Finally, despite the conventional wisdom that Iran has emerged as the greatest beneficiary of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, its position in Iraq is not as strong as assumed. No matter who wins the U.S. elections, American forces will be in Iraq for many years. Iran's leaders do not want Iraq to collapse, for then they would be drawn even deeper into a quagmire. But neither do they want Iraq to become once more a powerful, rich Arab country with close ties to the United States. They are worried that the United States will stay in Iraq with the blessing of most Iraqis and the Sunni Arab world. They are also aware of Iraq's economic potential if it can sort out its oil laws and establish an effective federal system of government. Under these circumstances oil production could soar. The fact that small foreign oil companies, notably from Korea, India and Norway, have a significant presence in Kurdistan is indicative of what could happen to all of Iraq if an agreed oil law is passed by the Iraqi parliament. Iranians are aware that the emergence of a strong Shia-led central government in Baghdad does not necessarily work in their favor. Iraqi Shia will want to benefit from economic growth in the south and will resist efforts by Iran if it plays too heavy a hand. President Ahmadinejad's state visit to Iraq in February 2008, while portrayed by some as a triumph, had downsides. He never got to visit the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala and did not get a photo opportunity with the Grand Ayatollah Sistani, a cleric who commands enormous respect throughout the Shia world.

 

THIS IS not to dismiss the very real threat Iran can bring to the region. What Iran can do is engage in asymmetric warfare and create mayhem for the United States, the Arab countries and Israel with its support for insurgents and terror organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas. If pushed to the limits of its tolerance, Iran could engage in a strategy of attacking Gulf oil infrastructure and blocking access to the Strait of Hormuz, at least for enough time to disrupt world oil markets. But such actions would be suicidal and put at risk Iran's own oil and gas exports and the facilities that produce them. Having the capacity to cause damage may give Iran a strong hand to play in regional geopolitics, but this does not mean it can be a regional hegemon. The more heavy-handed Iranian interference in the Arab world and against Israel, the more it will likely face countervailing challenges from the neighborhood, the United States and maybe at some point NATO forces. The fact that France has agreed to establish a small military base in the UAE, announced during President Sarkozy's visit to the region, is indicative that the United States is not the only external power concerned about Iranian behavior and the need to present the mullahs with a robust military presence in the region.

There remains the serious problem of what to do about Iran's nuclear program. It is clear that Ahmadinejad has a mandate to pursue uranium enrichment and the other vital components of a nuclear infrastructure, including heavy-water production. So long as Iran's leaders continue to insist that the program is for peaceful purposes and that they have no intention of deploying nuclear weapons, the conservative leadership will continue to receive widespread public support on this issue. This means that Iran will continue to develop all the prerequisites for a nuclear force while insisting that it is not violating any commitments. The problem is that all the major foreign intelligence services, including Russia's, believe the Iranians are lying, but each foreign government has a different attitude as to how to deal with the matter. Russia and China currently feel less threatened by the prospects of an Iranian bomb than either the United States or Israel, with the Europeans and the Arab countries somewhere in between.

Iran's leaders will be hesitant to make any compromises on the nuclear program so long as President Bush remains in office. The expectation is that the next American president will have to find a workable formula for talking to the Iranians. This could involve offering the regime more "carrots" if they are prepared to suspend the uranium-enrichment program or place it under international safeguards, but also threatening more "sticks." Short of force, the most effective new "sticks" would be a decision by the European Union to apply the same level of sanctions against Iran that the United States currently has in force. If the EU took this difficult step it would have a psychological and practical impact on Iran's efforts to modernize its economy and would send a stark reminder to Iran that it remains a pariah. In an effort to break out of strategic isolation, Iran's leaders are embarked on a global effort to expand their friendship with foreign countries, but establishing cozy relations with Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, to name but two, points to weakness not strength. Similarly, the notion that Iran has become the anchor for a sinister "Shia Crescent" stretching from Tehran through Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut belies the realities of Middle East politics and the highly complicated nature of Sunni-Shia relations in the Arab world.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to address how the balance of military power would change if Iran continues to develop its nuclear program. Much will depend upon the nature of a future Iranian nuclear-weapons capability. If it remains covert and Iran does not brag about it-even though everyone may assume Iran could assemble a bomb in a matter of months-the consequences will be serious but manageable. If, on the other hand, Iran withdraws from the NPT and goes full throttle toward a deployable nuclear force, perhaps analogous to Pakistan's, the repercussions would be more severe. Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and possibly Turkey could reassess their nonproliferation commitments. In the case of the Saudis it could lead to a Pakistani nuclear presence on the Arabian Peninsula, a development that could hardly make Iran feel stronger or more secure.

 

THE NEXT U.S. administration is likely to face the prospect of living with the mullahs while continuing to challenge them over their most dangerous habits-support for Hezbollah and Hamas, interference in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonization of Israel, and the continued development of a uranium-enrichment and heavy-water program. This will require a nuanced policy that will best be addressed in close cooperation with Europe and with better cooperation from Russia and China. For these reasons it is wise to lower the rhetoric over the Iranian threat while at the same time keeping open the options of negotiating with them if they wish to, or confronting them if they escalate their support of terrorism or break out with a nuclear weapon.

This is not an exciting policy prescription. Many will reject it as too tame, too laid-back. But it reflects the reality that we cannot get rid of the mullahs and that attempts by the United States to directly interfere in Iranian domestic affairs have been counterproductive. Absent some new egregious behavior by Iran, such as a massive attack on U.S. troops in Iraq, the use of force to set back Iran's nuclear program carries huge risks and is unlikely to be considered anytime soon. On the diplomatic front the Bush administration deserves credit for its cooperation with Europe and the UN Security Council in getting sanctions imposed on Iran for its nuclear program. The efforts of the U.S. Treasury to hamper Iran's access to financial markets have had some success. One should not underestimate the capacity of the United States and its allies to make life difficult for the Iranian financial sector as it seeks to develop its woefully underfunded energy infrastructure. The fact that Russia and China have supported three rounds of UN sanctions suggests that the cautious approach, while falling short of stopping Iran's program, sends a message to Iran that it remains under global scrutiny. Such policies should be continued by the next administration with the realization that Iran's potential to be a regional hegemon is limited.

The United States must sustain its presence in the Gulf irrespective of the immediate commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the key Asian powers, especially China, India, Japan and Korea, become more involved in the region, a time will come when the United States will have to decide how long it will remain the policeman and how much responsibility other powers could take on. Undoubtedly the most dramatic event that could change the equation would be the emergence of an Iranian government prepared to work with the United States and its allies to establish a collective-security arrangement in the Gulf. But that day is not on the horizon. In the meantime, the wisest policy is to nurture closer security ties with the Arab Gulf countries and make sure that the inevitable drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq is done prudently.

Essay Types: Essay