceptions, those who have called for American intervention have been careful to emphasize the quite modest costs they are willing to pay in intervening. While insistent that the interests at stake in Bosnia are very great, they are equally insistent that these interests be secured at modest cost."
The debate over Bosnia reminds one of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy doctrine of "humanitarian intervention", which argues that war can be waged on primarily humanitarian grounds, even in the absence of a clear and present (and grave and gathering) danger to the United States. As General Charles G. Boyd wrote in the September/October 1995 issue of Foreign Affairs , "the linchpin of the U.S. approach [in Bosnia] has been the under-informed notion that this is a war of good versus evil, of aggressor against aggrieved." Boyd argued that the legitimacy of interests is rarely, if ever, "the special province of only one or two factions", and that failure to recognize this axiom of international relations leads to disaster. Sometimes you have to "make peace with the guilty."
As Paddy Ashdown, the head of the Office of the High Representative that administers Bosnia and Hercegovina, put it in a statement, Izetbegovic "was in a real sense the father of his people. Without him I doubt if Bosnia and Hercegovina would exist today." Indeed, but has the order and stability of post-Cold War Europe increased as a result? Warren Zimmerman, America's last ambassador to Yugoslavia and a strong defender of Izetbegovic and his policies certainly thinks so. Writing in the pages of The National Interest in Fall 1994, he opined that "the time of the nation-state is ending; the time of the successful multi-ethnic state is already here. When that realization sinks in, it will be possible to look at Bosnia, not only as a cautionary tale, but also as an inspiration."
In 1970, Izetbegovic published a book entitled the Islamic Declaration , which led to his imprisonment under Tito on the charge of conspiring to create an Islamic state. This-combined with his wartime record (he was an active member of the S.S.'s Handzar Division, a unit composed of Bosnian jihadists whose primary targets were Bosnia's Jews and Serbs) and his actions before and during the Bosnian civil war (in particular his active acquiescence in the incorporation of mujahedeen units into the army of which he was commander-in-chief, units suspected of perpetrating some of the worst atrocities of an atrocious war)-suggests that Zimmerman's dismissal of Izetbegovic's Islamism and its applicability to the situation in Bosnia is too simplistic, if not inaccurate.
As Yugoslavia was falling apart, Izetbegovic helped to found the Party of Democratic Action (SDA)-a party composed overwhelmingly of Bosnian Muslims-whose slogan was "In Our Land, With Our Faith." This was in 1990, the same year the Islamic Declaration was reprinted in Sarajevo. Famously, the book proclaimed that "there can be no peace or coexistence between the ‘Islamic faith' and non-Islamic societies and political institutions." It argued that in countries where Muslims do not represent a majority of the population, the "Islamic order" could not be "implemented", and that the "Islamic authority […] may turn to violence."
The question of the activities of mujahedeen units in Izetbegovic's wartime army and his complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity is complicated. But some facts continue to weigh heavily in postwar Bosnia. For example, the Third Corps of the Seventh Muslim Mountain Brigade, made up of both fundamentalist Bosnian Muslims and foreigners, together with the Tenth Muslim Brigade, are suspected of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against Croats and Serbs inside Sarajevo during the Serb siege of the city as well as in many towns and villages in central Bosnia throughout the war.
The Sunday Times reported in June 1993 that secular Bosnian Muslim officers had grave reservations about the foreign mujahedeen, many of whom were sent by Al-Qaeda and commanded by Abdelkader Mokhtari, one of Osama bin Laden's top lieutenants. In fact, Bin Laden himself visited Izetbegovic in Sarajevo on at least one occasion during the war, according to the eye-witness account of Renate Flotau, a Der Spiegel reporter. Moreover, he and other senior Al-Qaeda operatives were also issued a Bosnian passport by the Bosnian embassy in Vienna. Colonel Stjepan Siber, then the deputy commander of Izetbegovic's army, argued that the Islamist units are the ones that "commit most of the atrocities […]. They have been killing, looting and stealing."
Izetbegovic served as commander-in-chief of the Army of Bosnia and Hercegovina and was, thus, criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, pursuant to several articles in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Worse yet, he was the honorary commander of the Seventh Muslim Mountain Brigade when it slaughtered Bosnian Serb POWs in the Serb village of Vozuca immediately after it fell on September 11, 1995. The next day, Izetbegovic reviewed his troops, exclaiming, on videotape, "In Vozuca, you have broken the backbone of the Chetnik (i.e. Serb) enemy. You show the way how we can achieve our aim of liberating our country."