A Surprising Calm

Although incomplete, the impressive advances achieved by the United
States and its allies may explain perhaps the biggest surprise since
the September 11 attacks: the absence of another mass casualty attack
involving Americans. In 2002, Al-Qaeda and its allies killed 200
people, 19 of whom were American. But this low American body count
was a close-run thing. Richard Reid, the so-called "shoebomber", was
thwarted from killing hundreds only by an alert stewardess--and by
his own abundant incompetence.

Nevertheless, the predictions of many informed observers (including me)
that another major attack was imminent have proven false. Success may be
due to disruptions of Al-Qaeda's command structure, the
organization's temporary suspension of operations until police and
intelligence pressures let up, or just good fortune. Trumpeting this
success would be foolish, however; for all any of us knows, tomorrow
may witness massive bloodshed. But even a year and a half of only
limited violence--and violence confined to targets overseas--is
clearly a success.

Even the Bali attack of October 2002 and killings of Americans in
Pakistan, Kuwait and Yemen can even be portrayed as a sort of
progress, albeit grim, in the effort against Al-Qaeda. In the past,
Al-Qaeda focused its attacks on symbolic targets linked to the United
States, particularly diplomatic and military facilities. The 1998
attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa and the 2000 attack on U.S.S.
Cole both indicated an adversary that sought to confront American
power head on--and was admired for it. The September 11 attacks were
against notably symbolic targets, and the attackers' daring is
unquestionable. The Bali attack, in contrast, was not the sort of
gesture that draws admiration from potential sympathizers. To all but
the most zealous or deluded, young Australian tourists are a far
lesser foe than American soldiers, diplomats and financiers.
Similarly, the attacks on missionary doctors in Yemen--people who had
devoted their lives to helping poor Yemenis and had gained the
respect of the local community--discredit the militants' cause. The
same may be said of the May 2003 attacks in Riyadh and Casablanca:
low-tech and likely counterproductive overall.

An apt comparison can be made to the 1997 Al-Jama Al-Islamiyya attack
on the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt where 58 tourists and
four Egyptians were murdered. The attack was roundly condemned, not
only by Western governments but by other radical Islamists who viewed
it as discrediting their cause. Support for Al-Jama Al-Islamiyya
plummeted in Egypt. Similarly, the Armed Islamic Group grew so brutal
in its campaign against the Algerian government that it disgusted
many Muslims who sympathized initially with its ideals. These groups
remain active, but their brutality has alienated the people they most
wanted to attract and, over time, has seriously hindered their
efforts.

In any event, the lack of a major attack against Americans so far
should not obscure the fact that Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups
probably remain capable of another major attack. Numerous senior U.S.
officials have publicly and repeatedly warned that the United States
is at risk of another attack from Al-Qaeda, and that this attack
could occur with little warning. They are right.

Losing Hearts, Losing Minds

Although in the short-term the war goes well, the long-term outlook
is more troubling. Al-Qaeda continues to draw numerous recruits
throughout the Middle East and the Islamic world more broadly. The
September 11 attacks built on Al-Qaeda's past successes, making it
clearly the leading anti-American movement in the world. Although it
is difficult to get more than an anecdotal sense of Al-Qaeda's
recruitment, bin Laden himself gloated about his successes in a
videotape shot before the overthrow of the Taliban. A UN report
released in December 2002 also noted that Al-Qaeda continued to
attract recruits and raise money successfully.

Al-Qaeda's worldwide stature as America's number one enemy may have
also allowed it to globalize what were in essence local conflicts.
Before September 11, Al-Qaeda constantly strove to turn local
movements into ones that shared its global anti-U.S. agenda. It had
mixed success. In the future, however, radicals fighting Egypt,
Israel, Russia, China, Algeria and other countries may focus more of
their attention on America. The jihadi movement in general appears
increasingly anti-American in its focus.

Indeed, American successes in shutting down terrorism in Afghanistan
and dispersing Al-Qaeda's fighters may help turn local groups against
the United States. Although organizations like Hamas and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan have no love for the United States, they have
not as of yet actively focused on American targets. This may change.
Al-Qaeda-linked militants, most of whom will enjoy considerable
prestige because of their ties to the group's past glories, may
reshape the local groups they rejoin. In Algeria in the 1990s,
returning fighters from Afghanistan radicalized local groups, and a
similar effect could be felt in Kashmir, Chechnya and among
Palestinians. Given that these groups have recruiting and fundraising
networks in Europe and elsewhere, a shift in targeting by these
organizations could prove very deadly.

Even as Al-Qaeda remains attractive, the United States appears to be
failing to win support in the Muslim world. Polls taken before the
war with Iraq became imminent suggest that the United States is
positively regarded (though not uncritically supported) in all
regions of the world except for the Middle East. In Jordan, Pakistan
and Egypt--all of which have governments that are strongly supportive
of the war on terror--popular dislike of the United States is
particularly intense. In Egypt, the second largest recipient of
American aid, only 6 percent of the population has a favorable
opinion of the United States.

Much-touted U.S. efforts at public diplomacy have so far made little
progress. Indeed, the most egregious and ridiculous conspiracy
theories appear to gain more credence in the Muslim world than do
patient U.S. efforts to gain support for its policies or attempts to
demonstrate "even-handedness" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In
the Arab world in particular, the poverty of alternatives to the
region's authoritarian governments further burnish the Islamists'
credentials to would-be recruits.

More generally, the legitimacy of U.S. power in the world is
suffering, including among the populations of many of our (formerly?)
closest allies. As Robert Satloff contends,

"For nations liberated by America in our parents' lifetime to tell
pollsters they believe . . . that Americans have somehow sacrificed
their moral compass while waging the war on terror bespeaks a
thundering failure to deliver the message of our policies abroad."

Ironically, too, U.S. efforts to fight terrorism have sometimes
fostered rather than diminished anti-U.S. perceptions. Washington's
embrace of sordid governments such as the Karimov regime in
Uzbekistan, its silence regarding Russian brutality in Chechnya and
other distasteful concessions offered to ensure these governments'
cooperation against Al-Qaeda are bolstering claims that the United
States supports the oppression of Muslims and props up brutal
governments.

The U.S.-Iraq conflict, too, is likely to increase hostility among
even moderate Islamists, particularly in the near-term. Richard
Clarke, the senior counter-terrorism official in both the Clinton and
(until recently) the George W. Bush administrations, contends:

"The war as seen on television in Islamic countries has dangerously
increased the level of frustration, anger, and hatred directed at the
United States. It has given radical Islamic terrorists another
target, U.S. personnel in Iraq. The seeds of future terrorism have
been sown."

There is plenty of evidence for this statement. Two moderate
Indonesian clerics (one of whom holds a degree from the University of
Chicago), for example, criticized U.S. policy toward Iraq and
immigration restrictions on Indonesians going to the United States
and refused to attend meetings in Washington. Scholars at Egypt's
Al-Azhar University, the leading institution of Islamic learning in
the Arab world, declared a U.S. attack on Iraq to be a "crusade" and
called for jihad in response. These are not voices in the wilderness,
but rather the core of the Sunni Muslim religious establishment.

Such problems are perhaps inevitable. Although public diplomacy
efforts should be both reviewed and renewed, making progress in a
region where most hearts and minds appear firmly set against America
is exceptionally difficult. At best, perhaps, we can strive for neutrality
or distaste rather than set our sights on a warm embrace. Similarly, when
possible the United States should distance itself from brutal
Middle Eastern regimes--but this is seldom possible and never
uncomplicated. This is because Al-Qaeda cannot be allowed another
sanctuary, or even another permissive environment, which is precisely
what such distancing could produce. Washington should try to make its
allies' own campaigns against their local militants less brutal, and
try to encourage efforts that will gain the goodwill of the
population in general. But the imperative of stopping another attack
will force the United States to embrace some dictators, even knowing
that this may contribute to problems in the long run.

Little Progress on Deterrence

Deterring terrorists is exceptionally difficult even under the best
of circumstances. In general, many terrorists are highly committed
and willing to take considerable personal risks. Potential followers
are easier to dissuade, but even they may be highly motivated.

So far, U.S. successes probably have had little deterrent effect. Bin
Laden and Zawahiri remain alive, defying a worldwide manhunt.
Operations against the West continue, even if they are less dramatic
than those of September 11. The U.S. failure to trap much of the
Al-Qaeda cadre at Tora Bora, and the reluctance to commit American
ground troops in large numbers, have validated for many bin Laden's
rhetoric that Americans are afraid to get their hands dirty in a
fight and will thus collapse if hit hard. The video bin Laden
released on February 11, on the occasion of the Id al-Adha, urging
Iraqis to take up arms against American invaders, also contained
taunts that Americans were cowards in Afghanistan, as they were not
willing to fight hard on the ground. Taken together, these weaknesses
may convince potential recruits and supporters that Al-Qaeda remains
a horse worth wagering on.

Essay Types: Essay